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INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
RE
16-14-X
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Action
Control: VR-585
Rec'd: November 9, 1952
NEA
FROM: New Delhi
11:25 a.m.
Info
TO: Secretary of State
SS
G
NO: 1960, November 8, 4 p.m.
EUR
FE
UNA
Ref EMBTEL 1796, Oct 29.
Deputy British High Commissioner informed us today in strictest
confidence of further conversation Oct 31 between Indian
Ambassador Raghavan and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai
in Peiping. Indian Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru had given
information to British High Commissioner recently on top-secret
basis and had added it was being given to no (rpt no) other
government at that time Deputy British High Commissioner
requested our knowledge of information be not (rpt not) in any way
made known to Indians or others; otherwise source will dry up
and any influence GOI may have with Chinese Communists may be
seriously prejudiced. We agreed receive information on this
basis.
Deputy British High Commissioner first reviewed substance
conversation between Indian Ambassador and Chinese Foreign
Minister on October 18 which appears to be that touched upon
in EMBTEL 1796. At that time Chinese Foreign Minister had
indulged in recriminations against UN and particularly US for
approximately one hour after which he outlined current Chinese
views on truce proposals at Panmunjom. He stated all three
proposals are unacceptable because all of them are based on
forcible detention. He said in extremely vague terms that his
government concluded that so-called "Chiang Kai-shek" agents
are not, in effect, genuine Chiang Kai-shek agents. Chinese
POWs would want to return home if they were in real neutral
camp.
Chinese Foreign Minister advanced three points:
1. Repatriation of all POWs after armistice;
2. Specific method and procedure open to discussion;
3. Principle of no (rpt no) forced repatriation permeates all
three UN proposals and as such they are unacceptable because
POWs are under forcible military control. In spite of Chinese
belief on these three points, Chinese have accepted reasonable
elements in three UN proposals regarding method and procedure.
However, screening in demilitarization zone is completely
unacceptable. US side broke off Panmunjom negotiations not
(rpt
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
-94
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
PROHIBITED
16-67338-1
GPO 97
Page data
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Document data
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- Core
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- Type
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DTO data
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Context sent to Scholar
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Document source metadata
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Page context
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"ocrText": "Was\nINCOMING TELEGRAM\nDepartment of State\nRE\n16-14-X\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION\nAction\nControl: VR-585\nRec'd: November 9, 1952\nNEA\nFROM: New Delhi\n11:25 a.m.\nInfo\nTO: Secretary of State\nSS\nG\nNO: 1960, November 8, 4 p.m.\nEUR\nFE\nUNA\nRef EMBTEL 1796, Oct 29.\nDeputy British High Commissioner informed us today in strictest\nconfidence of further conversation Oct 31 between Indian\nAmbassador Raghavan and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai\nin Peiping. Indian Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru had given\ninformation to British High Commissioner recently on top-secret\nbasis and had added it was being given to no (rpt no) other\ngovernment at that time Deputy British High Commissioner\nrequested our knowledge of information be not (rpt not) in any way\nmade known to Indians or others; otherwise source will dry up\nand any influence GOI may have with Chinese Communists may be\nseriously prejudiced. We agreed receive information on this\nbasis.\nDeputy British High Commissioner first reviewed substance\nconversation between Indian Ambassador and Chinese Foreign\nMinister on October 18 which appears to be that touched upon\nin EMBTEL 1796. At that time Chinese Foreign Minister had\nindulged in recriminations against UN and particularly US for\napproximately one hour after which he outlined current Chinese\nviews on truce proposals at Panmunjom. He stated all three\nproposals are unacceptable because all of them are based on\nforcible detention. He said in extremely vague terms that his\ngovernment concluded that so-called \"Chiang Kai-shek\" agents\nare not, in effect, genuine Chiang Kai-shek agents. Chinese\nPOWs would want to return home if they were in real neutral\ncamp.\nChinese Foreign Minister advanced three points:\n1. Repatriation of all POWs after armistice;\n2. Specific method and procedure open to discussion;\n3. Principle of no (rpt no) forced repatriation permeates all\nthree UN proposals and as such they are unacceptable because\nPOWs are under forcible military control. In spite of Chinese\nbelief on these three points, Chinese have accepted reasonable\nelements in three UN proposals regarding method and procedure.\nHowever, screening in demilitarization zone is completely\nunacceptable. US side broke off Panmunjom negotiations not\n(rpt\nREPRODUCTION FROM THIS\nCOPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS\n-94\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION\nPROHIBITED\n16-67338-1\nGPO 97"
}