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Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

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  • Parte de Records of the Naval Aide to the President (Truman Administration), State Department Briefs Files

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 May 1, 1952 By DEB NLT, Date 7-26-85 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS SOVIET NOTE We have informed Embassy London that we do not feel that the present draft reply to the Soviets which is being considered by the tripartite representatives in London is satisfactory, and we have suggested that the drafting problem will be simplified if we can first reach agreement on certain principles to govern the reply, namely the following four: 1) We should present the policy of European integration strongly and positively, but in so doing we should be careful not to present it as a policy which the three Powers have formulated and are insisting upon, but rather as a policy of the Federal Republic and other European countries which we, the US and the UK, support. (This presents some drafting problems since the French relationship to this policy is somewhat different from ours, through its participation in the EDC, but we believe this point is important in order to counteract a tendency among some Ger - mans to feel that we are forcing Germany down a path of our choosing.) 2) We should (not discuss any treaty provisions except as may be necessary in order to maintain positions already taken. We should omit all reference to questions of national armed forces, boundaries, of even the status of the German Government, since any of this would de- - tract from our first, essential condition, i.e. investigation of conditions for free elections. 3) With regard to unification we should seek to center the discussion on essential first steps and insofar as possible to pin the Soviets down to them. 4) Since four-power talks of some sort are probably necessary, it is desirable to take the initiative in proposing them in order to convince the Germans that we mean business and are not afraid to talk. Our initiative would also allow us to control the level, substance and timing of the talks - - the timing to be after the signature of the EDC treaty and the Contractual Agreement, but early in the ratification period. We have also submitted a draft of our own for con- sideration by the London representatives which embodies the above principles. SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION