Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-9-65 February 15, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INEORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY We have informed Embassy London that in sug- gesting a procedure for handling the Saar problem we did not wish to preclude a flexible approach which could be adapted to actual developments as well as possible differing views of other govern- ments. What we seek is a course of action most likely to achieve the immediate objective of separating the Saar issue from the European De- - fense Force and Contractual negotiation and ratification processes. If Adenauer and Schuman feel this can best be accomplished by Franco- German negotiations we would certainly not oppose such efforts. Our thought was that a tripartite offer might be of assistance to Adenauer in obtaining Bundestag ratifications. While we are aware of the dangers pointed out by the British Foreign Office in their recommendations to Mr. Eden, we believe any settlement will eventually have to have the agreement of the UK and US, and will, therefore, at some point necessitate a judgment on substance. Our recent experience in letting the French and Germans attempt to reach agreement on Security Controls does not encourage hope for the bilateral approach, but any agreement which they might reach on the Saar would probably be acceptable to us. The danger is that rigid and irreconcilable positions might develop which could have been avoided through the moderating presence of the US and UK. IRAN Prime Minister Mosadeq has informed Ambassador Henderson that he is extremely worried regarding the activities of the Iranian army. He said the army was in general unfriendly to the National Front and had been interfering systematically in elections throughout the country in order to handicap the efforts of National Front candidates. Only in Tehran and Azerbaijan had the army stayed out of politics because in the former it could not interfere without being obvious and in the latter because it feared that if it opposed the National Front, Tudeh candidates would be elected. Mosadeq said he had yet to find one high ranking Iranian officer who had not been, or was still, in British service. As Prime Minister he had little control over the army which looked to the Shah for orders. The Shah, therefore, had considerable responsibility for army conduct. He could not tolerate continued army interference in civil matters and said it might eventually be necessary for him to take some steps. SECRET SEGURITY INF ORMATION