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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (NavalAide) 281
and
OFFICE OF
E.O. 12065, Sec. March 3-402 6, THE 1982 SECRETARY WASHINGTON OF
DECLASSIFIED
STATE
State Dept. DLE Guidelines, NLT, Date 9-6-87
November 16, 1951
By
TOP SECRET
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
Hassan Youssef, the Chief of the King's Cabinet told
Ambassador Caffery Wednesday evening that the King
knows about Serageddin's conversations with Caffery (which suggested the
possibility of Egypt's acceptance of the Middle East Command proposals
if all British "troops" were withdrawn leaving flexibly-interpreted "British
technicians" in the Canal Zone in their place) and that the King highly ap-
proves. Hassan Youssef observed that Farouk is delighted that Serageddin
took the initiative in these conversations and hopes that they will lead to
final acceptance by the Egyptian Government of the defense plans, with the
usual reservations that the British must do something "satisfactory" on
the Sudan issue.
British Ambassador Stevenson in Cairo has told Caffery
that he believes a change of jovernment in Egypt will be necessary in order
to restore the status quo ante in the Canal Zone and that it may take some
pressure to achieve this. He says that Farouk still hopes that some formula
can be worked out in the framework of the present government which would
permit the resumption of negotiations, but the King has taken no action
against the extremists. Stevenson is urging his government to coordinate
closely with the US Government in studying the tactics which will be neces-
sary to push the Egyptians toward a reshuffling of their government.
BURMA
Our Charge in Rangoon told the Foreign Minister on
Wednesday that the US Government has received, with
growing concern, reports from reliable sources indicating the develop-
ment of a serious threat to the independence of Burma by insurgent groups
within the counrty. The Foreign Minister took the occasion to revert to the
subject of the Chinese Nationalist troops on Burmese territory and said that
captives from among these had guns of the latest American manufacture,
which evidenced a link between General Li Mi and the Chinese Nationalist
Government in Taipei. He said that we could be most helpful by persuading
Taipei to stop helping these troops in Burma and to break all communica -
tions with General Li Mi beyond ordering the troops out of Burma. Our
T O P SECRET