Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

his OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 1982 WASHINGTON State DEB Dept. Guidelines, NLT, Date March 9-10-85 6, August 12, 1952 By SEGRET SECURITY INFORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS BERLIN: In view of various recent developments which may portend a reimposition full or partial -- of the Berlin blockade, we have decided that we must take certain steps to meet the situation. The Department has studied Ambassador Kennan's suggestions of last week for an approach to the Soviets (see the August 8th summary) and we have authorized our High Commissioner to discuss such an approach with his British and French colleagues, unless he sees strong reasons to the contrary. We have suggested several modifications to the draft message to the Soviets as sketched by Ambassador Kennan in an effort to keep it more general in nature. If the British and French should not agree on the lines of our approach, or if there are other developments meanwhile concerning the bridge across the Elbe River, we will of course reconsider the tenor of our approach. We are studying possible retaliatory measures and we believe that action against East German barges in West Berlin and in the Federal Republic still offer the most effective countermeasures, assuming (in the case of Berlin) that the new by-pass canal will not be fully operative for some time. EGYPT: Further straws in the wind as to the general direction of the new government in Egypt are being examined with great interest by our Embassy in Cairo. Yesterday morning two colonels of General Naguib's entourage asked to see Ambassador Caffery, who has given the following account of their exchange: The colonels said that Egypt is a "weak nation and needs a strong friend" they would like the US for a friend. Caffery replied sympathetically but remarked that at this juncture our attitude was necessarily one of watchful waiting. Caffery congratulated them on the maintenance of order and the avoidance of violence and bloodshed during the coup. The colonels made the usual criticisms of the British and said they didn't want to deal with them. Caffery endeavored to explain to them that this was impossible and he outlined the essential part the British would have to play in Middle Eastern defense. Caffery told them he had heard they had released 114 detained communists. They replied that the number was exaggerated and only 84 had been released, a further 30 were "hard-core" Communists and would remain under detention. Caffery lectured them on Communist dangers and they gave him "adequate assurances". The colonels said that they do not SEGRET SECURITY INFORMA TION