Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 DEPARTMENT OF STATE State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON By NLT- He NARS, Date 11-13-10 June 6,1949 SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS PALESTINE We have informed the Secretary that, in view of Ethridge's belief that the immediate incorporation in Jordan of the Jordan administered areas of Arab Palestine would prejudice the carrying out of US policy toward Palestine, we believe that it is desirable to inform Bevin that action toward incorporation or the extension of the British treaty with Jordan to the administered territories would not be advisable. Ethridge believes that precipitate action by the British or by Abdullah might give the Israelis an excuse for ending the Lausanne talks and would provoke the Israelis into taking action to incorporate the Arab territories they now occupy, thus delaying any concession on their part in the Negeb or elsewhere. Ethridge believes that a decision is now being taken in Tel Aviv as to whether concessions will be made and feels that until the decision is known we should not encourage any action which would hamper the execution of the `US policy of obtaining territorial concessions from the Israelis. We have informed Ethridge that we would approve the in- corporation of the Egyptian occupied Gaza area in Israel in return for Israeli acceptance of the refugees in that area, provided that this had the full consent of the Egyptians, that Egypt receives territorial compensation in line with the President's formula, that the Israelis give unequivocal assurances on the rights of the refugees as Israeli citizens and that provision is made for UN supervision of the transfer of the area and of the subsequent status and treatment of the population for an appropriate period. CHINA In commenting on the approach to the US made by Communist leader Chou En-lai, our Consul General in Peiping says that two explanations are possible: 1) that Chou and his group may be tending toward Titoism; 2) that Chou took action with the full knowledge of the Chinese Communist Party and even possibly the approval of the USSR. Though our Consul General believes that it would be premature to accept the development of Titoism in the Chinese Communist Party before the party rank and file have really appreciated the gravity of their economic situation, he says that the Chou move could reflect greater divergence in high Communist Councils than had been suspected, in which case it would be evidence of Chou's fear of a possible purge of elements un- sympathetic to the Soviet line. He points out that, as Chou controls