Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT/NAUAR AIDE) 441 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State By Dept. DCB NLT, Date 9-11-8 E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 December 11, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA Embassy London reports the British Mission in Peiping telegraphed the UK Foreign Office that up to December 6 there had appeared no independent Chinese press comment on the Indian resolution on the Korean armistice negotiations. The press had confined itself to reproduction of the Tass comment and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky's speech before the General Assembly. The Foreign Office notes that neither Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's statement nor the Peiping press had specifically mentioned the Indian resolution. The British draw the inference that the Chinese Communist reaction to the resolution does not begin to be as wholly negative as the Soviets would have the UN believe. The Foreign Office was gratified that all but the Chinese Nationalists and the Soviet bloc were able to support the Indian resolution and especially that the Asian-Arab bloc lined up with the West. Rejection of the resolution by the USSR and the Chinese Communists cannot help but bring home to them the unreasonableness and intransigence of the Communist position, the effect of which may well extend far beyond the Korean issue. The Foreign Office reasons that the Indian resolution was probably primarily the work of Nehru himself, and that the strategy and even the immediate tactics employed by the Indian delegate, Menon, were under the immediate supervision and direction of the Prime Minister. US-UK FRENCH The British Embassy has informed us that TALKS Foreign Secretary Eden believes the UK and US should not renege on the understanding to hold tripartite meetings with the French at the time of the Paris NATO sessions. Eden believes tripartite talks would provide an opportunity to: 1) find out the real French desires on Indochina; 2) get French agreement on the Mediterranean command; and, 3) encourage a settlement on the Saar issue. He also thinks other questions raised by the French, including problems connected with TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION