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OCR Page 1 of 2The
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
June 20, 1952
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
7-29-85
By DEB NLT, Date SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
SOVIET NOTE
The French and British Ambassadors called on Secretary
Acheson yesterday afternoon to discuss a reply to the
latest Soviet note on Germany. Ambassador Bonnet summarized the pro-
gression in the French position but emphasized that his government con-
tinues to insist that the proposal for a four -power meeting must include
the question of elections and the interim status of/all-German government
and not be confined to the composition and functions of a commission of
investigation as proposed in the last US draft. However, the French are
now willing to accept a British proposal that the offer to discuss an all-
German government be made conditional upon prior four-power agreement
in discussions concerning elections. Ambassador Franks noted that the
French and British positions had moved toward agreement and inquired as
to the present US position.
Secretary Acheson stated that the issue was one of the
very greatest importance and not one of a mere preference for language.
If a note were sent as proposed by the French and British we would be
committed to a meeting involving discussion of the interim status of an
all-German government and this would undermine Chancellor Adenauer and
sabotage his plans for ratification of the contractual agreements and the
EDC treaty. This was not merely our estimate of the German situation but
was also the emphatic statement of Adenauer, who is the best judge of
German opinion. The Secretary pointed out that our immediate problem is
to aid Adenauer to secure ratifica tion and after that we can take care of
public opinion problems in France and other countries which will confront
parliamentary action later. He stressed the importance of timing and
emphasized that under the US proposal there could be meetings with the
Soviets but only at a later time.
Both Ambassadors said they would report fully although
Bonnet indicated he had no hope his government could agree. It was under- -
stood that a further tripartite meeting would take place when the two Em- -
bassies had received further instructions. Secretary Acheson's suggestion
that the matter might have to be discussed by the three Foreign Ministers
in London evoked from both Bonnet and Franks the hope that agreement
could be reached in Washington.
SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION