Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Maual Aide) 293 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE they State Dept. 6, 1982 E.O. WASHINGTON By. PER NLT, Date 9-6-8 December 10, 1951 TOP SECRET SECURITY INEORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT Concerned by the possibility of a widening difference of US-UK opinion over Egypt, Embassy London sets forth as follows what it believes to be the present British position: 1) the UK is firmly opposed to encouraging a plebiscite in the Sudan, among other reasons because it believes the Sudanese have been brought too far toward self-government and self-determination for the process to be reversed by acknowledging Egyptian sovereignty over the area; 2) on defense proposals the Foreign Office believes that some flexibility may be possible at the right time, flexibility such as a progressive civilianization of the Canal Zone base; 3) the British are vitally concerned with the timing of any new offer believing that their policy of patience and firmness has on the whole proved fairly successful and should be continued a little longer; 4) the For- eign Office doubts that the present Egyptian Government can ever agree to a satisfactory settlement and would not consider its fall as a result of pub- lic disturbances an unmitigated disaster; 5) the UK has in mind one last means of salvation which has not yet been used, namely the Egyptian army; and 6) nevertheless, the UK feels the present situation unsatisfactory and explosive and seeks any settlement which will not sacrifice fundamental objectives and principles. On the other hand Ambassador Caffery in commenting on Eden's views on the Sudan agrees that there is no responsible leader- - ship in Egypt at present but explains that neither the King nor any respon- - sible or irresponsible government could agree to any defense proposal S unless they had some lace-saving formula, of which Sudan is the only one in sight. He goes on to say that Seraggedin's efforts may produce a lull in the private war in the Canal Zone, but he emphasizes that if matters are allowed to drift the end will be either the occupation of Egypt or a sealing off of the Canal Zone. Caffery states that each day which passes will make the eventual solution more difficult. He notes that his British colleague understands the situation but asks that Eden be informed since the Foreign Office seems to be following a policy unfortunately similar to that they followed in Iran. TOP SECRET SECURITY INE ORMATION