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OCR Page 1 of 3the
NLT(Naual Aidel355
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
Guidelines, March 6, 1982
State Dept. DEB NLT, Date 7-26-85
May 21, 1952
By.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
Embassy London reports that Mr. Eden saw Egyptian Ambassador
Amr yesterday morning. Although Embassy London did not
immediately receive a detailed report of the conversation Embassy Cairo
has transmitted the text of the Egyptian "reply" to the latest British pro- -
posals to the Egyptians which Amr was to have handed Mr. Eden at their
meeting yesterday. The reply is couched in restrained terms but it
insists on recognition of Farouk as King of the Sudan.
It makes the following points: 1) Unity of Egypt and the Sudan
cannot be made dependent on recognition of the Kingts title since unity is
the origin of the King's title and the Kingts present title has introduced
nothing new in the situation; 2) the British alternative to unity is given in
vague terms as "any other status for the Sudan", and this might imply some
scheme different to the avowed aims of the Sudanese, both unionists and
separatists; 3) British recognition of the Egyptian Kingts title during an
interim period while the Sudanese are consulted is unacceptable because the
British did not have the right to make unilateral pledges of self-government
to the Sudanese; 4) It is contradictory to invite Egypt now to participate in
the consultation of the Sudanese because the British have done their utmost
to exclude Egypt from the Sudan ever since 1899 and consequently it would
be impossible for the Sudanese to express their will freely under the
present regime.
Amr also handed Eden the texts of three formulas on the Sudan
which would be acceptable to the Egyptian Government. These all speak of
unity between Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown; the first states
that the Sudanese "shall have the right to decide their future status" the
second says that the joint policy will have for its essential objectives "'to
assure the well -being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests
and their active preparation for self-government and consequently the
exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan", and the
third says that "the Sudanese shall have the right freely to decide their
future status"1.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION