Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(NAVAL AIDE) 423 the OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DED NLT, Date 9-10-85 November 6, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATTON SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS THE SAAR When asked by our High Commissioner in Germany if there had been any new developments in connection with the Saar problem, Chancellor Adenauer described the new Saar election law as "a mockery of democracy" and as an instrument which violates every rule of free elections. He referred specifically to the eligibility of voters and regulations governing the election campaign. The West German leader also referred to a report that the budget of the French Embassy in the Saar amounted to 137 million marks or its equivalent in francs, adding that 30 million marks would be allocated for propaganda purposes and that only 12 percent of the total budget would come from France and the remainder from the Saar. Adenauer said reports of forthcoming conversations between the French High Commission in Germany and himself were incorrect, saying he would not resume talks with the French until Foreign Minister Schuman replies to his letter of October 16 on the future status of the Saar. IRAN In a general discussion with Ambassador Henderson, Prime Minister Mosadeq said he hoped the US Govern- ment and public realized the US was more than ever responsible for the future of Iran now that relations had been broken with the UK. The US by assuming a passive attitude regarding Iran at this juncture would be just as much responsible for the country's collapse and loss of independence as if we were frankly hostile. Mosadeq said he saw five alternatives for Iran: 1) Reaching agreement with the UK so that oil could flow again, a possibility for which he saw little immediate chance. 2) The purchase of Iranian oil by the US and other countries, the eventuality on which he was placing the most hope. 3) Receipt of substantial financial and economic aid from abroad. Mosadeq said he would prefer either of the first solutions and was not asking the US for this kind of aid. 4) Balancing the Iranian budget by discharg- ing thousands of civil servants, sharply reducing the army, stopping all economic development and other capital expenditures and by im- posing stiff taxes. This alternative which would, in his view, aid the Communists and be dangerous for Iran. 5) Letting the financial and economic situation drift into national bankruptcy and chaos, which SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION