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Was INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State RE 16-14-X TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Action Control: VR-585 Rec'd: November 9, 1952 NEA FROM: New Delhi 11:25 a.m. Info TO: Secretary of State SS G NO: 1960, November 8, 4 p.m. EUR FE UNA Ref EMBTEL 1796, Oct 29. Deputy British High Commissioner informed us today in strictest confidence of further conversation Oct 31 between Indian Ambassador Raghavan and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai in Peiping. Indian Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru had given information to British High Commissioner recently on top-secret basis and had added it was being given to no (rpt no) other government at that time Deputy British High Commissioner requested our knowledge of information be not (rpt not) in any way made known to Indians or others; otherwise source will dry up and any influence GOI may have with Chinese Communists may be seriously prejudiced. We agreed receive information on this basis. Deputy British High Commissioner first reviewed substance conversation between Indian Ambassador and Chinese Foreign Minister on October 18 which appears to be that touched upon in EMBTEL 1796. At that time Chinese Foreign Minister had indulged in recriminations against UN and particularly US for approximately one hour after which he outlined current Chinese views on truce proposals at Panmunjom. He stated all three proposals are unacceptable because all of them are based on forcible detention. He said in extremely vague terms that his government concluded that so-called "Chiang Kai-shek" agents are not, in effect, genuine Chiang Kai-shek agents. Chinese POWs would want to return home if they were in real neutral camp. Chinese Foreign Minister advanced three points: 1. Repatriation of all POWs after armistice; 2. Specific method and procedure open to discussion; 3. Principle of no (rpt no) forced repatriation permeates all three UN proposals and as such they are unacceptable because POWs are under forcible military control. In spite of Chinese belief on these three points, Chinese have accepted reasonable elements in three UN proposals regarding method and procedure. However, screening in demilitarization zone is completely unacceptable. US side broke off Panmunjom negotiations not (rpt REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS -94 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION PROHIBITED 16-67338-1 GPO 97

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Media ID
c7a3b56ac2a631c2
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Document data

ID
519787482
Core
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Type
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Page context
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    "ocrText": "Was\nINCOMING TELEGRAM\nDepartment of State\nRE\n16-14-X\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION\nAction\nControl: VR-585\nRec'd: November 9, 1952\nNEA\nFROM: New Delhi\n11:25 a.m.\nInfo\nTO: Secretary of State\nSS\nG\nNO: 1960, November 8, 4 p.m.\nEUR\nFE\nUNA\nRef EMBTEL 1796, Oct 29.\nDeputy British High Commissioner informed us today in strictest\nconfidence of further conversation Oct 31 between Indian\nAmbassador Raghavan and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai\nin Peiping. Indian Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru had given\ninformation to British High Commissioner recently on top-secret\nbasis and had added it was being given to no (rpt no) other\ngovernment at that time Deputy British High Commissioner\nrequested our knowledge of information be not (rpt not) in any way\nmade known to Indians or others; otherwise source will dry up\nand any influence GOI may have with Chinese Communists may be\nseriously prejudiced. We agreed receive information on this\nbasis.\nDeputy British High Commissioner first reviewed substance\nconversation between Indian Ambassador and Chinese Foreign\nMinister on October 18 which appears to be that touched upon\nin EMBTEL 1796. At that time Chinese Foreign Minister had\nindulged in recriminations against UN and particularly US for\napproximately one hour after which he outlined current Chinese\nviews on truce proposals at Panmunjom. He stated all three\nproposals are unacceptable because all of them are based on\nforcible detention. He said in extremely vague terms that his\ngovernment concluded that so-called \"Chiang Kai-shek\" agents\nare not, in effect, genuine Chiang Kai-shek agents. Chinese\nPOWs would want to return home if they were in real neutral\ncamp.\nChinese Foreign Minister advanced three points:\n1. Repatriation of all POWs after armistice;\n2. Specific method and procedure open to discussion;\n3. Principle of no (rpt no) forced repatriation permeates all\nthree UN proposals and as such they are unacceptable because\nPOWs are under forcible military control. In spite of Chinese\nbelief on these three points, Chinese have accepted reasonable\nelements in three UN proposals regarding method and procedure.\nHowever, screening in demilitarization zone is completely\nunacceptable. US side broke off Panmunjom negotiations not\n(rpt\nREPRODUCTION FROM THIS\nCOPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS\n-94\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION\nPROHIBITED\n16-67338-1\nGPO 97"
}