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{
    "localId": "120942073",
    "label": "Statement by Edwin W. Pauley with Reference to the Korean Situation - Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate",
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{
    "id": "120942073",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/120942073",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Statement by Edwin W. Pauley with Reference to the Korean Situation - Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/120942073",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Longhand Notes Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Byrd, Harry Flood, 1887-1966",
        "Tydings, Millard E. (Millard Evelyn), 1890-1961",
        "Saltonstall, Leverett, 1892-1979",
        "Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973",
        "Byrnes, James F. (James Francis), 1882-1972",
        "Gurney, Chan, 1896-1985",
        "Russell, Richard B. (Richard Brevard), 1897-1971",
        "Knowland, William F. (William Fife), 1908-1974",
        "Bridges, Styles, 1898-1961",
        "Morse, Wayne L. (Wayne Lyman), 1900-1974",
        "Legislative hearings",
        "Congressional committees",
        "Korean War, 1950-1953"
    ],
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 3,
            "logicalDate": "1950-08-03",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1950
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "6\nTHE KOREAN SITUATION\nTHE KOREAN SITUATION\n7\nOne thing stood out particularly in my first conferences with Gen-\nsleuths, and we were somewhat bitterly amused at the precautions that\neral Chistiakov. I told him that I had repeatedly heard that por-\nwere taken with us. Whenever our trains neared any industrial ob-\ntions of power installations-namely the hydroelectric turbines->\njective they attempted to speed up, hoping we would have only the\nwere being removed, and Chistiakov violently denied there had been\nmost fleeting glimpse of it through the windows.\nremovals of any kind from the Korean territory north of the thirty-\nAnother incident of this type will be found on page 133 of my report\neighth parallel. At the same time Chistiakov said he could not per-\nto the President where one of our party bought a newspaper from a\nmit us to visit the Hungnam area and northward-where many of\nNorth Korean. The Russians seized the Korean, questioning him at\nthese removals had been reported-this for military reasons. He\nlength, and the train did not proceed until the newspaper was returned\nsaid there were SO many Soviet troops still there that he did not feel\nto the Korean who, in turn, was forced to take it down to the Militia\nit would be a safe place for us to visit.\nStation and give it to the police. Only then was the man freed, and\nWhen I insisted on going to Hungnam, nothing happened-not\na\nwe were allowed to get on with our reparations work.\nthing. The Soviets repeated we couldn't gro there for military rea-\nBecause the reparations reports are all a matter of record, as well as\nsons, but they kept repeating that I must believe them that nothing\nmy files, which can be found in the State Department, I have refrained\nhad been removed from North Korea-this is important-because\nfrom going into statistics, reports, et cetera. But one factor is SO\nvital\nit was a policy laid down in Moscow.\nit should be mentioned here: for its analysis reveals that as long as\nAnd I want to say something right here-that was one time the\nthe Soviets were going to stay in North Korea, under one cloak or\nSoviets told me the truth. By the time our mission left northern\nanother, they would, for economic as well as political reasons, very\nKorea we were largely convinced there had been, at the most, only\nlikely make a move on South Korea in due time.\ninconsequential removals-and for one very good reason-the Soviets\nThe facts I refer to are these: The Soviets were living off the land,\nnever intended to get out of there.\nas they do in all occupied countries, and this could not gro on indefi-\nThe U. S. S. R. was already arming itself for a stay in North\nnitely. It could not go on because Korea, which as a whole is about\nKorea-even if it was to be later propagandized that they had \"gone\nthe size of Yugoslavia, but with a population half as large as the entire\nhome.\" What this country has to learn is that the Soviets never go\nBalkans, is a land in which the north and south are as tied together as\nhome. They may go across the Street or down the alley, but they\na pretzel. Food production is 65 percent concentrated in the south;\ndon't even do that until they've left their agents so firmly planted that\ncoal, iron and steel, hydroelectric power and chemicals are from 80\nit takes a block-buster to budge them.\npercent to 95 percent concentrated in the north. But 65 percent of all\nLet me give you one example of how they were entrenching them-\nmachinery and 80 percent of all consumer goods is in the south.\nselves. This is only one of a dozen but it will do. It was one of the\nUnder those circumstances the country was meant to be a whole, and\nfirst symptoms of the Soviet aggression that was to come. We were\nit was for that reason we SO argued in the United Nations. The\ninspecting a locomotive works in Wonson. This was on June 2, 1946,\nSoviets knew it was meant to be a whole, also-and that is why you\nand it will be found on page 131 of our report to the President.\nhave war in Korea today.\nEverywhere Japanese skilled labor had been kept in Korea as \"pris-\nI could go on at length, but I imagine you gentlemen may want to\noners of war\" and when we kept asking about the numbers of them,\nask a few questions when I am through, so I will only make a couple\nthe Soviets became quite restless. They assured us that seeing so\nof more points on various facets of the reparations mission that I\nmany of them was sheer coincidence and that at this locomotive plant\nheaded. Any details and figures you want will be found in the files\nwe would find as many nationals of the Soviet Union working on tech-\nand in my own report. Therefore, I will confine myself as to what\nnical work as Japanese. And they weren't kidding. When we\nprecise impressions I formed, and why I formed them.\nentered the works, the Soviet manager snapped to attention, came to\nI think these impressions are only important because Korea may be\na salute and barked, \"Comrade General Romaneko, I am the foreman\nonly the first battleground. Korea in itself is but a symptom, bloody\nof the foundry reporting to you, Lieutenant Smirnov.\"\nand costly as it may be, of a malignancy that could sweep the world,\nGeneral Romaneko was the officer accompanying us.\ndestroying democracy and the hopes of free people everywhere unless\nAt that moment I knew we could no longer simply count the Soviet\nit is checked, and checked now.\n\"technicians\" as such. You couldn't tell where the Soviet workman\nTherefore, I would like to refer to page 6 of a letter I wrote the\nleft off and the soldier began.\nPresident of the United States when I submitted my final reparations\nI would like to point up here one facet of how closely guarded our\nreports on Germany, Japan, Soviet-occupied Korea, and Manchuria.\nwhole tour was. There were now three special trains taking us\nThis letter is in the files at the State Department.\nthrough this tightly guarded iron curtain. The one ahead carried\nYou understand, I am sure, from what I have already told you, some\nGeneral Romaneko, his staff, and personal. bodyguards. The second\nof the reasons I did not think the Soviets ever intended to get out of\ntrain was ours. The third train carried guards that were ostensibly\nKorea. In this letter to the President I wrote, and I quote:\nto protect the entire group, Soviets and Americans alike.\nBut the guards' interest was primarily in us. It is perhaps one of\nA review of the facts gathered in Manchuria both during my stay there and\nsubsequently by the staff who remained for about a month after I left for the\nthe weaknesses of a democracy as well as one of the strengths that\nParis conference leads me to believe that the recommendations on Korea should\nAmericans are hardly cut out, by nature or training, for roles as super"
}