Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NETCHANAL Aidel404 OFFICE OF 12065, Sec. 3-402 1982HE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. Guidelines, March 9-10-8 6, WASHINGTON State By DEB Dept. NLT, Date October 6, 1952 TOP SEGRET SECURITY INF ORMATION P SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS DENMARK Ambassador Anderson has reported from Copenhagen that the Danish Government has conferred with the chairmen of all the Danish parliamentary parties except the Communist concerning the strategy to be employed in handling the recent Soviet note. All the party chairmen were in agreement that this note, protesting against Atlantic Pact bases in Denmark, should not be answered for at least a month. Ambassador Anderson's informant stressed that the party chairmen and the government were united in an attitude of firmness and calmness and had no intention whatsoever of yielding to Soviet demands. Meanwhile, Ambassador Kennan has commented from Geneva that the Soviet note to Denmark should not be completely written off as an idle attempt at brow-beating the Danes. Kennan feels that the Soviets might have assumed, when they agreed to evacuate Bornholm after the second world war, that Denmark would remain in effect a demilitarized and neutralized state. If, as is probable, the Soviets are unconvinced of the defensive nature of the NATO bases, Kennan believes it to be not impossible that they should at some stage decide to re- occupy Bornholm. He therefore suggests that the Kremlin's assertions that NATO is aggressive should be firmly and directly met with a strong exposition of the purpose and rationale of NATO and a demand that the Soviets explain and prove their charges of NATO'S aggressive intent. IRAN Iranian Prime Minister Mosadeq yesterday received Secretary Acheson's reply on behalf of the President with what appeared to Ambassador Henderson to be a considerable degree of apprehension. Although Mosadeq said that he appreciated the clarification provided by this note from the United States, he ex- pressed doubt that the clarification would entirely eradicate the bad impression that the joint US-UK message had previously made in Iran. While he did not question the President's good faith, he felt that the earlier message had not been helpful. What he needed, he said, was forty-nine million pounds and he remarked, in a quasi- humorous vein, that he regretted the United States had persuaded the British not to give it to him. Ambassador Henderson reports that Mosadeq was obviously very worried, professing his bewilderment and skepticism as to British intentions. P.SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION