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OCR Page 1 of 2N
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
March 27, 1951
By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-85 ECRET
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
FOUR-POWER
No meeting was held on Monday. Ambassa-
EXPLORATORY TALKS
dor Jessup reports he has been trying to
explore possible new approaches to agenda
which might get meetings off dead center. Jessup feels that a completely
new approach might give us a propaganda advantage and, at any rate,
something new to bargain with.
KOREA
Sir Benegal Rau called on our deputy UN
delegate, Mr. Gross, in New York to discuss
the tactical crossing of the 38th Parallel. He said a certain Asian delega- -
tion had suggested that now was an appropriate time for an Asian appeal to
the UN not to let its forces cross the 38th Parallel. Rau said he was pre- -
senting this idea to us, not as a suggestion, but to get a US reaction before
communicating it to his Government. He said he thought that the concept
of his unnamed Asian colleague was based partly on the fact that the 38th
Parallel question is no longer academic and partly on General MacArthur's
recent statement on crossing it.
In answer to questions by Gross, Rau expressed
the personal view that the appeal, if observed by UN forces, would remove
one ground of the Chinese Communists basis for intervention, in that the
claim could not again be made that the UN had invaded North Korea. He
felt that the UN forces might halt some 10 miles behind the 38th Parallel
allowing the remaining area to be a buffer zone for land patrol action, and
this might be a stronger political position than the zone previously sug-
gested north of the Parallel.
Gross stressed that as members contributing
troops have been advised, any crossing of the Parallel is a tactical mili- -
tary measure and the UN is not committed to unification of Korea by the
invasion on a strategic scale of North Korea. He thought it likely that any
strategic crossing would be on the basis of wide consultation, certainly
among the group contributing armed forces. He stressed the fact that UN