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NLT/Craval Aide)326 any OFFICE OF DECP THE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 February 13, 1952 By DCB NLT, Date 9-9-85 TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EUROPEAN DEFENSE We have advised our missions at London, Paris, COMMUNITY and Bonn that the proposed meeting at London between the Allied Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer obviously depends on the amount of agreement reached in the tripartite talks, but that we share UK Foreign Secretary Eden's views that the meeting with Adenauer may prove useful. In connection with the proposed tripartite agenda at London, we state we will wish to include a discussion of the Saar problem and Germany's relationship to NATO. It may also be necessary to include on the agenda of the meeting with Adenauer, if one is decided upon, an item dealing with action to be taken by the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon regarding the European Defense Community treaty and EDC-NATO relationships, including a security guarantee, in order to be sure of firm German acceptance of all interlocking arrangements. With regard to the Saar problem we are prepared to suggest to the tripartite meeting a procedure for a settlement as follows: 1) as a first step, the US, UK and France should offer to begin negotiations with the Germans in London or Strasbourg as soon as the EDC treaty and the German contractual arrangements come into effect; 2) the resulting agreement should be submitted to the Saar for approval; 3) the US, UK and France then should begin discussions at an early date on the substance of a settlement. We add that if this procedure can be agreed on tripartitely and then with the Germans it may be possible to separate the Saar question from the EDC and contractual talks and open the way to an eventual Saar settle- - ment. We state further that while there is some area of German and French agreement on the idea of "Europeanization" of the Saar, that area of agreement is so small it would probably be best not to pursue it at the present time. We believe also that it is best that the US and UK not attempt at this time to make any substantive proposal on the Saar to the French and Germans, such as Adenauer had suggested. IRAN We have informed Embassy Tehran of the substance of Foreign Secretary Eden's reply of February 12 to Secre- - tary Acheson's letter of February 8 regarding the oil situation. Eden urged that we do everything possible to bring home to Iranian Prime Minister TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION