Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLTINaNA Aide l274 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the WASHINGTON October 31, 1951 TOP S E T SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN Ambassador Henderson has commented to the Department that the superficial political unity which seemed to possess Iranian politicians just prior to Mosadeg's de- parture for the US in support of the Iranian case before the UN has al- ready begun to play out, and political leaders have begun to jockey among themselves for position and power combinations. These maneuvers have involved not only the opposition leaders, but other personalities in Mosa- - deq's own National Front organization, such as Haerizadeh, Makki, and Kashani, who have reportedly attempted to establish an alliance which, it is speculated, may have been intended to: 1) increase their control over Mosadeq through political blackmail; 2) allow bargaining with other groups for maximum profit in joining a move to overthrow Mosadeq and bring in a "front'man such as Foreign Minister Kazami; or 3) satisfy Makki's personal ambition to become leader of a coalition between the National Front and the leftist elements. Embassy sources also report that a Majlis group under the leadership of Seyid Zia has 27 deputies "sworn to support each other in a struggle against Mosadeq when he re- turns", although, says Henderson, the strength of this opposition group has always been easily out-maneuvered by Mosadeq in the past. A more serious opponent is Qavam who is widely believed to enjoy the support of the Shah, but Henderson believes that Qavam's success would depend largely on a resolute stand by the Shah, who has in the past permitted himself to be cowed by an aroused Mosadeq and who might likely succumb again to the same pressures. Henderson believes that Mosadeg's absence has given much freer reign to these intrigues and that when Mosadeq returns he will be at the height of his popularity no matter what success or failure he meets in the US. Mosadeg's past tactics for brow-beating the Shah, nullifying Majlis opposition and exciting the populace can be used again, even in the face of economic deterioration, to present serious obstacles to any opposition movement, in case he chooses not to retire from the government. TOPSECRIT DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DED NLT, Date 9-5-85