Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, John M. Chang, Myo-Mook Lee, Taik Sang Chang, David Key, and Ruth Bacon

CONFIDENTIAL US/A/C.I/2503 November 23, 1951 DECLASSIFIED UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE SIXTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY Authority FRUS 1951 VM (in 1150 Memorandum of Conversation By DEBNLT Date 3-18-85 November 19, 1951 SUBJECT: Korean Resolution and Allied Questions PARTICIPANTS: Secretary of State John M. Chang, Prime Minister of Korea Dr. Myo-Mook Lee, Korean Minister to London Mr. Taik Sang Chang, Vice Chairman Korean Assembly Ambassador David Key Miss Ruth Bacon Mr. John M. Chang, Prime Minister of Korea, accompanied by Dr. Myo-Mook Lee and Mr. Taik Sang Chang called by appointment on the Secretary at 6:15 p.m. today. After referring to a recent report received by the U. N. that the cease-fire negotiations were making good progress and remarking that an armistice might, therefore, not be far distant, Mr. Chang observed that the Korean people would be bitterly dis- appointed if, after all the sacrifices which they have made and the suffering which they have undergone, a political settlement is arrived at which would still leave Korea divided and which would expose South Korea to the same threats and dangers which have existed since 1945. He felt that any such settlement would be tantamount to a defeat and suggested that, since the Communists respected only force, it was essential that the U. N. forces advance farther northwards, not so far as the Yalu perhaps, but at least considerably to the north of the present fighting front, some of which lies to the south of the 38th parallel and exposes Seoul to danger. Mr. Chang expressed the opinion that unless such a military advance were made, the U. N.'s negotiating position would be so weak as to hold out virtually no hope for the unification of Korea. In fact, he did not see how a sat- isfactory political settlement could be expected if an armistice were concluded on the basis of the present front in Korea. The Secretary assured Mr. Chang that the unification of Korea was an objective which the United States unreservedly sup- ported, and we must continue to "keep plugging at it". While he did not underestimate the difficulties of overcoming com- munist objections, he hoped that through the U. N. and through realization of the growing military strength of the democratic states, the Communists would agree to Korean unification as part of a general political settlement. Whether and if SO when the Communists were prepared to enter into a general settlement was a decision which rested largely in their hands. With respect to the present armistice negotiations and Mr. Chang's suggestion that the U. N. military forces seek to advance farther up the peninsula, the Secretary pointed out that these were primarily military questions concerning which we must look to General Ridgway for advice and äbide largely by his views. General Ridgway strongly favored an armistice based on the present front which he felt was the strongest and most advantageous position for the U. N. forces from a military viewpoint. General Ridgway, moreover, was opposed to any further advance northwards, since this would lengthen the U. N. supply lines, shorten the Communist supply lines 1098 CONFIDENTIAL