Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 April 18, 1952 By DEB NLT, Date9-9-85 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS USSR Embassy London has forwarded a summary of views on the recent Soviet note which Foreign Minister Eden intends to outline to the British cabinet. Eden will state that the present note, like the first Soviet note, is primarily designed to delay and impede Western plans for the association of (Germany with our common defense. The Soviet Government still has not committed itself to the holding of elections before the conclusion of a peace treaty. Eden will say we must proceed with our present policy of trying to secure the signature and sub- sequent ratification of the European Defense Community treaty and the German contractual agreement. We must so handle the Soviet note as to encourage Germany not only to sign but also to ratify these agreements. This means we must be careful not to shut the door on four power dis - cussions and on the reunification of Germany, However, we must play for time and seek to avoid any such discussions before the EDC treaty and contractual arrangements have been signed, as we now hope, in the third week of May. Holding of discussions will probably be a necessary prelude to ratification in Germany and France. We need not be in a hurry to reply to the Soviet note, which we should answer probably early in May. In our reply we should continue to uphold the UN commission as being the proper b ody to investigate conditions for elections. Since all- German elections are our first essential condition and will have to form the main item on the agenda of any four power discussions, we must keep them in the forefront in our reply. EGYPT Ambassador Caffery reports that British Ambassador Stevenson has sent a telegram to the British Foreign Office pointing out that Egyptian Prime Minister Hilali is suspicious of British good faith and his suspicion and disappointment are only confirmed by developments in Khartoum. A deadlock has been reached from which there is no exit except by means of some show of confidence on the British part in Egypt's desire to reach an agreement. Stevenson concluded his cable with the statement that acceptance in some form or another of "evacuation and "!unity" is and will remain the sole possible basis of negotiations with the Egyptians. The result of failure to find somebasis for negotiations would be very grave. A breakdown of negotiations would be serious, but the British position would be stronger in that event than if they had failed to agree even to start them. SECRET SECURITY INF FORMATION