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201681585
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Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams
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id
201681585
contentType
document
title
Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams
citationUrl
collections
Records of the Naval Aide to the President (Truman Administration)
State Department Briefs Files
subjects
Tito, Josip Broz, 1892-1980
Vyshinsky, Andrey Yanuaryevich, 1883-1954
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201681585
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23
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1949-06-23
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6
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1949
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nara-archive
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1
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d04079664babf5bb
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
June 23, 1949
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
USSR
Embassy Moscow believes that the Soviets willingness to
mark time as indicated in their attitude at the Paris CFM
is fundamentally attributable to the Kremlin's belief that a big
capitalist crisis is coming much faster than had previously been
expected. The Embassy, however, finds Vyshinski's defensive attitude
and apparent improvisation at the conference puzzling and suggests that
some basic change in Moscow's tactics may have taken place not long
before the meeting which may have been caused by the revelation in the
Soviet zone elections of the extent of the popular rebellion against
the Soviets in their zone and of the weakness of their organization
there. The Embassy thinks that another possible cause may have been
recent indications of unexpected weakness in the satellites, making
it inadvisable for the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Germany
and Austria, and that, consequently, progress toward a detailed working
out of agreed principles on an Austrian treaty will depend primarily
on Soviet success in reorganizing and tightening up the Communist
apparatus in the satellite countries and the Soviet zones of occupation.
TRIESTE
The Yugoslav Assistant Foreign Minister, in discussion with
the British Charge in Belgrade of the Soviet abandonment of
Yugoslavia on the Austrian border issue, has inquired concerning the
possibility of a compromise being reached on Triests. The British
Charge
informed him that his government might consider sympathetically any
reasonable arrangement that the Yugoslavs might work out with the Italians.
Our Charge in Belgrade suggests that we might reexamine our position on
Trieste with a view to possibly bringing some pressure on the Italians
to accept some solution other than the return of the entire territory to
Italy, pointing out that if the Soviets should adhere to our present po-
sition on the return of the entire territory we might be placed in the
position of endangering our entire policy of keeping Tito afloat, since
the Yugoslavs would almost certainly not withdraw from the sector of
Trieste they occupy and we would not be able to continue helping Tito
in the face of such defiance of our wishes. He believes that Soviet
adherence to our position could be the most effective means open to them
to bring about Tito's downfall.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979
By NLT- NC NARS, Date 11-13-to