Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED 12065, 1982 State Dept. E.O. Guidelines, NLT, Date March 9-5-88 6, June 5, 1951 By DEB SECRET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS PARIS FOUR In commenting on the Soviet rejection of the POWER TALKS Western notes, Ambassador Jessup says that the chief difficulty to be anticipated now in dealing with the Soviet reply is the French attitude, due to the coming French elections. Parodi anticipates a government decision that nothing can be done to break off the talks before June 17th (election day). Davies left for London last night to consult with Morrison. Davies had stated definitely, however, as a result of conversations in London over the past weekend that the British Government will insist on a clear statement in Paris terminating the discussions. He said he did not exclude the possi- bility that we could indicate to the Soviets that if they have anything new to bring up the three governments would designate representatives in Paris to consider the matter--i. e. the British and American ambassa- dors. There is general agreement among the Western delegates (and the view is shared by the Department) that any reply to the Soviets must stress that our invitation to the Soviets still stands. JAPANESE TREATY Ambassador Dulles has begun talks in London concerning the Japanese treaty. At the first talk Mr. Morrison said he accepted the principle of a quick and liberal peace, but that Japanese wrongs and cruelties are not forgotten and could not be wholly ignored in the treaty. He said that armaments should be specified and a limit set beyond which the Japanese could not go without the consent of the Allied powers. He felt some recognition of mistreated prisoners of war and their families should be accorded, for which pur- pose all or part of Japan's gold should be applied. Moreover, Formosa's status should be unchanged, and there should be no participation on be - half of China at present. Mr. Morrison also indicated that the British would need more details on commercial and financial matters. Dulles points out that the only major surprise in the above is the British pro- posal for limiting rearmament, which is directly contrary to the position expressed in the British aide-memoire of March 12th. SECREI