Ask the Scholar
Page 2 of 5
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
the
ARCHIVES RECORDA AND
SERVICS**
2.
"The President must act to prevent public calamity, but what
could he do? Each side wanted him to proceed against the other, for
impeding interstate commerce, but coal was not being mined at all,
and invoking the commerce clause would have little effect. Neither was
the strike, in a constitutional sense, a Federal question. The mines
were all in Pennsylvania, that State's troops kept a modicum of order,
and her public authorities had not asked for United States troops.
"Roosevelt was not the man to admit for a moment that, as
President, he was without power to take positive steps for the general
welfare. He proposed arbitration, the miners, led by John Mitchell, a
real labor statesman, promptly agreed, but the operators insisted that
they would not have their property rights interfered with in the slightest.
Finally, on October 3, 1902, the President got representatives of both
sides to meet with him. Mitchell kept his temper, but the operators, in
Roosevelt's view, 'came down in a most insolent frame of mind, refused
to talk of arbitration or other accommodations of any kind, and used
language that was insulting to the miners and offensive to me'. After
the meeting they added insult to injury by telling the papers that they
had "turned down' both the miners and the President.
"These coal barons were singularly ignorant both of the general
public temper, and of the character of Theodore Roosevelt. The former
was soon evidenced by a flood of letters to the White House backing his
Page data
- Page
- 2
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 87ac5ba9fcb9015b
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 159441162
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "159441162",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441162",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Excerpt, The Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943 by George Fort Milton",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441162",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"General Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876515/876515-01-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876515/876515-01-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876515/876515-01-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 5,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "159441162",
"label": "Excerpt, The Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943 by George Fort Milton",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441162"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "159441162",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441162",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Excerpt, The Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943 by George Fort Milton",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441162",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"General Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876515/876515-01-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876515/876515-01-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876515/876515-01-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 5,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441162",
"naId": 159441162,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 2,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876515/876515-01-02.jpg",
"mediaId": "87ac5ba9fcb9015b",
"ocrText": "the\nARCHIVES RECORDA AND\nSERVICS**\n2.\n\"The President must act to prevent public calamity, but what\ncould he do? Each side wanted him to proceed against the other, for\nimpeding interstate commerce, but coal was not being mined at all,\nand invoking the commerce clause would have little effect. Neither was\nthe strike, in a constitutional sense, a Federal question. The mines\nwere all in Pennsylvania, that State's troops kept a modicum of order,\nand her public authorities had not asked for United States troops.\n\"Roosevelt was not the man to admit for a moment that, as\nPresident, he was without power to take positive steps for the general\nwelfare. He proposed arbitration, the miners, led by John Mitchell, a\nreal labor statesman, promptly agreed, but the operators insisted that\nthey would not have their property rights interfered with in the slightest.\nFinally, on October 3, 1902, the President got representatives of both\nsides to meet with him. Mitchell kept his temper, but the operators, in\nRoosevelt's view, 'came down in a most insolent frame of mind, refused\nto talk of arbitration or other accommodations of any kind, and used\nlanguage that was insulting to the miners and offensive to me'. After\nthe meeting they added insult to injury by telling the papers that they\nhad \"turned down' both the miners and the President.\n\"These coal barons were singularly ignorant both of the general\npublic temper, and of the character of Theodore Roosevelt. The former\nwas soon evidenced by a flood of letters to the White House backing his"
}