Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date 9-10-8 E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, July 22, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN: Although the National Front Deputies called off a demonstration scheduled for yesterday, popular uprising in Tehran and certain other cities assumed a revolutionary flavor; the anti-foreign, pro-Mosadeq movement developed into an anti-Shah as well as an anti-Qavam attitude, Our Ambassador ad- vised that this growing opposition to the Shah, taking into considera- tion the Shah's character and his refusal to grant Qavam the operating powers he needed to survive, made Qavam's resignation inevitable. The Shah interpreted these public manifestations as indicating that popular opinion was against Qavam and held protracted conferences with National Front leaders in an effort to secure a compromise which would be agreeable to the National Front and to the many other members of the Majlis. The Minister of Court Ala advised that the Shah had assured National Front leaders he would approve no Prime Minister unacceptable to them. By late afternoon the Shah accepted Qavam's resigna- tion and the Majlis was called into session to give an inclination vote for a new Prime Minister. Of the 64 present, 61 voted for Mosadeq and two abstained. A royal decree was issued appointing Mosadeq Prime Minister and radio Tehran has announced that, "all officials were instructed to prevent the departure of Qavam from the country. His departure was subject to permission of the present government. He is believed to intend to leave country.' Our Ambassador reports that after weighing develop- ments in Iran and public reaction thereto during the past four days it seems clear that the resignation of Qavam and the triumph of the National Front was due to two factors; 1) the refusal of the Shah to grant powers to Qavam sufficient to maintain order and 2) the resultant government impotency which was seized upon by the National Front organization to play on the popular fear that return of Qavam meant also return to foreign domination of Iran. Admittedly the prestige of Mosadeq had materially declined by the time of his resignation. For the first twenty-four hours it had appeared that Qavam would succeed but the National Front, quickly realizing he had not received SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION