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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT/NAVAL AIDE) 449
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
State By DEB NLT, Date 9-11-85
Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
E.O. 12065,
WASHINGTON
December 23, 1952
TOP SECRET SECURITY IIVFORIMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
INDIA
Ambassador Bowles has reported his first general
discussions with Prime Minister Nehru since
immediately after UN action on the Indian resolution.
In analyzing subsequent developments, Nehru recalled
that while there had been no commitment Chou En-lai had definitely
given the Indian Ambassador at Peiping the clear impression that
China would go along with the Indian compromise resolution. More
than that, the Indians had been encouraged by the fact that the Soviet
representatives in New York had not turned down the Indian proposal
in early talks. Nehru stated that Ambassador Raghavan was convinced
that Chou En-lai had been overruled and that his position had now
deteriorated. Nehru said that it was obvious that the Soviets had
applied vigorous pressure and that he believed Chou En-lai was
prepared to resist this pressure but that his associates including
Mao Tse-tung had overruled him.
In commenting on the Soviet charges of Indian in- -
sincerity in seeking peace in Korea and of simply playing the American
game, Nehru said if was difficult for him to understand Communist
methods, which left no room for a reasonable approach to any
question, but that following Vishinsky's attack Malik had gone out of
his way at the UN to ease the position of the Indian delegates and that
friendly gestures had been made to the Indian Ambassador at Moscow.
This led Nehru to believe the Soviets still wished to avoid a break
with India.
Nehru stated he understood clearly our concern over
the military danger from the Soviets and that he realized we could
not allow a vacuum in Europe; that he did not expect any modification
of Soviet viewpoint and was convinced that the only hope of avoiding
a disasterous world war was through the easing of the present close
relationship between the Chinese and the Soviets. He admitted that
TOP SECRET SECURITY