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OCR Page 1 of 2CLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
TOP
INCOMING
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
MESSAGE
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
SECRET
POP SECRET
PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
FROM:
CINCFE TOKYO JAAAN
TO:
DEPTAR WASH DC FOR CSUSA FOR JCS
NR:
C 68285
4 NOV 50
U msg WAR 95790.
It is impossible at this time to authoritatively
appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention
in North Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon
the battle intelligence coming in from the front:
First, that the Chinese Communist Government proposes
to intervene with its full potential military forces, openly
proclaiming such course at what it might determine as an
appropriate time; second, that 1$ will covertly render mili-
tary assistance, but will, so far as possible, conceal the
fact for diplomatic reasons; third, that it S:s permitting and
abetting a flow of more. or less voluntary personnel across
the border to strengthen and assist the North Korean remnants
in their struggle to retain a nominal foothold in Korea:
fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has been in the
belief that no UN Forces would be committed in the extreme
northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea. A
realization that such forces were insufficient. for the pur-
pose may well have furnished the concept of salvaging some-
thing from the wreckage.
The first contingency would represent a momentous
decision of the gravest international importance. While it is
a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict such
action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it
and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant
its immediate acceptance.
The last three contingencies or e combination thereof,
seem to be most likely condition at the present moment,
CM IN
8116
(H Nov 50)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
J.C.S. RECRADING MEMO 16.74
DOD Directive 5100.30, June 18, 1979
By
NLT- HL NARS, Date 11.6-10
COPY NO.
OCS FORM
REPLACES DA SCO FORM 22-1
TOP SECRET
M-g
1 AUG 50
331
15 JAN 49, WHICH MAY BE USED
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-O-898688
Terms
Subject
Korean War, 1950-1953
Relations
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