Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT ( Naval Addition OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIRIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 December 19, 1950 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 5-18-18 P T SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS WESTERN EUROPE Before leaving for Brussels, High Commissioner McCloy talked with Chancellor Adenauer who stated that the pillars of his foreign policy were rapprochement with France, good relations with the UK, and a strong attachment to the US. Adenauer said that without the US be - ing strong in Europe there was no hope for Europe since the other powers were irresolute and were no match for the unrelenting pres. - sures from the east. He further stated that his policy was firmly directed toward thorough integration of Germany with the western powers and that any thought of a neutralized Germany was unreal- istic. Adenauer expressed his view that it was much wiser and better from all points of view to renounce for a time the thought of a reunited Germany which might fall under Soviet influence and made it clear that what he feared was an unarmed and neutralized Germany rather than one thoroughly integrated with the west and capable of being defended against eastern encroachment. Adenauer indicated that he would like to see the Brussels meeting produce a decision: 1) to open discussions with the Germans regarding their contribution to western defense with no propositions on which a positive or negative reply was demanded but rather a series of discussions during the course of which German comments and counter proposals might be made; 2) to give an indication that the German contribution would be on a basis of equality and some change in the political status of Germany, which also would be sub- ject to an exchange of views with the Germans; and 3) that the concept of a contractual relationship was not discarded as a possible means by which, after discussions, a new and satisfactory status for the occupying powers could be achieved. Adenauer on several occasions expressed his great fear of the results of a four power conference, citing his awareness of pressure in France for neutralization of Germany and of elements in the UK labor govern- ment which took the same line. He commented that the situation in Germany looked less favorable than is the actual fact. He expressed doubt that steps taken now by Germany to contribute to western defense would produce overt action by the Soviet Union and that even if the Soviets were more apt to move than he thought he preferred to go ahead anyway. TOP SEGRET