Memorandum of Conversation with Hume Wrong, John D. Hickerson, and Ward Allen

NLT (KOREA/SO, 537 DelR DEPARTMENT OF STATE TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Memorandum of Conversation DATE: December 6, 1951 SUBJECT: Korean Armistice PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Wrong, Canada Mr. Hickerson - UNA Mr. Ward Allen - EUR DECLASSIFIED COPIES TO: C - Mr. Bohlen - Mr. Matthews Fleus 1951 Vol. G Authority UNA - Mr. Hickerson EUR - Mr. Bonbright By DEB NLT Date 3-5-85 FE - Mr. Johnson GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1 Ambassador Wrong had been requested by Foreign Minister Pearson from Paris to obtain clarification of US views on certain aspects of the proposed declaration to be issued in the event of an armistice and the courses of action to be followed in the event of a violation. The UK have given Canada (as well as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) copies of Foreign Minister Eden's telegram to Churchill reporting on the Acheson-Eden meeting in Rome November 27, and Mr. Churchill's reply to Eden. Based on these, Mr. Pearson raised the following points: 1. Consultation: He feels that Canada should have been consulted by the US directly before now and not be expected to obtain its information solely through the British. He feared that without direct consultations Canada "might be confronted with US-UK agreement and be asked to accept it unaltered or without sufficient time for consideration." Ambassador Wrong suggested it would therefore be tactful and desirable that the Department keep him informed. Mr. Pearson had suggested using the Washington liaison arrangements of those countries fighting in Korea for a general discussion of the future courses of action. However, Ambassador Wrong readily agreed with Mr. Hickerson's view that this was not the appropriate procedure, and in response to Ambassador Wrong's request Mr. Hickerson assured him that we would discuss the matter with Canada directly. Mr. Hickerson, however, indicated our concern that the UK had at this juncture brought in all four senior Commonwealth members since we did not yet want to consult widely and were worried about French reaction if they should discover that they had not been consulted as early as the UK and the Commonwealth. 042903 "TOP SECRET 6