Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLTCNAvAl Aide/254 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 October 1, 1951 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 TOP SECRET By DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85 SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN Following public announcement by the British Government of its intention to take the Iranian oil dispute to the UN Security Council, the British Ambassador was called in on Saturday and in- - formed that the Department felt that Security Council action on the matter was, at best, questionable, and that the type of resolution the UK had in mind might have extremely unfortunate results. We believe the Soviets would be bound to veto such a resolution, and, while the veto in itself would not be of particular concern, the Soviets would for the first time have a popular veto and an open- ing for an effective ideologi cal propaganda campaign. In addition, we doubted that seven votes could be obtained for the UK resolution, even assuming that the US could vote for it, whic h we did not wish to do, and the UK itself were permitted to vote. Even assuming seven votes could be obtained, we believe the Iranians would defy the resolution, and we pointed out that passage of another resolution by the UN which was not carried out would add to the moral decline of the UN. We expressed our view that the resolution would certainly freeze the Iranian position, thus going far toward making further negotiations impossible, and would probably strengthen the position of Prime Minister Mosadeq, as he would pose as the champion of Iran against the world. As a corollary, it would throw Iran in the position of being defended solely by the Soviet Union. We gave the Ambassador a text of a resolution of the type which we thought might have a chance of being adopted in the SC and which, if adopted, might be turned to a constructive end. Our resolution would call upon the UK and Iran to resume negotiations at the earliest practicable moment in a further effort to resolve their differences; to refrain from action of any kind which might further aggravate the situation or prejudice the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned; and, to inform the SC of the steps taken by them to carry out the resolution. We also hinted to the Ambassador that we might be willing to send a message to Mosadeq exhorting him not to take action on the order expelling the last remaining British technicians from the Abadan refinery while the case was under consideration in the SC, pointing out that Iran had been a great beneficiary of the UN. AUSTRIAN TREATY Embassy London has been informed by British officials that the UK Foreign Office does not favor use of the US draft of an abbreviated peace treaty for Austria for the present since they TOP SECRET