Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

to NLT(Maual Aide)190 OFFICE OF If THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-85 April-12, 1951 TOOP S E SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS FOUR-POWER - Ambassador Jessup's attempt during EXPLORATORY TALKS the 28th session of the Paris talks yesterday to draw out the Soviets on their complete agenda proposals evoked a long propaganda blast from Gromyko on the NAT and the US bases in Europe and the Near East. Gromyko avoided clarifying his ideas on the position and inter- - relationship of the various Soviet agenda proposals. We have informed Jessup that the Department is not agreeable to a recent suggestion of M. Parodi that the Western Powers make a minor concession to the Soviets on the armaments item as a last attempt at agreement before resorting to a split agenda. (M. Parodi had suggested the following revision of the armaments sub-item: "Existing level of armaments and armed forces; reduction and control of armaments and armed forces of the US, UK, USSR and France. 11) We have suggested instead that, if the British and French are agreeable, Jessup might try out the following language as a new tripartite agenda proposal: "Existing level of arma- ments and armed forces and measures which the USSR, US, UK and France could propose for international control and reduction of arma- ments and armed forces. 11 We have also informed Jessup that if the deadlock continues on the order of the sub-items under Item 1, he may propose that the order of the sub-items be left for the decision of the Foreign Ministers. We have added, for Jessup's information, that we cannot agree at this time to accepting "German demilitarization¹ as the first sub-item, but we could eventually do so if it were the ulti- mate concession necessary to reach agreement on the agena as a whole. IRAN We have informed Embassy Tehran that the first two meetings with the British in Washington on Iran were primarily devoted to a general exploration of the Iranian situation; it appears, however, that a