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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State 97 TELEGRAPH BRANCH 24-D SEORET Action Control: 403 Rec'd: May 1, 1951 UNA FROM: New York 7:25 p.m. Info TO: Secretary of State SS G NO: 1470, May 1, 6:27 p.m. E P L PRIORITY EUR NEA Re: AMC ARA FE At Jebb's request Ross and Hyde met with him and Lacoste to DCR hear UK instructions. Ross stated Gross would handle item at May 3 meeting, returning from leave May 2. Jebb emphasized the great importance which the UK attaches to a declaration of UN aims in Korea "to which all would subscribe" UK feels this is directly tied up with question of any report from AMC to GA political comite. UK would not be prepared to vote for any selective embargo report by AMC to political comite unless and until such a declaration were issued. He understands US opposes a declaration during a CHICOM offensive and did not dissent from this view but noted offensive now seems blunted. He suggested one main objection to US plan for selective embargo is idea of vague formula with each state deciding what falls within it. He suggested general debate in AMC or sub-comite looking toward a short specific list of items to be embargoed. Developing in detail, US formula is too vague and subject to objection by Asians. It could be clarified by debate. Hence US as sponsor would have to give COCOM List One in disguised form. He suggested therefore putting in COCOM List One at out- set as basis for short list comprising items clearly having direct relation to war effort. This would avoid later diffi- culties for members in reporting UK would have difficulty reporting under US formula because some export controls now in effect are to implement UK currency and supply policy as distinct from Korean policy. Hence US formula would create UK operating problem under COCOM List Two providing quantitive controls. Lacoste agreed that a short itemized list is far preferable to US formula. Fact to be kept secret is restriction on exports to Soviet bloc. If short list were used UK would justify denial of ex- ports to Soviet bloc on theory these exports might have as ultimate destination PRC. India (possibly other Commonwealth countries) presents special problem, and UK would have strong objection to withdrawing open general license to a commonwealth member. UK would REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED SECRET