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NLT (Naval Aide) 198 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE May DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85 May 7, 1951 By TOP SECRE SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS FOUR POWER In the 43rd session of the Four Power PARIS TALKS talks in Paris on Friday, Soviet Delegate Gromyko "accepted" alterna- tive A of the three Western agenda plans on the condition that the West accept a Soviet "amendment on the armaments sub-item, which consisted of the acceptance of the Soviet wording of April 4 which would limit the discussion to the armaments of the Four Powers. He made no mention of an item on the North Atlantic Treaty or on bases. The three western delegates pointed out that the Soviet delegate had not accepted any of the three alternate proposals and that since the Soviet delegate knows the West cannot accept the Soviet wording on the armaments item, the matter stands exactly as it did before introduc- tion of the Soviet "amendment". At the Saturday meeting, Gromyko embarked on a bitter denunciation of Western policies and that of the UK in particular, and stated that agreement in the meetings now depends on the position of the Western powers with respect to reduc- - tion of the armaments of the four powers. The three representatives rejected this thesis, stating that the three Western alternatives, each of which would allow the Foreign Ministers to meet, were still open, and that despite the label attached to the Soviet "amendment", the Soviet delegate had made no proposal on any major point since April 4. UK POLICY Our Ambassador in London has discussed IN FAR EAST with British Foreign Minister Morrison the Secretary's recent personal message on Far Eastern policies and was encouraged by Morrison's generally reasonable and cooperative approach to the problem. He stated that a Cabinet decision had been made on the question of the bombing of Chinese Communist bases and that the only problem involved is that of consultation, emphasizing that a firm political decision in principle had been made to authorize retaliatory bombing in the event of "material" air attack on UN troops and that arrangements had been