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NLT CHaval Aide/252 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 September 27, 1951 State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85 TOP SECRET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN We have instructed Ambassador Henderson in Tehran to seek an appointment with the Shah today and present to him our grave concern over the expulsion order to the British oil technicians in Abadan. Henderson is also to urge the Shah to take some effective action to prevent the implementation of the expulsion order. He is also to say that while we are convinced that the British sincerely desire to reach an amicable solution to the controversy, the proposals thus far put forward by the Iranian Government would not provide a reasonable basis for the resumption of nego- tiations, and there is serious doubt that successful negotiations with Prime Minister Mosadeq are possible. Henderson is to urge the Shah to replace Mosadeq if he feels he is in a position to do so. He will assure the Shah that the US will assist Iran in obtaining an agreement which would eliminate any interference in internal Iranian affairs on the part of the oil company and which would provide to Iran a net profit as high as that received by any other country under comparable circumstances. Embassy London has answered our query as to the extent that domestic political considerations in Great Britain are playing a role in Britain Government's handling of the Iranian crisis. Our Embassy says that although domestic political considerations usually weigh heavily in any Govern- - ment action in regard to Iran , they were probably only a secondary factor in the Government s decision to reject the latest proposals, which, for the present, are rendered largely academic by the expulsion order. Our Charge in London was briefed yesterday by the acting head of the Foreign Office on a British Cabinet meeting on the Iranian situation of the previous evening. The latter says the Cabinet is faced with the decision of: 1) voluntary withdrawals from Abadan before the Iranians can expel them; or 2) use of force to maintain them. The dilemma is rendered more difficult for the Labor Government by the imminence of general elections and the fact that it has, in recent months, been more vulnerable to attack on its Middle East policy than on any other phase of its foreign policy. After a careful analysis of the complexities of the situation, both from a domestic and international view- point, our Embassy is inclined to believe that the Labor Government will find itself under strong compulsion to use force to stay in Abaden, although decision to use force will probably be largely influenced by the US attitude. The Embassy adds a " final note of caution" over the depth of feeling the Iranian crisis has TOP SECRET