Telegram from John Muccio to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State RE TELEGRAPH BRANCH 15-H-X DVaA SECURITY INFORMATION Action Control: 2676 FE Rec'd: FROM: Pusan June 6, 1952 Info 1:30 p.m. SS TO: Secretary of State G EUR NO: 1301, June 6, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF THREE). UNA USUN OLI NTACT CIA ARMY RPTD INFO CINCUNC, EUSAK ADVANCE, DEPUTY CONDR EUSAK, 2 LOG AIR COMD CG UNCACK DIP 288 BY OTHER MEANS. NAVY P I. Conferred with Gen Clark and Amb Murphy in Tokyo yesterday I afternoon and with Gen Van Fleet in Seoul this morning; also DCR with Plimsoll (chairman, UNCURK) and my staff this noon. DCRM Have just had two hours with Rhee in which I took up points outlined DEPTEL 907, June 4 (rpts Tokyo 400). Summary in nutshell was: Please be patient a little longer and all will work cut for the best. In addition taking up eight numbered points in ref tel, I made three additional points concerning (1) lifting martial law and releasing Assemblymen (2) necessity composing differences with opponents if vital support in UN for Korean operations to be maintained, and (3) inability to avoid publicity on US attitude or. account pressure from Congress and press unless satisfactory actions taken immed. I also stressed he shidn't get idea already being expressed certain circles in Pusan that US Govt, Embassy and UNC URK taking sides as between individuals or groups, that US wants to support him and stands ready help him resolve differences if this can be done, as I was sure was still possible, in way which will reassure foreign govts that the constitutional process was being preserved. In short, I said we are not (rpt not) questioning his objectives so much as the tactics employed which were repugnant to us. Rhee replied: When tactics interfere with objectives, it throws a different light on tactics. He went on that he was sorry about Pres Truman's concern and foreign reactions generally. of course, Korea was dependent on foreign aid and as recipient was grateful for whatever the US and other govts made available. However, issues were so important that they had to be resolved and he could not (rpt not) help it if the donors shld decide to offer less than they had in the past. He said to tell Pres Truman that he did not (rpt not) want to do anything which wld appear ungrateful for all the Presi- dent's help to Korea but that the President shld trust him b and be patient SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED