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{
    "localId": "120942073",
    "label": "Statement by Edwin W. Pauley with Reference to the Korean Situation - Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate",
    "core": "doc",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/120942073"
}

{
    "id": "120942073",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/120942073",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Statement by Edwin W. Pauley with Reference to the Korean Situation - Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/120942073",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Longhand Notes Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Byrd, Harry Flood, 1887-1966",
        "Tydings, Millard E. (Millard Evelyn), 1890-1961",
        "Saltonstall, Leverett, 1892-1979",
        "Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973",
        "Byrnes, James F. (James Francis), 1882-1972",
        "Gurney, Chan, 1896-1985",
        "Russell, Richard B. (Richard Brevard), 1897-1971",
        "Knowland, William F. (William Fife), 1908-1974",
        "Bridges, Styles, 1898-1961",
        "Morse, Wayne L. (Wayne Lyman), 1900-1974",
        "Legislative hearings",
        "Congressional committees",
        "Korean War, 1950-1953"
    ],
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 3,
            "logicalDate": "1950-08-03",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1950
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{
    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "8\nTHE KOREAN SITUATION\nTHE KOREAN SITUATION\n9\nbe substantially underscored. Korea may well be the pivot of Asiatic politics,\nwas going on. And I said I didn't care who had told them that, but\nand it deserves as much consideration as many of the other areas and issues\nthe facts were as I stated.\nwhich appear to be taken much more seriously.\nWhen I got back on my feet I was so concerned about the whole\nSenator JOHNSON. In your judgment, did the President and the\nevaluation of the Korean situation that I wrote the President a letter\nState Department fail to give that consideration?\nfrom Tokyo on June 22, 1946. The whole letter is available, so I will\nMr. PAULEY. Senator Johnson, if I could finish-\nonly read excerpts from it.\nSenator JOHNSON. I would like you to answer that question there.\nSenator KNOWLAND. Might I just interrupt at that point, Mr.\nMr. PAULEY. Yes.\nPauley? Going back to where you said that some of the press had\nSenator JOHNSON. You say you strongly recommended and that\nindicated they thought North Korea had been looted as Manchuria\nyou underscored your recommendations. Now, in your judgment, did\nhad been and such was not the fact, I take it you are referring to the\nthe President act on those recommendations? Is that your point that\nfact that North Korea at that time had not been looted.\nhe did not act?\nMr. PAULEY. Yes.\nMr. PAULEY. No. He did.\nSenator KNOWLAND. But not to the fact that Manchuria had not\nWhile Korea seems small in the midst of the tremendous expanse of Asia, we\nbeen looted.\nmust remember that it is equal-\nMr. PAULEY. Manchuria was completely devastated. It was one\nI am still quoting from my memo to the President in 1946-\nof the greatest crimes that was ever perpetrated on the human race.\nSenator KNOWLAND. I wanted that to be clear.\nin area and population to Czechoslovakia and Hungary combined. Unfortunately,\nthe situation in Korea is probably even more delicate than in any other spot\nMr. PAULEY. Yes.\nwhere we find ourselves in competition with the Soviets.\nSenator KNOWLAND. Because I was sure you were not testifying\nthat there had not been the looting in Manchuria.\nThat ends the quotation.\nPerhaps I overstepped myself when I made recommendations about\nMr. PAULEY. I am very glad you brought that out. Thank you.\nKorea that were not entirely in the province of the reparations mission.\nThe CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Pauley.\nBut I was as concerned then as I am now-as concerned as we all are\nMr. PAULEY. I am quoting now from my letter to the President of\nabout the future of our country. Any man who is proud of his citizen-\nJune 22, 1946:\nship and wants his children to grow up in a world like he did can't feel\nDEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: Following are some observations, conclusions, and rec-\nommendations on the Korean situation based upon a first-hand inspection by\nany other way.\nI had felt how essentially hopeless it was to try and reason with the\nmyself and my staff in Korea. I have also given consideration to interviews\nwith people in our occupation forces in Korea, as well as Koreans and members\nSoviets at a local level by the time I left North Korea. My last night\nof the Soviet occupation forces in North Korea.\nGeneral Chistiakov had given a dinner for our staff, and I still re-\nFrankly I am greatly concerned with our position in Korea.\nWhile\nmember my feelings when he asked me questions that showed how\nKorea is a small country and in terms of our military strength is a small respon-\nlittle the Soviets understood us-and possibly how little we understood\nsibility, it is an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia\nmay depend. It is here where a test will be made of whether a democratic com-\nthem.\npetitive system can be adapted to meet the challenge of a defeated feudalism, or\nFor example, Chistiakov-and you must remember he was the\nwhether some other system-i. e., communism-will become stronger.\nSoviet general who conquered Finland and is still the U. S. S. R.\nIt is clear from the action of the Soviets that they have no immediate intention\nAmbassador in Korea, and consequently should have a little more\nof withdrawing from Korea for the following reasons:\nknowledge of the world than the average Russian-asked me why we\nOne reason I gave is, and I quote:\nallowed strikes in the United States. He couldn't believe it either\nCommunism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere\nwhen I told him, in answer to another question, that of course anyone\nelse in the world. The Japanese owned the railroads, all of the public utilities,\nin this country was allowed to do anything he pleases and go anywhere\nincluding power and light, as well as all of the major industries and natural\nhe wants to go without even papers. Nor would he believe, although\nresources. Therefore, if these are suddenly found to be owned by \"The Peoples'\nCommittee\"-\nhe was polite about it, that the working man gets enough pay to insure\ngood living conditions. He simply-and I'm not being facetious-\nwhich, as you all know, is the Communist Party and the Communist\ndidn't talk our language. And I haven't met any of them that did.\norganization there-\nI will never forget my first press conference when I returned to\nthey will have acquired them without struggle of any kind or any work in\nSeoul. That was after I came back across the thirty-eighth parallel.\ndeveloping them.\nI was very ill, I had bacillary dysentery and was put in the hospital\nStill another reason I gave is-and I am quoting from my memo-\nthat night in a very serious condition. But, at any rate, the press\nrandum to him in 1946\nseemed to expect me to report that Korea had been looted just like\nThe Soviet Army is obviously ensconcing itself for a long stay. Officers' fam-\nManchuria was. And when I said that, on the contrary, the Russians\nilies are with them. The army is virtually operating the railroads. State-\nweren't taking anything out, for the obvious reason they expected to\nments by high-ranking officers show no indication of any plan of leaving or even\nstay there, there was a lot of screaming. The press said this was\na hope of leaving.\nexactly opposite from that their friends in the military had told them"
}