Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Navil Aide / 239 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 September 7, 1951 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 NTT, Date 9-5-85 TOP SECRET By DEB SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS INDIA In an analysis of Nehru's attitude toward Japan, Ambas- sador Henderson has warned that Nehru will work toward the undermining of the US-Japanese alliance and the elimination of all US influence in Japan and the Far East. Henderson believes India's rejection of the Japanese treaty represents a step on Nehru's part toward the eventual exclusion of all Western military power and "political and economic pressures" from the mainland and waters of Asia. In rejecting the Japanese treaty Nehru has laid a basis from which he will carry on a subsequent campaign to stimulate and gain influence over the nationalistic and anti-white elements in Japan, in the hope of guiding them eventually to take over power in Japan, denounce the Japanese alliance with the US, and insist on the evacuation of all Amer - ican armed forces from Japan, and return to Japanese control such islands as the US might be occupying. Henderson believes Nehru has made little progress thus far in his attempts to draw Communist China away from its ties with Russia, but if he can eventually succeed in doing this and in drawing Japan away from the US he will have made substantial progress in the direction of attain- ing a united Asia in which he can play an important role and which he would like to use in pursuing further objectives. Nehru is not likely to move too openly or rapidly, says Henderson, for he will not wish to arouse too much hostility or indignation in the US. He realizes that for some time to come India will sorely need certain capital and consumption goods which only the US can furnish. He is not likely to disclose his real objectives and will try to appear as a demo- cratic idealist and will endeavor to gain support in the Western world, particularly the US and the UK, of various non-Communist left-wing elements and professional "liberals. Nehru will make special efforts to charm and flatter the naive Americans and British, who he thinks might be useful in helping mold public opinion in his favor. He will continue to make minor concessions and friendly gestures from time to time to the US in order to keep down the tide of resentment and make US officials think: "He will come to our side TOP SECRET