Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(NAVAL AIDE) 307 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 January 3, 1952 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By, DBB NTT, Date 9-9-Fop SEGRET SECURITY INF ORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA We have instructed Ambassador Bruce in Paris to deliver a personal message from Secretary Acheson to either Prime Minister Pleven or Foreign Minister Schuman on the sub- ject of the proposed warning statement to be issued if an armistice is reached in Korea. The message points out that the only difference which appears to remain between the French and American positions relates to the degree to which the countries participating in the Korean hostilities will publicly make explicit their determination in this regard. We are convinced that the statement should make completely clear to the Com- munists, as well as to the rest of the world, what the consequences of such a flagrant breach of the armistice would be. We believe that only by such a clear statement of our intentions can we achieve the maximum deterrent effect upon the Communists and thereby safeguard our forces against treachery, and only thereby can we make clear to the peoples of the world where the responsibility would lie for the serious consequences which would follow upon a renewal of the attack. We do not think the state- ment would provoke the Communists or constitute an ultimatum any more than did our joint declaration on West Germany in September 1950. We do think that such a statement of our determination would give the Com- munists pause before they embark on new acts of aggression. It is the considered judgment of the highest political and military authorities in this government that only if we can count on a clear public statement to deter the Communists can we afford to accept armistice terms which in themselves would not provide the UN forces with that degree of protection which we would otherwise have to demand. Without such an unequivocal statement we cannot see how it will be possible to conclude an armistice. At this juncture, the highest interests of the free world require that we seize this opportunity to end hostilities in Korea. The message asks the French to reconsider as a matter of urgency their objections to the last sentence of our projective statement in order that it may carry the great weight of unanimous approval. We have informed our Ambassador for his information that it is a matter of the greatest urgency that French agreement be achieved as quickly as possible in order that amended instructions may be sent to Ridgway which should permit the expeditious conclusion of an armistice. TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION