Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

HLT (Naval Aide)285 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 November 21, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 9-6-85 E T SECURITY INORMATION : IRAN Ambassador Gifford has expressed his concern over the possible repercussions in Great Britain of an Am- - erican aid-to-Iran program which could be interpreted in the UK as the use of American money to perpetuate the Mosadeq regime. The British, says Gifford, feel that they have done everything within reason to reach a workable settlement with Mosadeq; it is imperative that we consult with the British Government sufficiently in advance of any assistance we are contemplating to allow for full consideration of their views. Gifford says that we should certainly represent any assistance we give Iran as aid to the Shah rather than to Mosadeq, if we believe that this distinction can be successfully made, which Gifford himself doubts. He says that as long as Mosadeq remains in power any assistance to Iran will be interpre. - ted as assistance to Mosadeq. Gifford says it appears to him that Mosa- - deq has not moved one inch from his obstinate and suicidal attitude to- ward the oil dispute and he believes that an important factor in this has been Mosadeg's belief that he would in the end be saved from collapse by US money. Gifford asks why, if the Iranian budget will keep the gov- ernment going until February, we should even hint at this time that we may help them financially, for, by holding out the prospect of American aid, we remove any incentive for them to get their oil situation straight- ened out promptly. Gifford concludes that, while fully mindful of the dan- gers which might ultimately follow from Mosadeg's failure to get help, he doubts that it is an alternative to these dangers to appear to reward Mosa- deq for the policy he is pursuing. Ambassador Henderson in Tehran reports that the Iranian delegation to the US has interpreted our attitude toward Mosadeq's request for aid as being more favorable than is actually the case. The impression is being created by various spokesmen for the National Front, by the press and by the radio, that adequate American aid is almost cer- - tain. It looks as though the National Front is trying to build up so much confidence in US willingness to give aid as to make it extremely difficult for the US eventually to refuse or to postpone such aid without being sub- ject to charges of having made false promises. Henderson says that the T SECURITY VEORMATTON