Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Navil Aide 1 276 OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE May E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 DEB NLT, Date 9-6-85 November 6, 1951 By IOPSECRE SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS UNITED KINGDOM On Sunday evening at dinner Mr. Eden informally discussed with the Secretary the British position in the Middle East. Eden stressed that the Egyptian problem was the out- standing one in the area, and he assured the Secretary that the British con- sidered the Four Power offer to Egypt still to be open. He said the ques. - tion of oil stoppage was now firmly in the hands of the Foreign Office ra- ther than the military. Eden also said that the British believe the situation is more hopeful than would appear on the surface. As to Morocco, Eden said the UK was committed to support the French in a determined effort to prevent consideration of the Moroccan question by the General Assembly and to support them on merits thereafter. Eden argued strongly that the US also should take such a position. The Secretary said that we could not vote against placing the matter on the agenda and would abstain, but we would not discourage other countries from voting against the agenda item. On the merits of the question, we would join against any resolution which condemned or criticized the French or any resolution for UN investigation. Eden suggested that the US, UK and France should issue a general statement on the Middle East which would be followed by a Four Power statement on the Middle East Command. The Secretary sugges- ted combining these two, so as to cement our position with Turkey, and agreed to look further into the matter. UNITED KINGDOM- In view of Mr. Eden's recent statement to the Sec- - IRAN retary that the British believe Mosadeq could still be replaced by a more amenable government in Iran, the Department has informed the Secretary that it remains most concerned about the British attitude and believes it will have difficulty in persuading Mosadeq to remain in the US for longer than a few days. The Department fears that we would be assuming grave responsibilities for the internal situa- tion in Iran if we persuaded the head of its government to remain long abroad during such critical times. Moreover, we are concerned at the charge of IOPSCRE