Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT / Naval Aide) 145 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 December 29, 1950 By, DEB NTT, Date L-18-35 [ORSECRET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS GERMANY We have informed High Commissioner McCloy of our view that it is essential to press forward with the development of the US position for negotiations concerning German contribution to western European defense and the placing of the relationship between the occupying powers and Germany on a contractual basis. We indicated that the Germans will probably stall pending clarification of possibilities for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, being willing to explore the problems but not to approach any binding agreements. We believe therefore that we must bend every effort to achieve results at the earliest possible time with- out regard to the possibility or existence of negotiations with the Soviets, in order to minimize the ability of the Soviets to affect adversely the German position through its propaganda. In this connec- tion the British Embassy here has informed us that the British Govern- ment puts great emphasis on this point. YUGOSLAVIA We have been informed by the British Embassy here that the UK thinks the US, UK and France should approach the Yugoslav Government at an early date with an offer of eventual military aid and that a small team of allied service experts should be sent to Yugoslavia to conduct on-the- spot investigations of Yugoslav requirements. The UK Foreign Office favors this tripartite approach because: 1) the proposal constitutes a natural development of the tripartite policy of "keeping Tito afloat;" 2) Tito has now drifted so far from the Cominform that the admitted risk of supplying him with arms seems worth accepting; 3) the present inability of the UK to provide Yugoslavia with war material and the uncertainty whether the US can do so in the near future is not sufficient grounds for not making the offer. The British have suggested that the proposed approach be based on the recent Yugoslav request to the French Government for war material. Our view on this question has not yet been finally determined, although we feel there is serious question as to the desirability of a direct tripartite approach to Tito at the present time. Our Embassy in Paris has concurred in this view, TOP SECRET