Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 DEPARTMENT OF STATE State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY By NLT- HC NARS, Date 11-13-fo / WASHINGTON June 13, 1949 IC 4 1 SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS AUSTRIA Our delegation in Paris has been advised that we favor liberalization of the four-power occupation policy in Austria, including a substantial reduction in occupation forces, progressive re- linquishment of the Allied Council authority, and a shift to a civilian High Commissioner. We feel such action is necessary to offset the develop- ing political situation in Austria, which stems from disappointment over the failure of the treaty discussions and exasperation with the burdens of military occupation. We believe that the strength of the western posi- tion will be undermined if we remain content with the status quo, and we recommend that: 1) immediate discussions be held with the British and French to formulate a program to be followed on either a tripartite or quadripartite basis, reopening the problem of occupation costs and im- pressing on the British and French the necessity of assuming such costs in Austria; 2) presentation of the tripartite program be made to Vyshinski in Paris, urging his cooperation in creating conditions in Austria which would approximate the post-treaty period; and 3) if the USSR refuses to cooperate, the three western powers should take steps along the proposed line as far as possible without prejudice to our rights under the control agreement. ISRAEL Our Charge in Amman reports that according to a reliable military source the number of incidents along the Jordan- Israeli frontier have recently increased rapidly. Greatly increased Israeli military activity around Jerusalem is also reported, and local authorities are concerned that Israel may be planning to seize Mt. Scopus or Latrun. Our Charge recommends that we make it clear to Israel that its troops must immediately be withdrawn and that further "aggressive acts" will not be tolerated. Ethridge has expressed his opinion that Israel must accept primary responsibility for the stalemate at Lausanne. He says it was con- sistently pointed out to the Israelis at Lausanne that the key to peace was some concession on the refugees, but Israel refused to make any sig- nificant concession or to indicate how many refugees it would take back and under what conditions. Ethridge believes that Israel's attitude toward the refugees is morally reprehensible and politically short-sighted, and that Israel's position as a "conqueror" demanding further concessions makes not for peace but for more trouble. Ethridge states that a deal on the Gaza strip could be a basis for settlement both of the refugee and the territorial questions, but only if accompanied by a concession in the Negeb