Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT Naval Aide) 392 OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE the E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-1085 September 10, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS TRYGVE LIE'S Prior to Mr. Lie's departure for Europe to TRIP TO EUROPE: discuss the Korean situation with Eden and Schuman, our mission at the UN stressed to Lie that he should avoid any implication to the British and French that he is in any way acting as an agent of the US. Also, US strongly believes additional measures should be taken by the forthcoming GA rela- tive to allied support of the Korean effort. We consider General Assembly recommendations for additional measures thoroughly warranted since they would more nearly equalize the burden borne by the US and other members and are a matter of simple equity to the US people. We feel GA failure to take action signalizing UN intention to persevere in and strengthen resistance to Communist aggression in Korea would redouble Communist intransigence and hamper armistice negotiations and that it is possible that additional political and economic measures of the type we envisage might tip the delicate balance of forces motivating the Communists so as to induce them to reach agreement at Panmunjom. We are as eager as we have ever been to obtain additional UN forces for Korea, would welcome anything Lie could do to obtain such forces but doubt whether either France or UK is in a position to effect greater contributions. Emphasis might appropriately be placed on obtaining forces from countries which have not yet made mili- tary contributions. Upon being informed of the foregoing, Mr. Lie expressed major concern that the UN would suffer greatly unless some positive and affirmative UN action" is taken. He believes that unless there are increased troop contributions and possibly other measures as well, the Communists "would have won the second round" and neither US public opinion would tolerate such a result nor would the UN survive it. He wishes to impress upon Eden and Pearson, both of whom he will see in London on September 11, the importance of UK and Canadian Governments taking the initiative to contribute or obtain 20 or 30,000 additional troops and to drop any idea that the UN should "sit by and see what happens.' TOP SECRET SECURITY INEORMATION