Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to President Harry S. Truman, with Attachments
Ask the Scholar
Page 35 of 35
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
THE
"NATIONA
ANORIVES AMID
REGORDS
PUBLIT
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
0.5.
SERVICE
WASHINGTON
REVENUMENT
24 June 1946
My dear Mr. President:
The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge your letter
of 15 June 1946 addressed to the Secretary of War and to me, and
to refer to my conversation with you of 19 June on the general
subject of the reorganization of the War and the Navy Departments.
It is my understanding from your letter and our sub-
sequent conversation that your principal objectives are:
(1)
The creation of a single department of national
defense under a civilian head, with broad powers
of over-all supervision and control, while leav-
ing full administration of their respective
Services to the Secretaries for War, Navy, and Air.
(2)
With particular regard to the Navy -- the pre-
servation of its integrity and autonomy so as to
insure the retention of those imponderables of
spirit and morale so essential to a military
Service, and to insure also that the ability of
the future Navy to discharge its responsibility
for the security of the Nation is not impaired.
I consider the foregoing objectives attainable, and the
recognized difficulties in drafting legislation which will insure
their success, surmountable.
One of the other points in your letter of 15 June relates
to the subject of land-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-
submarine warfare, and protection of shipping. I am glad to note
that the Navy is to have a continuing part in the future development
of these operations, so that full advantage may be taken of its
experience in this field and of the lessons learned in the late war.
Admiral Nimitz joins me in this expression.
I wish to thank you for the patience with which you have
listened to the Navy's views on the reorganization of our national
defense and for the time which you have devoted to the subject. You
may be assured of my desire and that of Admiral Nimitz to cooperate
with you fully in the effort to achieve the objectives of your program.
Respectfully,
The President
The White House
James Tour 10l
SAFETY ARDHIVES MATIONAL RECORDS THENEY AND
1-A
8.5.
SERVICE
HOLD FOR RELEASE
HOLD FOR RELEASE
HOLD FOR RELEASE
June 15, 1946
CONFIDENTIAL: The following documents relating to proposed Army-Navy
unification MUST BE HEID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE until released.
CAUTION: Release is for all regular editions of newspapers appearing on the
street NOT EARLIER THAN 6:00 o' clock P.M., EASTERN STANDARD TIME, today,
Saturday, June 15, 1946. The same hour of release applies to radio com-
mentators and news broadcasters.
NOTE: This release covers all of the documents, i.e., 1, letter of the
President to the chairmen of the Senate and House committees on military
affairs and naval affairs; 2, joint report to the President by the Secretary
of War and Secretary of the Navy; 3, the reply of the President to this
report.
PLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION.
CHARLES G. ROSS
Secretary to the President.
The President today sent identical letters, as follows, to Senator
Elbort D. Thomas of Utah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs; Sonator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate
Committee on Naval Affairs; Representative Androw J. May of Kontucky, chair-
man of the House Committee on Military Affairs, and Representative Carl
Vinson of Georgia, chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs:
My dear
:
One of the most important problems confronting our
country today is the establishment of a definite military
policy.
In the solution of this problem, I consider it vital
that we have a unified armed force for our national defense.
At my request the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy have made a sincere effort to settle the differences exist-
ing between the services on this question. They have made splendid
progress.
They have reached an agreement on eight important elements
of unification, and with reference to the four upon which there was
not full agreement, their differences are not irreconcilable.
A
(OVER)
1-B
On May 31, 1946 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy delivered a report to me of the results of their efforts.
I have replied to them today stating my position on those points
submitted to me for decision.
I enclose herewith a copy of the report of the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy, together with a copy of my
reply to them.
You will note that there are now presented twelve basic
principles upon which the unification of the services can be based.
They are as follows:
1. Single military department.
There should be one Department of National Defense. It
would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the
cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with
the title of "Secretary." These secretaries would be charged with
the internal administration within their own services. They would not
be members of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,
subject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary
of National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different
functions and different organizations and for these reasons the
integrity of each service should be retained. The civilian
secretaries of the services would be members of the Council of
Common Defense and in this capacity they would have the further
opportunity to represent their respective services to the fullost
extent.
2. Three coordinated services.
There should be three coordinate services--the Army,
Havy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and
should operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the
National Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary
of National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should
be known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and
Secretary for the Air Force.
3. Aviation.
The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the
development, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military
air resources of the United States with the following exceptions,
in which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:
(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential
to Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States
Marine Corps.
1-C
(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal
administration and for air transport over routes of sole
interest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot
be met by normal air transport facilities.
(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of
personnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.
Land-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine
warfare and protection of shipping can and should be manned
by Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work
as a team there must be close cooperation, with interchange
of personnel and special training for specific duties.
Within its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation
must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity
to develop its maximum usefulnoss.
4. United States Marine Corps.
There shall be maintained as 0. constituent part of
the Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its
supporting air component to perform the following functions:
(1) Service with the Fleet in the scizure or defense of
Advanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land
operations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval
campaign.
(2) To continue the development of those aspects of
amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, tochnique,
and equipment employed by the landing forces.
(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service
on armed vessels of the Navy.
(4) To provide security detachments for protection of
Naval property at Naval stations and bases.
5. Council of National Defense.
To integrate our foreign and military policies and to
enable the military services and other agencies of government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving our national security.
The membership of this council should consist of the Secretary of
State, the civilian head of the military establishment, the civilian
heads of the military services, and the Chairman of the National
Security Resources Board, referred to below.
(OVER)
1-D
6. National Security Resources Board.
To establish, and keep up to date, policies and pro-
grams for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of
our national security. It should operate under the Council and be
composed of representatives of the military services and of other
appropriate agencies.
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic
responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate
the military programs, to make recommendations for integration
of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction
of the United States military forces.
8. No single Military Chief of Staff.
In the opinion of the War Department, the military
establishment should contain a single military Chief of Staff, who
would serve as principal military adviser, available to *offer advice
when differences of opinion arise among the military heads of the
several services. The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
should be the highest source of military advice. The War Department
is willing to omit the feature of a single Chief of Staff.
9. Central Intelligence Agency.
To compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered
by various government agencies, including the military, and to fur-
nish such information to the National Defense Council and to other
government agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the
Council. An organization along these lines, established by Executive
Order, already exists.
10. Procurement and Supply.
There should be an agency to prevent wasteful competition
in the field of military supply and procurement through joint planning
and coordination of procurement, production and distribution.
11. Research Agencies.
There should be an agency to coordinate the scientific
research and development of the military services.
12. Military Education and Training.
There should be an agency to review periodically the
several systems of education and training of personnel of the mili-
tary services and to adjust them into an integrated program.
1-E
A plan of unification containing these twelve elements has
my unqualified endorsement. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval
Operations have assured me that they will support such a plan.
It is my hope that the Congress will pass legislation
as soon as possible effecting a unification based upon these
twelve principles.
Very sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN
2-A
Following is the text of the joint letter on army and navy
unification sent to the President by Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal:
31 May 1946
TRUBEN
The President
BARRY
ARCHIFEMAND RECORDS
The White House
8.3.
ROVERNMENT
Dear Mr. President:
Pursuant to your instructions, we have reviewed the
major elements involved in establishing a greater measure
of unification among our national security organizations,
with a view to defining those matters upon which we agree
and those upon which we differ. While we regret our in-
ability to bridge completely the gap between us, we are
pleased to be able to report a. considerabl e area of agree-
ment. Sincere efforts to expand it were made by both of us.
For your convenience, we outline below those matters
upon which agreement exists and those upon which we are
unable to agree. The order of presentation is not intended
to indicate the relative importance of the various items.
I. Agreement exists on the following matters:
1. Council of Common Defense
To integrate our foreign and military policies and
to enable the military services and other agencies of
government to cooperate more effectively in matters
involving our national security. The membership of
this council should consist of the Secretary of State,
the civilian head of the military establishment (if
there be a single military department), the civilian
heads of the military services, and the Chairman of
the National Security Resources Board, referred to
below.
(OVER)
2 - B
2. National Security Resources Board
To establish, and keep up to date, policies and
programs for the maximum use of the Nation's resources
in support of our national security. It should oper-
ate under the Council and be composed of representa-
tives of the military services and of other appropriate
agencies.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic
responsibilities to the services in support. thereof,
to integrate the military programs, to make recommenda-
tions for integration of the military budget, and to
provide for the strategic direction of the United States
military forces.
4. No Single Military Chief of Staff
In the opinion of the War Department, the military
establishment should contain a single military Chief
of Staff, who would serve as principal military adviser,
available to offer advice when differences of opinion
arise among the military heads of the several services.
The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be
the highest source of military advice. The War Depart-
ment is willing to omit the feature of a single Chief
of Staff.
5. Central Intelligence Agency
To compile, analyze, and evaluate information
gathered by variouş government agencies, including the
military, and to furnish such information to the
National Security Council and to other government
agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the
Council. An organization along these lines, established
by Executive Order, already exists.
6. Procurement and Supply
There should be an agency to prevent wasteful com-
petition in the field of military supply and procure-
ment through joint planning and coordination of procure-
ment, production and distribution. If there should be
a single military department, this agency should be
within the department.
2 - C.
7. Research Agencies
There should be an agency to coordinate the scientific
research and development of the military services. If
there should be a single military department, this agency
should be within the department. The existence of such
an agency would not remove the need for an over-all
Central Research Agency.
8. Military Education and Training
There should be an agency to review periodically the
several systems of education and training of personnel
of the military services and to adjust them into an inte-
grated program. If there should be a single military
department, this agency should be within the department.
As to the agencies mentioned in 6, 7 and 8 above,
the War Department believes that these agencies will not
be fully effective except as agencies within a single
department. The Navy, on the other hand, believes that
they will be more fully offective under a coordinated
organization than under a single military department.
II. We are unable to agree on the following matters:
1. Single Military Department
War Department View
Navy Department View
The military establishment
The Navy favors uni-
should be set up as a single
fication but in a less
entity, headed by a civilian of
drastic and extreme form.
cabinet rank with authority and
It believes that serious
responsibility for the several
disadvantages will result
services. The administration
from combining the military
and supervision of the services
services into one depart-
should, Kowever, so far as pos-
ment. It would involve
sible be delegated to their re-
sacrifices of sound admin-
spective heads, in order that
istrative autonomy and
each service may have as much
essential service morale.
freedom of development as possible
and in order that the traditions
The Navy recognizes the
and prestige of each be not im-
need for a greater measure
paired.
of integration than now
exists, not only between
(Only if there is this unity
the military departments
of structure, headed by an indi-
but among all agencies of
vidual with power of decision,
government responsible for
can we achieve action where there
our national security. A
is now inaction, concerted policy
single military department
where there is now disjointed
falls short of meeting
policy, and economy of manpower,
these objectives.
OVER
2-D
resources and money where
While the Navy feels
there is now waste of them
that the measures upon
all. Any organization which
which agreement exists, as
does not facilitate prompt
set forth above, would
decision and prompt action
fully meet the needs of
thereon, totally ignoros
present conditions, it sees
scientific development and
certain advantages in
the nature of modern war.
placing a Presidential
The military security of
Deputy with clearly defined
the United States is a sin-
powers of decision over
glc objective. Accomplish-
specified matters at the
ment of this single object-
head of the Council of
ive with the greatest
Common Defense. From this
economy and officiency de-
as a starting point, it
mands unity of direction.)
should be possible to move
forward such further mea-
sures of unification as
become advisable, based on
further experience.
The Secretary of the
Navy recommends to the
President, in view of the
wide area of agreement
which presently exists,
that legislation be enacted
at once giving statutory
effect to those matters on
which there is agreement.
These steps will of them-
selves constitute a very
substantial advance over
our pre-war, and even our
present, organization for
national security. If
they are put into effect
it will be possible, in the
opinion of the Secretary of
the Navy, to meet the nine
specific objectives set
forth in the President's
message to the Congress on
December 19, 1945. Further
considerátion and study can
then be given to the remain-
ing questions on which there
is wide and general diver-
gehce of view between, and
outside of, the military
departments.
2-E
2. Three Coordinate Branches
War Department View
Navy Department View
The military establishment
The Navy feels that our
should contain three coordin-
national security requires
ate branches--naval, ground
maintenance of the integrity
and air. Each should have a
of the Navy Department,
civilian head and a military
headed by a civilian Secre-
commander. These officials
tary of Cabinet rank. Naval
should have access to the
aviation, together with sur-
President, but not Cabinet
face and subsurface compon-
rank since this would be in
ents, have been soundly
derogation of the position
integrated within the Navy.
of the civilian head of the
The Navy feels that similar
military establishment. As
integration by the Army of
was stated above, the three
its air and ground forces
branches should be given as
would be in the best inter-
much autonomy as possible.
est of our national security.
(Qur experience in the last
war clearly indicates that
However, if the alter-
parity for the Air Force-
natives were three military
and the operation of all three
departments or one, the Navy
services as a team are essen-
would prefer three depart-
tial to our national security.
ments.
Everything that we know of the
future points to an increase
rather than a decrease in the
decisive role of air power.)
3. Aviation
War Department View
Navy Department View
Responsibility for the
The Navy has no desire
development, procurement,
either to compete with, or
maintenance and operations
to dictate to, the Army Air
of the military air resources
Forces. On the other hand,
of the United States should
the Navy feels that its
be a function of the Air
experience qualifies it to
Forces with the following
judge its own aviation needs.
exceptions, in which cases
these responsibilities should
One reason for the Navy's
be vested in the U.S. Navy:
strong conviction against a
(a) Ship, carrier and water-
single department is the
based aircraft essential to
continued efforts of the Army
naval operations including
Air Forces to restrict and
(OVER)
2-F
those of the U.S. Marine
limit naval aviation. The
Corps. (b) Land-type
Navy knows that these ef-
aircraft necessary for
forts, if successful, would
essential internal adminis-
seriously impair our sea
tration and for air trans-
power and jeopardize our
port over routes of sole
national security.
interest to Naval forces
and where the requirements
To accomplish its funda-
cannot be met by normal air
mental purpose, the Navy
transport facilities. (c)
needs a certain number of
Lànd-type aircraft neces-
landplanes for naval recon-
sary for the training of
naissance, anti-submarine
personnel for (a) and (b)
warfare and protection of
above.
shipping. Experience indi-
cates that such landplanes,
(The nation cannot
to be effective, must be
afford the luxury of several
manned by naval personnel
completely self-sufficient
trained in naval warfare.
services. The war demon-
Lack of such aircraft under
strated that they must be
complete naval control as to
complementary--mutually
design, procurement, opera-
supporting. With respect
tions, personnel, training
to land planes, there are
and administration might be
no purely naval functions
disastrous to our national
which justify uneconomical
security. Similarly the
duplication of equipment
Navy must have air transport
and installations. For
essential to its needs.
example, the Air Force al-
ready performs long-range
reconnaissance for the
ground forces and itself.
The Navy's recognized re-
quirement for the products
of long-range reconnaissance
can be effectively filled
by the Air Force. As re-
gards anti-submarine war-
fare, it is the view of
the War Department that
the experience of the Army
Air Forces in the last war
adequately justifies the
belief that land based
planes operated by the
Air Forces can meet this
requirement).
2-G
4. United States Marine Corps
The Navy and the Army differ on the functions of the
United States Marine Corps as follows:
War Department View
Navy Department Views
There shall be maintained
There shall be maintained
as a constituent part of the
as a constituent part of the
Naval Service a balanced Fleet
Naval Service a balanced
Marine Force including its
Fleet Marine Force including
supporting Air Component for
its supporting Air Component
(1) service with the
for
Fleet in the seizure of enemy
(1) service with the
positions not involving sus-
Fleet in the seizure or
tained land fighting and
defense of advance Naval
Bases or for the conduct of
(2) to continue the devel-
such limited land operations
opment of tactics, techniques
as are essential to the
and equipment relating to
prosecution of a Naval cam-
those phases of amphibious
paign and
warfare which pertain to
waterborne aspects of landing
(2) to continue the
operations.
development of those aspects
of amphibious operations
which pertain to the tactics,
techniques and equipment
employed by landing forces.
There is agreement upon the other primary duties of
the Marine Corps, viz:
(1) To provide detachments and organizations for
service on armed vessels of the Navy, and
(2) To provide security detachments for protection
of Naval property at Naval stations and bases.
(OVER)
2-H
These matters have been explored by us with
a sincere desire to comply with your wishes that
the military services reach complete mutual agree-
ment. Our failure to achieve complete unanimity
is due to no reason other than that our respective
views on the points of difference are as sincere
as they are divergent.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ James Forrestal
/s/ Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of War
3-A
The text of the letter from the President to Secretaries Patterson
and Forrestal follows:
TRUNTO
June 15, 1946
"MATIONAL
ARCHIVED AND
RECORDS
U.S.
SERVICE"
Gontlemen:
I have read with care your joint report of May 31, 1946.
It was also helpful to me to have the full oral presentation of the
points involved, which you and the members of your Departments made
to me on June 4th.
I am pleased and gratified at the progress you have made.
I feel that WO have come C long way in narrowing the zono of disagree-
ment which had previously existed between the services. The full under-
stand ng reached on eight vital aspects of unification is a
significant accomplishment. These eight elements are Council of
Common Defense, National Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, omission of single Military Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence
Agency, Procurement and Supply, Research Agencies and Military
Education and Training.
In addition to these eight points of agreement, I am advised
also by representatives of both services that they are in accord in
their attitude toward the provision in the Thomas Bill, S. 2044, which
provides for four assistant secretaries in charge of Research,
Intelligence, Procurement, and Training, respectively. They believe
that such assistant secretaries are unnecessary. I agree with their
position that the presence of these four assistant secretaries is
undesirable because they would greatly complicate the internal
administration of the services and that such a plan would deprive
the secretaries of the respective services of functions which are
properly theirs.
Your report of May 31st listed four items upon which you
were unable to agree. An analysis of your comments contained in your
report, and in the lengthy discussion which we had, discloses that
the services are not nearly so far apart in their attitude toward
these points as had been reported. It is my firm conviction that the
determination of these questions in the manner which I present herein
will result in a plan which incorporates the best features offered by
the respective services.
With reference to the points upon which full agreement was
(OVER)
3-B
not reached my position is as follows:
1. Single military department.
There should be one Department of National Defense. It
would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the
cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the
title of "Secretary. These secretaries would be charged with the
internal administration within their own services. They would not be
members of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,
subject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary
of National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different
functions and different organizations and for these reasons the integrity
of each service should be retained. The civilian secretaries of the
services would be members of the Council of Common Defense and in this
capacity they would have the further opportunity to represent their
respective services to the fullest extent.
2: Three coordinated services.
There should be three coordinate services -- the Army,
Navy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and
should operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the
National Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary of
National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should be
known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and Secretary
for the Air Force.
3. Aviation.
The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the
development, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military
air resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in
which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:
(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential
to Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States
Marine Corps.
(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal
administration and for air transport over routes of sole
interest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot
be met by normal air transport facilities.
(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of
personnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.
Land-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-
submarine warfare and protection of shipping can and should
3-C
be manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services
are to work as a team there must be close cooperation, with
interchange of personnel and special training for specific
duties.
Within its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation
must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity
to develop its maximum usefulness.
4. United States Marine Corps.
There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the
Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its supporting
air component to perform the following functions:
(1) Service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of
Advanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land
operations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval
campaign.
(2) To continue the development of those aspects of
amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique,
and equipment employed by the landing forces.
(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service
on armed vessels of the Navy.
(4) To provide security detachments for protection of
Naval property at Naval stations and bases.
It is important that the basic elements of the plan of
unification be stated clearly. The cight fundamental points agreed
upon and the four points which are herewith decided, constitute a
total of twelve basic principles that should form the framework of the
program for integration.
There is no dosire or intention to affect adversely the
integrity of any of the services. They should perform their separate
functions under the unifying direction, authority and control of the
Secretary of National Defense. The internal administration of the
three services should be preserved in order that the high morale and
esprit de corps of each service can be retained.
It was gratifying to have both of you and General Eisenhower
and Admiral Nimitz assure me that you would all give your wholehearted
support to a plan of unification no matter what the decision would be
on those points upon which you did not fully agree. I know that I can
count upon all of you for full assistance in obtaining passage in the
(OVER)
IN
06027498 odd ti 90467 mir W behave 4d
dubi incluateque stole od 150m ededs and # 88 *toir of STS
chilogyn TOP entators [sloege has tennotroq to eppenoratal
3-D
Isvall 10 reqdired sit
neving od term dud bedrivisor ed don dean
galoven of
Congress of a Bill containing the twelve basic elements set forth
above.
#89700 ontick sodeds bothull od
and to true A as ed Itede sudi
off soio? ONLIGN Very sincerely yours, Levell
satwollot and motheq of disanogmes Its
98 asholob TO croaine odt at fould ont 852w service (1)
Not Hous to with 202 TO sees (svall boonevbA
Invall 8 to out of 0'18 HARRY S. TRUMAN
inglagnso
to eddoges code to edd ountines of (S)
resident edd of nistricq dolitit
galbnal ons boyo.lene bis
701 in polvong of (E)
bdd to elessov boarts DO
The Honorable
to Robert P. Patterson obivors of (d)
The 'Secretary of War. Lovell do Levell
20 no.Eg odd 10 advanolo stand odd sadt at #
adming ddyto off vylzealo bodate of
5 The Honorable toob ors deliw asalog work use bns noge
to James Forrestal Evede food aolqtoning slend to latot
The Secretary of the Navy.
101
odd douths 05 nottoodni 10 ortech on at отоль
adexpise meding bluode vodi receiving orfit to yrs to virgotal
oild to Cortnos bas snivtino odd тораш
odd to Connotns odf Incoidall to
bas sivion daid odd todd rebie nt od hlvode securios pould
od DAD outvins 11630 to equa eb singer
bas woy to died sved of sulvitions now n
bedreans.,Lock TUOY ovly the blues NOV saild oweas attain has
sd blwow notalooh oild sedm notion on to nota 5 S troaque
não I sads word I coorne you blb DOT detity gaqu no
and at agezeng antistado nt constatesa IIM 709 you to 110 позо drubs
1-A
HOLD FOR RELEASE
HOLD FOR RELEASE
HOLD FOR RELEASE
June 15, 1946
TRUNTY
CONFIDENTIAL: The following documents relating to proposed Army-Navy
ANOVE
"ИАТЮЗА,
AROHIVED AND
RECORDS
THE
unification MUST BE HEID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE until released.
U.S.
SERVICE"
SPVERTMENT
CAUTION: Release is for all regular editions of newspapers appearing on the
street NOT EARLIER THAN 6:00 o'clock P.M., EASTERN STANDARD TIME, today,
Saturday, June 15, 1946. The same hour of release applies to radio com-
mentators and news broadcasters.
NOTE: This release covers all of the documents, i.e., 1, letter of the
President to the chairmen of the Senate and House committees on military
affairs and naval affairs; 2, joint report to the President by the Secretary
of War and Secretary of the Navy; 3, the reply of the President to this
report.
PLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION.
CHARLES G. ROSS
Secretary to the President.
The President today sent identical letters, as follows, to Senator
Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs; Sonator David I. Walsh of Missachusetts, chairman of the Senate
Committee on Naval Affairs; Representative Andrew J. May of Kentucky, chair-
man of the House Committee on Military Affairs, and Representative Carl
Vinson of Goorgia, chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs:
My dear
:
One of the most important problems confronting our
country today is the establishment of a definite military
policy.
In the solution of this problem, I consider it vital
that we have a unified armed force for our national defense.
At my request the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy have made a sincere effort to settle the differences exist-
ing between the services on this question. They have made splendid
progress.
They have reached an agreement on eight important elements
of unification, and with reference to the four upon which there was
not full agreement, their differences are not irreconcilable.
(OVER)
1-B
On May 31, 1946 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy delivered a report to me of the results of their efforts.
I have replied to them today stating my position on those points
submitted to me for decision.
I enclose herewith a copy of the report of the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy, together with a copy of my
reply to them.
You will note that there are now presented twelve basic
principles upon which the unification of the services can be based.
They are as follows:
1. Single military department.
There should be one Department of National Defense. It
would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the
cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with
the title of "Secretary. " These secretaries would be charged with
the internal administration within their own services. They would not
be members of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,
subject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary
of National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different
functions and different organizations and for these reasons the
integrity of each service should be retained. The civilian
secretaries of the services would be members of the Council of
Common Defense and in this capacity they would have the further
opportunity to represent their respective services to the fullost
extent.
2. Three coordinated services.
There should be three coordinate services--the Army,
Navy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and
should operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the
National Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary
of National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should
be known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and
Secretary for the Air Force.
3. Aviation.
The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the
development, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military
air resources of the United States with the following exceptions,
in which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:
(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential
to Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States
Marine Corps.
1-C
(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal
administration and for air transport over routes of sole
interest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot
be met by normal air transport facilities.
(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of
personnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.
Land-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine
warfare and protection of shipping can and should be manned
by Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work
as a team there must be close cooperation, with interchange
of personnel and special training for specific duties.
Within its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation
must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity
to develop its maximum usefulness.
4. United States Marine Corps.
There shall be maintained as = constituent part of
the Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its
supporting air component to perform the following functions:
(1) Service with the Fleet in the scizure or dofense of
Advanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land
operations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval
campaign.
(2) To continue the development of those aspects of
amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique,
and equipment employed by the landing forces.
(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service
on armed vessels of the Navy.
(4) To provide security detachments for protection of
Naval property at Naval stations and bases.
5. Council of National Defense.
To integrate our foreign and military policies and to
enable the military services and other agencies of government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving our national security.
The membership of this council should consist of the Secretary of
State, the civilian head of the military establishment, the civilian
heads of the military services, and the Chairman of the National
Security Resources Board, referred to below.
(OVER)
1-D
6. National Security Resources Board.
To establish, and keep up to date, policies and pro-
grams for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of
our national security. It should operate under the Council and be
composed of representatives of the military services and of other
appropriate agencies.
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic
responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate
the military programs, to make recommendations for integration
of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction
of the United States military forces.
8. No single Military Chief of Staff.
In the opinion of the War Department, the military
establishment should contain a single military Chief of Staff, who
would serve as principal military adviser, available to offer advice
when differences of opinion arise among the military heads of the
several services. The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
should be the highest source of military advice. The War Department
is willing to omit the feature of a single Chief of Staff.
9. Central Intelligence Agency.
To compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered
by various government agencies, including the military, and to fur-
nish such information to the National Defense Council and to other
government agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the
Council. An organization along these lines, established by Executive
Order, already exists.
10. Procurement and Supply.
There should be an agency to prevent wasteful competition
in the field of military supply and procurement through joint planning
and coordination of procurement, production and distribution.
11. Research Agencies.
There should be an agency to coordinate the scientific
research and development of the military services.
12. Military Education and Training.
There should be an agency to review periodically the
several systems of education and training of personnel of the mili-
tary services and to adjust them into an integrated program.
1-E
A plan of unification containing these twelve elements has
my unqualified endorsement. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval
Operations have assured me that they will support such a plan.
It is my hope that the Congress will pass legislation
as soon as possible effecting a unification based upon these
twelve principles.
Very sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN
2-A
Following is the text of the joint letter on army and navy
unification sent to the President by Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal:
31 May 1946
The President
TRUMAN
MARRI
ARCHIVED AND
The White House
RECORDS
THERY
8.5.
SERVICE
Dear Mr. President:
BOVERNMENT
Pursuant to your instructions, we have reviewed the
major elements involved in establishing a greater measure
of unification among our national security organizations,
with a view to defining those matters upon which we agree
and those upon which we differ. While we regret our in-
ability to bridge completely the gap between us, we are
pleased to be able to report a considerable area of agree-
ment. Sincere efforts to expand it were made by both of us.
For your convenience, we outline below those matters
upon which agreement exists and those upon which we are
unable to agree. The order of prosentation is not intended
to indicate the relative importance of the various items.
I. Agreement exists on the following matters:
1. Council of Common Defense
To integrate our foreign and military policies and
to enable the military services and other agencies of
government to cooperate more effectively in matters
involving our national security. The membership of
this council should consist of the Secretary of State,
the civilian head of the military establishment (if
there be a single military department), the civilian
heads of the military services, and the Chairman of
the National Security Resources Board, referred to
below
(OVER)
2 - B
2. National Security Resources Board
To establish, and keep up to date, policies and
programs for the maximum use of the Nation's resources
in support of our national security. It should oper-
ate under the Council and be composed of representa-
tives of the military services and of other appropriate
agencies.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic
responsibilities to the services in support thereof,
to integrate the military programs, to make recommenda-
tions for integration of the military budget, and to
provide for the strategic direction of the United States
military forces.
4. No Single Military Chief of Staff
In the opinion of the War Department, the military
establishment should contain a single military Chief
of Staff, who would serve as principal military adviser,
available to offer advice when differences of opinion
arise among the military heads of the several services.
The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be
the highest source of military advice. The War Depart-
ment is willing to omit the feature of a single Chief
of Staff.
5. Central Intelligence Agency
To compile, analyze, and evaluate information
gathered by various government agencies, including the
military, and to furnish such information to the
National Security Council and to other government
agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the
Council. An organization along these lines, established
by Executive Order, already exists.
6. Procurement and Supply
There should be an agency to prevent wasteful com-
petition in the field of military supply and procure-
ment through joint planning and coordination of procure-
ment, production and distribution. If there should be
a single military department, this agency should be
within the department.
2 - C
7. Research Agencies
There should be an agency to coordinate the scientific
research and development of the military services. If
there should be a single military department, this agency
should be within the department. The existence of such
an agency would not remove the need for an over-all
Central Research Agency.
8, Military Education and Training
There should be an agency to review periodically the
several systems of education and training of personnel
of the military services and to adjust them into an inte-
grated program. If there should be a single military
department, this agency should be within the department.
As to the agencies mentioned in 6, 7 and 8 above,
the War Department believes that these agencies will not
be fully effective except as agencies within a single
department. The Navy, on the other hand, believes that
they will be more fully effective under a coordinated
organization than under a single military department.
II. We are unable to agree on the following matters:
1. Single Military Department
War Department View
Navy Department View
The military establishment
The Navy favors uni-
should be set up as a single
fication but in a less
entity, headed by a civilian of
drastic and extreme form.
cabinet rank with-authority and
It believes that serious
responsibility for the several
disadvantages will result
services. The administration
from combining the military
nd supervision of the services
services into one depart-
should, however, so far as pos-
ment. It would involve
sible be delogated to their re-
sacrifices of sound admin-
spective heads, in order that
istrative autonomy and
each service may have as much
essential service morale.
freedom of development as possible
and in order that the traditions
The Navy recognizes the
and prestige of each be not im-
need for a greater measure
paired.
of integration than now
exists, not only between
(Only if there is this unity
the military departments
of structure, headed by an indi-
but among all agencies of
vidual with power of decision,
government responsible for
can we achieve action where there
our national security. A
is now inaction, concerted policy
single military department
where there is now disjointed
falls short of meeting
policy, and economy of manpower,
these objectives.
OVER
2-D
resources and money where
While the Navy feels
there is now waste of them
that the measures upon
all. Any organization which
which agreement exists, as
does not facilitate prompt
set forth above, would
decision and prompt action
fully meet the needs of
thereon, totally ignores
present conditions, it sees
scientific development and
certain advantages in
the nature of modern war.
placing a Presidential
The military security of
Doputy with clearly defined
the United States is a sin-
powers of decision over
glc objective. Accomplish-
specified matters at the
ment of this single object-
head of the Council of
ive with the greatest
Common Defense. From this
economy and officiency de-
as a starting point, it
mands unity of direction.)
should be possible to move
forward such further mea-
sures of unification as
become advisable, based on
further experience.
The Secretary of the
Navy recommends to the
President, in view of the
wide area of agreement
which presently exists,
that legislation be enacted
at once giving statutory
effect to those matters on
which there is agreement.
These steps will of them-
selves constitute a very
substantial advance over
our pre-war, and even our
present, organization for
national security. If
they are put into effect
it will be possible, in the
opinion of the Secretary of
the Navy, to meet the nine
specific objectives set
forth in the President's
message to the Congress on
December 19, 1945. Further
consideration and study can
then be given to the remain-
ing questions on which there
is wide and general diver-
gence of view between, and
outside of, the military
dopartments.
2-E
2. Three Coordinate Branches
War Department View
Navy Department View
The military establishment
The Navy feels that our
should contain three coordin-
national security requires
ate branches--naval, ground
maintenance of the integrity
and air. Each should have a
of the Navy Department,
civilian head and a military
headed by a civilian Secre-
commander. These officials
tary of Cabinet rank. Naval
should have access to the
aviation, together with sur-
President, but not Cabinet
face and subsurface compon-
rank since this would be in
ents, have been soundly
derogation of the position
integrated within the Navy.
of the civilian head of the
The Navy feels that similar
military establishment. As
integration by the Army of
was stated above, the three
its air: and ground forces
branches should be given as
would be in the best inter-
much autonomy as oossible.
est of our national security.
(Our experience in the last
war clearly indicates that
However, if the alter-
parity for the Air Force
natives were three military
and the operation of all three
departments or one, the Navy
services as a team are essen-
would prefer three depart-
tial to our national security.
ments.
Everything that we know of the
future points to an increase
rather than a decrease in the
decisive role of air power.)
3. Aviation
War Department View
Navy Department View
Responsibility for the
The Navy has no desire
development, procurement,
either to compete with, or
maintenance and operations
to dictate to, the Army Air
of the military air resources
Forces. On the other hand,
of the United States should
the Navy feels that its
be a function of the Air
experience qualifies it to
Forces with the following
judge its own aviation needs.
exceptions, in which cases
these responsibilities should
One reason for the Navy's
be vested in the U.S. Navy:
strong conviction against a
(a) Ship, carrier and water-
single department is the
based aircraft ossential to
continued efforts of the Army
naval operations including
Air Forces to restrict and
(OVER)
2-F
those of the U.S. Marine
limit naval aviation. The
Corps. (b) Land-type
Navy knows that these ef-
aircraft necessary for
forts, if successful, would
essential internal adminis-
seriously impair our sea
tration and for air trans-
power and jeopardize our
port over routes of sole
national security.
interest to Naval forces
and where the requirements
To accomplish its funda-
cannot be met by normal air
mental purpose, the Navy
transport facilities. (c)
needs a certain number of
Land-type aircraft neces-
landplanes for naval recon-
sary for the training of
naissance, anti-submarine
personnel for (a) and (b)
warfare and protection of
above.
shipping. Experience indi-
cates that such landplanes,
(The nation cannot
to be effective, must be
afford the luxury of several
manned by naval personnel
completely self-sufficient
trained in naval warfare.
services. The war demon-
Lack of such aircraft under
strated that they must be
complete naval control as to
complementary--mutually
design, procurement, opera-
supporting. With respect
tions, personnel, training
to land planes, there are
and administration might be
no purely naval functions
disastrous to our national
which justify uneconomical
security. Similarly the
duplication of equipment
Navy must have air transport
and installations. For
essential to its needs.
example, the Air Force al-
ready performs long-range
reconnaissance for the
ground forces and itself.
The Navy's recognized re-
quirement for the products
of long-range reconnaissance
can be effectively filled
by the Air Force. As re-
gards anti-submarine war-
fare, it is the view of
the War Department that
the experience of the Army
Air Forces in the last war
adequately justifies the
belief that land based
planes operated by the
Air Forces can meet this
requirement).
2-G
4.
United States Marine Corps
The Navy and the Army differ on the functions of the
United States Marine Corps as follows:
War Department View
Navy Department Views
There shall be maintained
There shall be maintained
as a constituent part of the
as a constituent part of the
Naval Service a balanced Fleet
Naval Service a balanced
Marine Force including its
Fleet Marine Force including
supporting Air Component for
its supporting Air Component
(1) service with the
for
Fleet in the seizure of enemy
(1) service with the
positions not involving sus-
Fleet in the seizure or
tained land fighting and
defense of advance Naval
Bases or for the conduct of
(2) to continue the devel-
such limited land operations
opment of tactics, .techniques
as are essential to the
and equipment relating to
prosecution of a Naval cam-
those phases of amphibious
paign and
warfare which pertain to
waterborne aspects of landing
(2) to continue the
operations.
development of those aspects
of amphibious operations
which pertain to the tactics,
techniques and equipment
employed by landing forces.
There is agreement upon the other primary duties of
the Marine Corps, viz:
(1) To provide detachments and organizations for
service on armed vessels of the Navy, and
(2) To provide security detachments for protoction
of Naval property at Naval stations and bases.
(OVER)
2-H
These matters have been explored by us with
a sincere desire to comply with your wishes that
the military services reach complete mutual agree-
ment. Our failure to achieve complete unanimity
is due to no reason other than that our respective
views on the points of difference are as sincere
as they are divergent.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ James Forrestal
/s/ Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of War
3-A
The text of the letter from the President to Secretaries Patterson
and Forrestal follows:
June 15, 1946
Gentlemen:
I have read with care your joint report of May 31, 1946.
It was also helpful to me to have the full oral presentation of the
points involved, which you and the members of your Departments made
to me on June 4th.
I am pleased and gratified at the progress you have made.
I feel that WC have come & long way in narrowing the zone of disagree-
ment which had previously existed between the services. The full under-
stand: ng reached on eight vital aspects of unification is a
significant accomplishment. These eight elements are Council of
Common Defense, National Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, omission of singlo Military Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence
Agency, Procurement and Supply, Research Agencies and Military
Education and Training.
In addition to these oight points of agreement, I am advised
also by representatives of both services that they are in accord in
their attitude toward the provision in the Thomas Bill, S. 2044, which
provides for four assistant secretaries in charge of Research,
Intelligence, Procurement, and Training, respectively. They believe
that such assistant secretaries are unnecessary. I agree with their
position that the presence of these four assistant secretaries is
undesirable because they would greatly complicate the internal
administration of the services and that such a plan would deprive
the secretaries of the respective services of functions which are
properly theirs.
Your report of May 31st listed four items upon which you
were unable to agree. An analysis of your comments contained in your
report, and in the lengthy discussion which we had, discloses that
the services are not nearly so far apart in their attitude toward
these points as had been reported. It is my firm conviction that the
determination of these questions in the manner which I present herein
will result in a plan which incorporates the best features offered by
the respective services.
With reference to the points upon which full agreement was
(OVER)
3-B
not reached my position is as follows:
1. Single military department.
There should be one Department of National Defense. It
would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the
cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the
title of "Secretary." These secretaries would be charged with the
internal administration within their own services. They would not be
members of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,
subject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary
of National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different
functions and different organizations and for these reasons the integrity
of each service should be retained. The civilian secretaries of the
services would be members of the Council of Common Defense and in this
capacity they would have the further opportunity to represent their
respective services to the fullest extent.
2. Three coordinated services.
There should be three coordinate services -- the Army,
Navy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and
should operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the
National Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary of
National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should be
known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and Secretary
for the Air Force.
3. Aviation.
The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the
development, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military
air resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in
which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:
(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential
to Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States
Marine Corps.
(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal
administration and for air transport over routes of sole
interest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot
be met by normal air transport facilities.
(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of
personnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.
Land-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-
submarine warfare and protection of shipping can and should
TREMEN
AND
"NATIONAL
ARCHIVED AND
RECORDS
TOTAL
8.5.
SERVICE
3-C
GUYERTMENT
be manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services
are to work as a team there must be close cooperation, with
interchange of personnel and special training for specific
duties.
Within its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation
must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity
to develop its maximum usefulness.
4. United States Marine Corps.
There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the
Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its supporting
air component to perform the following functions:
(1) Service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of
Advanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land
operations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval
campaign.
(2) To continue the development of those aspects of
amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique,
and equipment employed by the landing forces.
(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service
on armed vessels of the Navy.
(4) To provide security detachments for protection of
Naval property at Naval stations and bases.
It is important that the basic elements of the plan of
unification be stated clearly. The cight fundamental points agreed
upon and the four points which are herewith decided, constitute a
total of twelve basic principles that should form the framework of the
program for integration.
There is no desire or intention to affect adversely the
integrity of any of the services. They should perform their separate
functions under the unifying direction, authority and control of the
Secretary of National Defense. The internal administration of the
three services should be preserved in order that the high morale and
esprit de corps of each service can be retained.
It was gratifying to have both of you and General Eisenhower
and Admiral Nimitz assure me that you would all give your wholehearted
support to a plan of unification no matter what the decision would be
on those points upon which you did not fully agree. I know that I can
count upon all of you for full assistance in obtaining passage in the
(OVER)
Page data
- Page
- 35
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- document
- Media ID
- 201b2a441c30d24c
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 159441342
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "159441342",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441342",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to President Harry S. Truman, with Attachments",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441342",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"General Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876529/876529-05-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876529/876529-05-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876529/876529-05-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 35,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "159441342",
"label": "Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to President Harry S. Truman, with Attachments",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441342"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "159441342",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441342",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to President Harry S. Truman, with Attachments",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441342",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"General Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876529/876529-05-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876529/876529-05-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876529/876529-05-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 35,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159441342",
"naId": 159441342,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"logicalDate": "1946-06-01",
"month": 6,
"year": 1946
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 35,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "document",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876529/876529-05.pdf",
"mediaId": "201b2a441c30d24c",
"ocrText": "THE\n\"NATIONA\nANORIVES AMID\nREGORDS\nPUBLIT\nTHE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY\n0.5.\nSERVICE\nWASHINGTON\nREVENUMENT\n24 June 1946\nMy dear Mr. President:\nThe purpose of this letter is to acknowledge your letter\nof 15 June 1946 addressed to the Secretary of War and to me, and\nto refer to my conversation with you of 19 June on the general\nsubject of the reorganization of the War and the Navy Departments.\nIt is my understanding from your letter and our sub-\nsequent conversation that your principal objectives are:\n(1)\nThe creation of a single department of national\ndefense under a civilian head, with broad powers\nof over-all supervision and control, while leav-\ning full administration of their respective\nServices to the Secretaries for War, Navy, and Air.\n(2)\nWith particular regard to the Navy -- the pre-\nservation of its integrity and autonomy so as to\ninsure the retention of those imponderables of\nspirit and morale so essential to a military\nService, and to insure also that the ability of\nthe future Navy to discharge its responsibility\nfor the security of the Nation is not impaired.\nI consider the foregoing objectives attainable, and the\nrecognized difficulties in drafting legislation which will insure\ntheir success, surmountable.\nOne of the other points in your letter of 15 June relates\nto the subject of land-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-\nsubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. I am glad to note\nthat the Navy is to have a continuing part in the future development\nof these operations, so that full advantage may be taken of its\nexperience in this field and of the lessons learned in the late war.\nAdmiral Nimitz joins me in this expression.\nI wish to thank you for the patience with which you have\nlistened to the Navy's views on the reorganization of our national\ndefense and for the time which you have devoted to the subject. You\nmay be assured of my desire and that of Admiral Nimitz to cooperate\nwith you fully in the effort to achieve the objectives of your program.\nRespectfully,\nThe President\nThe White House\nJames Tour 10l\nSAFETY ARDHIVES MATIONAL RECORDS THENEY AND\n1-A\n8.5.\nSERVICE\nHOLD FOR RELEASE\nHOLD FOR RELEASE\nHOLD FOR RELEASE\nJune 15, 1946\nCONFIDENTIAL: The following documents relating to proposed Army-Navy\nunification MUST BE HEID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE until released.\nCAUTION: Release is for all regular editions of newspapers appearing on the\nstreet NOT EARLIER THAN 6:00 o' clock P.M., EASTERN STANDARD TIME, today,\nSaturday, June 15, 1946. The same hour of release applies to radio com-\nmentators and news broadcasters.\nNOTE: This release covers all of the documents, i.e., 1, letter of the\nPresident to the chairmen of the Senate and House committees on military\naffairs and naval affairs; 2, joint report to the President by the Secretary\nof War and Secretary of the Navy; 3, the reply of the President to this\nreport.\nPLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION.\nCHARLES G. ROSS\nSecretary to the President.\nThe President today sent identical letters, as follows, to Senator\nElbort D. Thomas of Utah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military\nAffairs; Sonator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate\nCommittee on Naval Affairs; Representative Androw J. May of Kontucky, chair-\nman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, and Representative Carl\nVinson of Georgia, chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs:\nMy dear\n:\nOne of the most important problems confronting our\ncountry today is the establishment of a definite military\npolicy.\nIn the solution of this problem, I consider it vital\nthat we have a unified armed force for our national defense.\nAt my request the Secretary of War and the Secretary of\nthe Navy have made a sincere effort to settle the differences exist-\ning between the services on this question. They have made splendid\nprogress.\nThey have reached an agreement on eight important elements\nof unification, and with reference to the four upon which there was\nnot full agreement, their differences are not irreconcilable.\nA\n(OVER)\n1-B\nOn May 31, 1946 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of\nthe Navy delivered a report to me of the results of their efforts.\nI have replied to them today stating my position on those points\nsubmitted to me for decision.\nI enclose herewith a copy of the report of the Secretary\nof War and the Secretary of the Navy, together with a copy of my\nreply to them.\nYou will note that there are now presented twelve basic\nprinciples upon which the unification of the services can be based.\nThey are as follows:\n1. Single military department.\nThere should be one Department of National Defense. It\nwould be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the\ncabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with\nthe title of \"Secretary.\" These secretaries would be charged with\nthe internal administration within their own services. They would not\nbe members of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,\nsubject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary\nof National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different\nfunctions and different organizations and for these reasons the\nintegrity of each service should be retained. The civilian\nsecretaries of the services would be members of the Council of\nCommon Defense and in this capacity they would have the further\nopportunity to represent their respective services to the fullost\nextent.\n2. Three coordinated services.\nThere should be three coordinate services--the Army,\nHavy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and\nshould operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the\nNational Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary\nof National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should\nbe known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and\nSecretary for the Air Force.\n3. Aviation.\nThe Air Force shall have the responsibility for the\ndevelopment, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military\nair resources of the United States with the following exceptions,\nin which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:\n(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential\nto Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States\nMarine Corps.\n1-C\n(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal\nadministration and for air transport over routes of sole\ninterest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot\nbe met by normal air transport facilities.\n(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of\npersonnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.\nLand-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine\nwarfare and protection of shipping can and should be manned\nby Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work\nas a team there must be close cooperation, with interchange\nof personnel and special training for specific duties.\nWithin its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation\nmust not be restricted but must be given every opportunity\nto develop its maximum usefulnoss.\n4. United States Marine Corps.\nThere shall be maintained as 0. constituent part of\nthe Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its\nsupporting air component to perform the following functions:\n(1) Service with the Fleet in the scizure or defense of\nAdvanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land\noperations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval\ncampaign.\n(2) To continue the development of those aspects of\namphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, tochnique,\nand equipment employed by the landing forces.\n(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service\non armed vessels of the Navy.\n(4) To provide security detachments for protection of\nNaval property at Naval stations and bases.\n5. Council of National Defense.\nTo integrate our foreign and military policies and to\nenable the military services and other agencies of government to\ncooperate more effectively in matters involving our national security.\nThe membership of this council should consist of the Secretary of\nState, the civilian head of the military establishment, the civilian\nheads of the military services, and the Chairman of the National\nSecurity Resources Board, referred to below.\n(OVER)\n1-D\n6. National Security Resources Board.\nTo establish, and keep up to date, policies and pro-\ngrams for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of\nour national security. It should operate under the Council and be\ncomposed of representatives of the military services and of other\nappropriate agencies.\n7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nTo formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic\nresponsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate\nthe military programs, to make recommendations for integration\nof the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction\nof the United States military forces.\n8. No single Military Chief of Staff.\nIn the opinion of the War Department, the military\nestablishment should contain a single military Chief of Staff, who\nwould serve as principal military adviser, available to *offer advice\nwhen differences of opinion arise among the military heads of the\nseveral services. The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nshould be the highest source of military advice. The War Department\nis willing to omit the feature of a single Chief of Staff.\n9. Central Intelligence Agency.\nTo compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered\nby various government agencies, including the military, and to fur-\nnish such information to the National Defense Council and to other\ngovernment agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the\nCouncil. An organization along these lines, established by Executive\nOrder, already exists.\n10. Procurement and Supply.\nThere should be an agency to prevent wasteful competition\nin the field of military supply and procurement through joint planning\nand coordination of procurement, production and distribution.\n11. Research Agencies.\nThere should be an agency to coordinate the scientific\nresearch and development of the military services.\n12. Military Education and Training.\nThere should be an agency to review periodically the\nseveral systems of education and training of personnel of the mili-\ntary services and to adjust them into an integrated program.\n1-E\nA plan of unification containing these twelve elements has\nmy unqualified endorsement. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of\nthe Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval\nOperations have assured me that they will support such a plan.\nIt is my hope that the Congress will pass legislation\nas soon as possible effecting a unification based upon these\ntwelve principles.\nVery sincerely yours,\nHARRY S. TRUMAN\n2-A\nFollowing is the text of the joint letter on army and navy\nunification sent to the President by Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal:\n31 May 1946\nTRUBEN\nThe President\nBARRY\nARCHIFEMAND RECORDS\nThe White House\n8.3.\nROVERNMENT\nDear Mr. President:\nPursuant to your instructions, we have reviewed the\nmajor elements involved in establishing a greater measure\nof unification among our national security organizations,\nwith a view to defining those matters upon which we agree\nand those upon which we differ. While we regret our in-\nability to bridge completely the gap between us, we are\npleased to be able to report a. considerabl e area of agree-\nment. Sincere efforts to expand it were made by both of us.\nFor your convenience, we outline below those matters\nupon which agreement exists and those upon which we are\nunable to agree. The order of presentation is not intended\nto indicate the relative importance of the various items.\nI. Agreement exists on the following matters:\n1. Council of Common Defense\nTo integrate our foreign and military policies and\nto enable the military services and other agencies of\ngovernment to cooperate more effectively in matters\ninvolving our national security. The membership of\nthis council should consist of the Secretary of State,\nthe civilian head of the military establishment (if\nthere be a single military department), the civilian\nheads of the military services, and the Chairman of\nthe National Security Resources Board, referred to\nbelow.\n(OVER)\n2 - B\n2. National Security Resources Board\nTo establish, and keep up to date, policies and\nprograms for the maximum use of the Nation's resources\nin support of our national security. It should oper-\nate under the Council and be composed of representa-\ntives of the military services and of other appropriate\nagencies.\n3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff\nTo formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic\nresponsibilities to the services in support. thereof,\nto integrate the military programs, to make recommenda-\ntions for integration of the military budget, and to\nprovide for the strategic direction of the United States\nmilitary forces.\n4. No Single Military Chief of Staff\nIn the opinion of the War Department, the military\nestablishment should contain a single military Chief\nof Staff, who would serve as principal military adviser,\navailable to offer advice when differences of opinion\narise among the military heads of the several services.\nThe Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be\nthe highest source of military advice. The War Depart-\nment is willing to omit the feature of a single Chief\nof Staff.\n5. Central Intelligence Agency\nTo compile, analyze, and evaluate information\ngathered by variouş government agencies, including the\nmilitary, and to furnish such information to the\nNational Security Council and to other government\nagencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the\nCouncil. An organization along these lines, established\nby Executive Order, already exists.\n6. Procurement and Supply\nThere should be an agency to prevent wasteful com-\npetition in the field of military supply and procure-\nment through joint planning and coordination of procure-\nment, production and distribution. If there should be\na single military department, this agency should be\nwithin the department.\n2 - C.\n7. Research Agencies\nThere should be an agency to coordinate the scientific\nresearch and development of the military services. If\nthere should be a single military department, this agency\nshould be within the department. The existence of such\nan agency would not remove the need for an over-all\nCentral Research Agency.\n8. Military Education and Training\nThere should be an agency to review periodically the\nseveral systems of education and training of personnel\nof the military services and to adjust them into an inte-\ngrated program. If there should be a single military\ndepartment, this agency should be within the department.\nAs to the agencies mentioned in 6, 7 and 8 above,\nthe War Department believes that these agencies will not\nbe fully effective except as agencies within a single\ndepartment. The Navy, on the other hand, believes that\nthey will be more fully offective under a coordinated\norganization than under a single military department.\nII. We are unable to agree on the following matters:\n1. Single Military Department\nWar Department View\nNavy Department View\nThe military establishment\nThe Navy favors uni-\nshould be set up as a single\nfication but in a less\nentity, headed by a civilian of\ndrastic and extreme form.\ncabinet rank with authority and\nIt believes that serious\nresponsibility for the several\ndisadvantages will result\nservices. The administration\nfrom combining the military\nand supervision of the services\nservices into one depart-\nshould, Kowever, so far as pos-\nment. It would involve\nsible be delegated to their re-\nsacrifices of sound admin-\nspective heads, in order that\nistrative autonomy and\neach service may have as much\nessential service morale.\nfreedom of development as possible\nand in order that the traditions\nThe Navy recognizes the\nand prestige of each be not im-\nneed for a greater measure\npaired.\nof integration than now\nexists, not only between\n(Only if there is this unity\nthe military departments\nof structure, headed by an indi-\nbut among all agencies of\nvidual with power of decision,\ngovernment responsible for\ncan we achieve action where there\nour national security. A\nis now inaction, concerted policy\nsingle military department\nwhere there is now disjointed\nfalls short of meeting\npolicy, and economy of manpower,\nthese objectives.\nOVER\n2-D\nresources and money where\nWhile the Navy feels\nthere is now waste of them\nthat the measures upon\nall. Any organization which\nwhich agreement exists, as\ndoes not facilitate prompt\nset forth above, would\ndecision and prompt action\nfully meet the needs of\nthereon, totally ignoros\npresent conditions, it sees\nscientific development and\ncertain advantages in\nthe nature of modern war.\nplacing a Presidential\nThe military security of\nDeputy with clearly defined\nthe United States is a sin-\npowers of decision over\nglc objective. Accomplish-\nspecified matters at the\nment of this single object-\nhead of the Council of\nive with the greatest\nCommon Defense. From this\neconomy and officiency de-\nas a starting point, it\nmands unity of direction.)\nshould be possible to move\nforward such further mea-\nsures of unification as\nbecome advisable, based on\nfurther experience.\nThe Secretary of the\nNavy recommends to the\nPresident, in view of the\nwide area of agreement\nwhich presently exists,\nthat legislation be enacted\nat once giving statutory\neffect to those matters on\nwhich there is agreement.\nThese steps will of them-\nselves constitute a very\nsubstantial advance over\nour pre-war, and even our\npresent, organization for\nnational security. If\nthey are put into effect\nit will be possible, in the\nopinion of the Secretary of\nthe Navy, to meet the nine\nspecific objectives set\nforth in the President's\nmessage to the Congress on\nDecember 19, 1945. Further\nconsiderátion and study can\nthen be given to the remain-\ning questions on which there\nis wide and general diver-\ngehce of view between, and\noutside of, the military\ndepartments.\n2-E\n2. Three Coordinate Branches\nWar Department View\nNavy Department View\nThe military establishment\nThe Navy feels that our\nshould contain three coordin-\nnational security requires\nate branches--naval, ground\nmaintenance of the integrity\nand air. Each should have a\nof the Navy Department,\ncivilian head and a military\nheaded by a civilian Secre-\ncommander. These officials\ntary of Cabinet rank. Naval\nshould have access to the\naviation, together with sur-\nPresident, but not Cabinet\nface and subsurface compon-\nrank since this would be in\nents, have been soundly\nderogation of the position\nintegrated within the Navy.\nof the civilian head of the\nThe Navy feels that similar\nmilitary establishment. As\nintegration by the Army of\nwas stated above, the three\nits air and ground forces\nbranches should be given as\nwould be in the best inter-\nmuch autonomy as possible.\nest of our national security.\n(Qur experience in the last\nwar clearly indicates that\nHowever, if the alter-\nparity for the Air Force-\nnatives were three military\nand the operation of all three\ndepartments or one, the Navy\nservices as a team are essen-\nwould prefer three depart-\ntial to our national security.\nments.\nEverything that we know of the\nfuture points to an increase\nrather than a decrease in the\ndecisive role of air power.)\n3. Aviation\nWar Department View\nNavy Department View\nResponsibility for the\nThe Navy has no desire\ndevelopment, procurement,\neither to compete with, or\nmaintenance and operations\nto dictate to, the Army Air\nof the military air resources\nForces. On the other hand,\nof the United States should\nthe Navy feels that its\nbe a function of the Air\nexperience qualifies it to\nForces with the following\njudge its own aviation needs.\nexceptions, in which cases\nthese responsibilities should\nOne reason for the Navy's\nbe vested in the U.S. Navy:\nstrong conviction against a\n(a) Ship, carrier and water-\nsingle department is the\nbased aircraft essential to\ncontinued efforts of the Army\nnaval operations including\nAir Forces to restrict and\n(OVER)\n2-F\nthose of the U.S. Marine\nlimit naval aviation. The\nCorps. (b) Land-type\nNavy knows that these ef-\naircraft necessary for\nforts, if successful, would\nessential internal adminis-\nseriously impair our sea\ntration and for air trans-\npower and jeopardize our\nport over routes of sole\nnational security.\ninterest to Naval forces\nand where the requirements\nTo accomplish its funda-\ncannot be met by normal air\nmental purpose, the Navy\ntransport facilities. (c)\nneeds a certain number of\nLànd-type aircraft neces-\nlandplanes for naval recon-\nsary for the training of\nnaissance, anti-submarine\npersonnel for (a) and (b)\nwarfare and protection of\nabove.\nshipping. Experience indi-\ncates that such landplanes,\n(The nation cannot\nto be effective, must be\nafford the luxury of several\nmanned by naval personnel\ncompletely self-sufficient\ntrained in naval warfare.\nservices. The war demon-\nLack of such aircraft under\nstrated that they must be\ncomplete naval control as to\ncomplementary--mutually\ndesign, procurement, opera-\nsupporting. With respect\ntions, personnel, training\nto land planes, there are\nand administration might be\nno purely naval functions\ndisastrous to our national\nwhich justify uneconomical\nsecurity. Similarly the\nduplication of equipment\nNavy must have air transport\nand installations. For\nessential to its needs.\nexample, the Air Force al-\nready performs long-range\nreconnaissance for the\nground forces and itself.\nThe Navy's recognized re-\nquirement for the products\nof long-range reconnaissance\ncan be effectively filled\nby the Air Force. As re-\ngards anti-submarine war-\nfare, it is the view of\nthe War Department that\nthe experience of the Army\nAir Forces in the last war\nadequately justifies the\nbelief that land based\nplanes operated by the\nAir Forces can meet this\nrequirement).\n2-G\n4. United States Marine Corps\nThe Navy and the Army differ on the functions of the\nUnited States Marine Corps as follows:\nWar Department View\nNavy Department Views\nThere shall be maintained\nThere shall be maintained\nas a constituent part of the\nas a constituent part of the\nNaval Service a balanced Fleet\nNaval Service a balanced\nMarine Force including its\nFleet Marine Force including\nsupporting Air Component for\nits supporting Air Component\n(1) service with the\nfor\nFleet in the seizure of enemy\n(1) service with the\npositions not involving sus-\nFleet in the seizure or\ntained land fighting and\ndefense of advance Naval\nBases or for the conduct of\n(2) to continue the devel-\nsuch limited land operations\nopment of tactics, techniques\nas are essential to the\nand equipment relating to\nprosecution of a Naval cam-\nthose phases of amphibious\npaign and\nwarfare which pertain to\nwaterborne aspects of landing\n(2) to continue the\noperations.\ndevelopment of those aspects\nof amphibious operations\nwhich pertain to the tactics,\ntechniques and equipment\nemployed by landing forces.\nThere is agreement upon the other primary duties of\nthe Marine Corps, viz:\n(1) To provide detachments and organizations for\nservice on armed vessels of the Navy, and\n(2) To provide security detachments for protection\nof Naval property at Naval stations and bases.\n(OVER)\n2-H\nThese matters have been explored by us with\na sincere desire to comply with your wishes that\nthe military services reach complete mutual agree-\nment. Our failure to achieve complete unanimity\nis due to no reason other than that our respective\nviews on the points of difference are as sincere\nas they are divergent.\nFaithfully yours,\n/s/ James Forrestal\n/s/ Robert P. Patterson\nSecretary of the Navy\nSecretary of War\n3-A\nThe text of the letter from the President to Secretaries Patterson\nand Forrestal follows:\nTRUNTO\nJune 15, 1946\n\"MATIONAL\nARCHIVED AND\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGontlemen:\nI have read with care your joint report of May 31, 1946.\nIt was also helpful to me to have the full oral presentation of the\npoints involved, which you and the members of your Departments made\nto me on June 4th.\nI am pleased and gratified at the progress you have made.\nI feel that WO have come C long way in narrowing the zono of disagree-\nment which had previously existed between the services. The full under-\nstand ng reached on eight vital aspects of unification is a\nsignificant accomplishment. These eight elements are Council of\nCommon Defense, National Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs of\nStaff, omission of single Military Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence\nAgency, Procurement and Supply, Research Agencies and Military\nEducation and Training.\nIn addition to these eight points of agreement, I am advised\nalso by representatives of both services that they are in accord in\ntheir attitude toward the provision in the Thomas Bill, S. 2044, which\nprovides for four assistant secretaries in charge of Research,\nIntelligence, Procurement, and Training, respectively. They believe\nthat such assistant secretaries are unnecessary. I agree with their\nposition that the presence of these four assistant secretaries is\nundesirable because they would greatly complicate the internal\nadministration of the services and that such a plan would deprive\nthe secretaries of the respective services of functions which are\nproperly theirs.\nYour report of May 31st listed four items upon which you\nwere unable to agree. An analysis of your comments contained in your\nreport, and in the lengthy discussion which we had, discloses that\nthe services are not nearly so far apart in their attitude toward\nthese points as had been reported. It is my firm conviction that the\ndetermination of these questions in the manner which I present herein\nwill result in a plan which incorporates the best features offered by\nthe respective services.\nWith reference to the points upon which full agreement was\n(OVER)\n3-B\nnot reached my position is as follows:\n1. Single military department.\nThere should be one Department of National Defense. It\nwould be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the\ncabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the\ntitle of \"Secretary. These secretaries would be charged with the\ninternal administration within their own services. They would not be\nmembers of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,\nsubject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary\nof National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different\nfunctions and different organizations and for these reasons the integrity\nof each service should be retained. The civilian secretaries of the\nservices would be members of the Council of Common Defense and in this\ncapacity they would have the further opportunity to represent their\nrespective services to the fullest extent.\n2: Three coordinated services.\nThere should be three coordinate services -- the Army,\nNavy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and\nshould operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the\nNational Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary of\nNational Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should be\nknown as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and Secretary\nfor the Air Force.\n3. Aviation.\nThe Air Force shall have the responsibility for the\ndevelopment, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military\nair resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in\nwhich responsibility must be vested in the Navy:\n(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential\nto Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States\nMarine Corps.\n(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal\nadministration and for air transport over routes of sole\ninterest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot\nbe met by normal air transport facilities.\n(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of\npersonnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.\nLand-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-\nsubmarine warfare and protection of shipping can and should\n3-C\nbe manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services\nare to work as a team there must be close cooperation, with\ninterchange of personnel and special training for specific\nduties.\nWithin its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation\nmust not be restricted but must be given every opportunity\nto develop its maximum usefulness.\n4. United States Marine Corps.\nThere shall be maintained as a constituent part of the\nNaval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its supporting\nair component to perform the following functions:\n(1) Service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of\nAdvanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land\noperations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval\ncampaign.\n(2) To continue the development of those aspects of\namphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique,\nand equipment employed by the landing forces.\n(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service\non armed vessels of the Navy.\n(4) To provide security detachments for protection of\nNaval property at Naval stations and bases.\nIt is important that the basic elements of the plan of\nunification be stated clearly. The cight fundamental points agreed\nupon and the four points which are herewith decided, constitute a\ntotal of twelve basic principles that should form the framework of the\nprogram for integration.\nThere is no dosire or intention to affect adversely the\nintegrity of any of the services. They should perform their separate\nfunctions under the unifying direction, authority and control of the\nSecretary of National Defense. The internal administration of the\nthree services should be preserved in order that the high morale and\nesprit de corps of each service can be retained.\nIt was gratifying to have both of you and General Eisenhower\nand Admiral Nimitz assure me that you would all give your wholehearted\nsupport to a plan of unification no matter what the decision would be\non those points upon which you did not fully agree. I know that I can\ncount upon all of you for full assistance in obtaining passage in the\n(OVER)\nIN\n06027498 odd ti 90467 mir W behave 4d\ndubi incluateque stole od 150m ededs and # 88 *toir of STS\nchilogyn TOP entators [sloege has tennotroq to eppenoratal\n3-D\nIsvall 10 reqdired sit\nneving od term dud bedrivisor ed don dean\ngaloven of\nCongress of a Bill containing the twelve basic elements set forth\nabove.\n#89700 ontick sodeds bothull od\nand to true A as ed Itede sudi\noff soio? ONLIGN Very sincerely yours, Levell\nsatwollot and motheq of disanogmes Its\n98 asholob TO croaine odt at fould ont 852w service (1)\nNot Hous to with 202 TO sees (svall boonevbA\nInvall 8 to out of 0'18 HARRY S. TRUMAN\ninglagnso\nto eddoges code to edd ountines of (S)\nresident edd of nistricq dolitit\ngalbnal ons boyo.lene bis\n701 in polvong of (E)\nbdd to elessov boarts DO\nThe Honorable\nto Robert P. Patterson obivors of (d)\nThe 'Secretary of War. Lovell do Levell\n20 no.Eg odd 10 advanolo stand odd sadt at #\nadming ddyto off vylzealo bodate of\n5 The Honorable toob ors deliw asalog work use bns noge\nto James Forrestal Evede food aolqtoning slend to latot\nThe Secretary of the Navy.\n101\nodd douths 05 nottoodni 10 ortech on at отоль\nadexpise meding bluode vodi receiving orfit to yrs to virgotal\noild to Cortnos bas snivtino odd тораш\nodd to Connotns odf Incoidall to\nbas sivion daid odd todd rebie nt od hlvode securios pould\nod DAD outvins 11630 to equa eb singer\nbas woy to died sved of sulvitions now n\nbedreans.,Lock TUOY ovly the blues NOV saild oweas attain has\nsd blwow notalooh oild sedm notion on to nota 5 S troaque\nnão I sads word I coorne you blb DOT detity gaqu no\nand at agezeng antistado nt constatesa IIM 709 you to 110 позо drubs\n1-A\nHOLD FOR RELEASE\nHOLD FOR RELEASE\nHOLD FOR RELEASE\nJune 15, 1946\nTRUNTY\nCONFIDENTIAL: The following documents relating to proposed Army-Navy\nANOVE\n\"ИАТЮЗА,\nAROHIVED AND\nRECORDS\nTHE\nunification MUST BE HEID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE until released.\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nSPVERTMENT\nCAUTION: Release is for all regular editions of newspapers appearing on the\nstreet NOT EARLIER THAN 6:00 o'clock P.M., EASTERN STANDARD TIME, today,\nSaturday, June 15, 1946. The same hour of release applies to radio com-\nmentators and news broadcasters.\nNOTE: This release covers all of the documents, i.e., 1, letter of the\nPresident to the chairmen of the Senate and House committees on military\naffairs and naval affairs; 2, joint report to the President by the Secretary\nof War and Secretary of the Navy; 3, the reply of the President to this\nreport.\nPLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION.\nCHARLES G. ROSS\nSecretary to the President.\nThe President today sent identical letters, as follows, to Senator\nElbert D. Thomas of Utah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military\nAffairs; Sonator David I. Walsh of Missachusetts, chairman of the Senate\nCommittee on Naval Affairs; Representative Andrew J. May of Kentucky, chair-\nman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, and Representative Carl\nVinson of Goorgia, chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs:\nMy dear\n:\nOne of the most important problems confronting our\ncountry today is the establishment of a definite military\npolicy.\nIn the solution of this problem, I consider it vital\nthat we have a unified armed force for our national defense.\nAt my request the Secretary of War and the Secretary of\nthe Navy have made a sincere effort to settle the differences exist-\ning between the services on this question. They have made splendid\nprogress.\nThey have reached an agreement on eight important elements\nof unification, and with reference to the four upon which there was\nnot full agreement, their differences are not irreconcilable.\n(OVER)\n1-B\nOn May 31, 1946 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of\nthe Navy delivered a report to me of the results of their efforts.\nI have replied to them today stating my position on those points\nsubmitted to me for decision.\nI enclose herewith a copy of the report of the Secretary\nof War and the Secretary of the Navy, together with a copy of my\nreply to them.\nYou will note that there are now presented twelve basic\nprinciples upon which the unification of the services can be based.\nThey are as follows:\n1. Single military department.\nThere should be one Department of National Defense. It\nwould be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the\ncabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with\nthe title of \"Secretary. \" These secretaries would be charged with\nthe internal administration within their own services. They would not\nbe members of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,\nsubject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary\nof National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different\nfunctions and different organizations and for these reasons the\nintegrity of each service should be retained. The civilian\nsecretaries of the services would be members of the Council of\nCommon Defense and in this capacity they would have the further\nopportunity to represent their respective services to the fullost\nextent.\n2. Three coordinated services.\nThere should be three coordinate services--the Army,\nNavy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and\nshould operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the\nNational Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary\nof National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should\nbe known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and\nSecretary for the Air Force.\n3. Aviation.\nThe Air Force shall have the responsibility for the\ndevelopment, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military\nair resources of the United States with the following exceptions,\nin which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:\n(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential\nto Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States\nMarine Corps.\n1-C\n(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal\nadministration and for air transport over routes of sole\ninterest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot\nbe met by normal air transport facilities.\n(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of\npersonnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.\nLand-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine\nwarfare and protection of shipping can and should be manned\nby Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work\nas a team there must be close cooperation, with interchange\nof personnel and special training for specific duties.\nWithin its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation\nmust not be restricted but must be given every opportunity\nto develop its maximum usefulness.\n4. United States Marine Corps.\nThere shall be maintained as = constituent part of\nthe Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its\nsupporting air component to perform the following functions:\n(1) Service with the Fleet in the scizure or dofense of\nAdvanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land\noperations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval\ncampaign.\n(2) To continue the development of those aspects of\namphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique,\nand equipment employed by the landing forces.\n(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service\non armed vessels of the Navy.\n(4) To provide security detachments for protection of\nNaval property at Naval stations and bases.\n5. Council of National Defense.\nTo integrate our foreign and military policies and to\nenable the military services and other agencies of government to\ncooperate more effectively in matters involving our national security.\nThe membership of this council should consist of the Secretary of\nState, the civilian head of the military establishment, the civilian\nheads of the military services, and the Chairman of the National\nSecurity Resources Board, referred to below.\n(OVER)\n1-D\n6. National Security Resources Board.\nTo establish, and keep up to date, policies and pro-\ngrams for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of\nour national security. It should operate under the Council and be\ncomposed of representatives of the military services and of other\nappropriate agencies.\n7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nTo formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic\nresponsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate\nthe military programs, to make recommendations for integration\nof the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction\nof the United States military forces.\n8. No single Military Chief of Staff.\nIn the opinion of the War Department, the military\nestablishment should contain a single military Chief of Staff, who\nwould serve as principal military adviser, available to offer advice\nwhen differences of opinion arise among the military heads of the\nseveral services. The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nshould be the highest source of military advice. The War Department\nis willing to omit the feature of a single Chief of Staff.\n9. Central Intelligence Agency.\nTo compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered\nby various government agencies, including the military, and to fur-\nnish such information to the National Defense Council and to other\ngovernment agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the\nCouncil. An organization along these lines, established by Executive\nOrder, already exists.\n10. Procurement and Supply.\nThere should be an agency to prevent wasteful competition\nin the field of military supply and procurement through joint planning\nand coordination of procurement, production and distribution.\n11. Research Agencies.\nThere should be an agency to coordinate the scientific\nresearch and development of the military services.\n12. Military Education and Training.\nThere should be an agency to review periodically the\nseveral systems of education and training of personnel of the mili-\ntary services and to adjust them into an integrated program.\n1-E\nA plan of unification containing these twelve elements has\nmy unqualified endorsement. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of\nthe Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval\nOperations have assured me that they will support such a plan.\nIt is my hope that the Congress will pass legislation\nas soon as possible effecting a unification based upon these\ntwelve principles.\nVery sincerely yours,\nHARRY S. TRUMAN\n2-A\nFollowing is the text of the joint letter on army and navy\nunification sent to the President by Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal:\n31 May 1946\nThe President\nTRUMAN\nMARRI\nARCHIVED AND\nThe White House\nRECORDS\nTHERY\n8.5.\nSERVICE\nDear Mr. President:\nBOVERNMENT\nPursuant to your instructions, we have reviewed the\nmajor elements involved in establishing a greater measure\nof unification among our national security organizations,\nwith a view to defining those matters upon which we agree\nand those upon which we differ. While we regret our in-\nability to bridge completely the gap between us, we are\npleased to be able to report a considerable area of agree-\nment. Sincere efforts to expand it were made by both of us.\nFor your convenience, we outline below those matters\nupon which agreement exists and those upon which we are\nunable to agree. The order of prosentation is not intended\nto indicate the relative importance of the various items.\nI. Agreement exists on the following matters:\n1. Council of Common Defense\nTo integrate our foreign and military policies and\nto enable the military services and other agencies of\ngovernment to cooperate more effectively in matters\ninvolving our national security. The membership of\nthis council should consist of the Secretary of State,\nthe civilian head of the military establishment (if\nthere be a single military department), the civilian\nheads of the military services, and the Chairman of\nthe National Security Resources Board, referred to\nbelow\n(OVER)\n2 - B\n2. National Security Resources Board\nTo establish, and keep up to date, policies and\nprograms for the maximum use of the Nation's resources\nin support of our national security. It should oper-\nate under the Council and be composed of representa-\ntives of the military services and of other appropriate\nagencies.\n3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff\nTo formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic\nresponsibilities to the services in support thereof,\nto integrate the military programs, to make recommenda-\ntions for integration of the military budget, and to\nprovide for the strategic direction of the United States\nmilitary forces.\n4. No Single Military Chief of Staff\nIn the opinion of the War Department, the military\nestablishment should contain a single military Chief\nof Staff, who would serve as principal military adviser,\navailable to offer advice when differences of opinion\narise among the military heads of the several services.\nThe Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be\nthe highest source of military advice. The War Depart-\nment is willing to omit the feature of a single Chief\nof Staff.\n5. Central Intelligence Agency\nTo compile, analyze, and evaluate information\ngathered by various government agencies, including the\nmilitary, and to furnish such information to the\nNational Security Council and to other government\nagencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the\nCouncil. An organization along these lines, established\nby Executive Order, already exists.\n6. Procurement and Supply\nThere should be an agency to prevent wasteful com-\npetition in the field of military supply and procure-\nment through joint planning and coordination of procure-\nment, production and distribution. If there should be\na single military department, this agency should be\nwithin the department.\n2 - C\n7. Research Agencies\nThere should be an agency to coordinate the scientific\nresearch and development of the military services. If\nthere should be a single military department, this agency\nshould be within the department. The existence of such\nan agency would not remove the need for an over-all\nCentral Research Agency.\n8, Military Education and Training\nThere should be an agency to review periodically the\nseveral systems of education and training of personnel\nof the military services and to adjust them into an inte-\ngrated program. If there should be a single military\ndepartment, this agency should be within the department.\nAs to the agencies mentioned in 6, 7 and 8 above,\nthe War Department believes that these agencies will not\nbe fully effective except as agencies within a single\ndepartment. The Navy, on the other hand, believes that\nthey will be more fully effective under a coordinated\norganization than under a single military department.\nII. We are unable to agree on the following matters:\n1. Single Military Department\nWar Department View\nNavy Department View\nThe military establishment\nThe Navy favors uni-\nshould be set up as a single\nfication but in a less\nentity, headed by a civilian of\ndrastic and extreme form.\ncabinet rank with-authority and\nIt believes that serious\nresponsibility for the several\ndisadvantages will result\nservices. The administration\nfrom combining the military\nnd supervision of the services\nservices into one depart-\nshould, however, so far as pos-\nment. It would involve\nsible be delogated to their re-\nsacrifices of sound admin-\nspective heads, in order that\nistrative autonomy and\neach service may have as much\nessential service morale.\nfreedom of development as possible\nand in order that the traditions\nThe Navy recognizes the\nand prestige of each be not im-\nneed for a greater measure\npaired.\nof integration than now\nexists, not only between\n(Only if there is this unity\nthe military departments\nof structure, headed by an indi-\nbut among all agencies of\nvidual with power of decision,\ngovernment responsible for\ncan we achieve action where there\nour national security. A\nis now inaction, concerted policy\nsingle military department\nwhere there is now disjointed\nfalls short of meeting\npolicy, and economy of manpower,\nthese objectives.\nOVER\n2-D\nresources and money where\nWhile the Navy feels\nthere is now waste of them\nthat the measures upon\nall. Any organization which\nwhich agreement exists, as\ndoes not facilitate prompt\nset forth above, would\ndecision and prompt action\nfully meet the needs of\nthereon, totally ignores\npresent conditions, it sees\nscientific development and\ncertain advantages in\nthe nature of modern war.\nplacing a Presidential\nThe military security of\nDoputy with clearly defined\nthe United States is a sin-\npowers of decision over\nglc objective. Accomplish-\nspecified matters at the\nment of this single object-\nhead of the Council of\nive with the greatest\nCommon Defense. From this\neconomy and officiency de-\nas a starting point, it\nmands unity of direction.)\nshould be possible to move\nforward such further mea-\nsures of unification as\nbecome advisable, based on\nfurther experience.\nThe Secretary of the\nNavy recommends to the\nPresident, in view of the\nwide area of agreement\nwhich presently exists,\nthat legislation be enacted\nat once giving statutory\neffect to those matters on\nwhich there is agreement.\nThese steps will of them-\nselves constitute a very\nsubstantial advance over\nour pre-war, and even our\npresent, organization for\nnational security. If\nthey are put into effect\nit will be possible, in the\nopinion of the Secretary of\nthe Navy, to meet the nine\nspecific objectives set\nforth in the President's\nmessage to the Congress on\nDecember 19, 1945. Further\nconsideration and study can\nthen be given to the remain-\ning questions on which there\nis wide and general diver-\ngence of view between, and\noutside of, the military\ndopartments.\n2-E\n2. Three Coordinate Branches\nWar Department View\nNavy Department View\nThe military establishment\nThe Navy feels that our\nshould contain three coordin-\nnational security requires\nate branches--naval, ground\nmaintenance of the integrity\nand air. Each should have a\nof the Navy Department,\ncivilian head and a military\nheaded by a civilian Secre-\ncommander. These officials\ntary of Cabinet rank. Naval\nshould have access to the\naviation, together with sur-\nPresident, but not Cabinet\nface and subsurface compon-\nrank since this would be in\nents, have been soundly\nderogation of the position\nintegrated within the Navy.\nof the civilian head of the\nThe Navy feels that similar\nmilitary establishment. As\nintegration by the Army of\nwas stated above, the three\nits air: and ground forces\nbranches should be given as\nwould be in the best inter-\nmuch autonomy as oossible.\nest of our national security.\n(Our experience in the last\nwar clearly indicates that\nHowever, if the alter-\nparity for the Air Force\nnatives were three military\nand the operation of all three\ndepartments or one, the Navy\nservices as a team are essen-\nwould prefer three depart-\ntial to our national security.\nments.\nEverything that we know of the\nfuture points to an increase\nrather than a decrease in the\ndecisive role of air power.)\n3. Aviation\nWar Department View\nNavy Department View\nResponsibility for the\nThe Navy has no desire\ndevelopment, procurement,\neither to compete with, or\nmaintenance and operations\nto dictate to, the Army Air\nof the military air resources\nForces. On the other hand,\nof the United States should\nthe Navy feels that its\nbe a function of the Air\nexperience qualifies it to\nForces with the following\njudge its own aviation needs.\nexceptions, in which cases\nthese responsibilities should\nOne reason for the Navy's\nbe vested in the U.S. Navy:\nstrong conviction against a\n(a) Ship, carrier and water-\nsingle department is the\nbased aircraft ossential to\ncontinued efforts of the Army\nnaval operations including\nAir Forces to restrict and\n(OVER)\n2-F\nthose of the U.S. Marine\nlimit naval aviation. The\nCorps. (b) Land-type\nNavy knows that these ef-\naircraft necessary for\nforts, if successful, would\nessential internal adminis-\nseriously impair our sea\ntration and for air trans-\npower and jeopardize our\nport over routes of sole\nnational security.\ninterest to Naval forces\nand where the requirements\nTo accomplish its funda-\ncannot be met by normal air\nmental purpose, the Navy\ntransport facilities. (c)\nneeds a certain number of\nLand-type aircraft neces-\nlandplanes for naval recon-\nsary for the training of\nnaissance, anti-submarine\npersonnel for (a) and (b)\nwarfare and protection of\nabove.\nshipping. Experience indi-\ncates that such landplanes,\n(The nation cannot\nto be effective, must be\nafford the luxury of several\nmanned by naval personnel\ncompletely self-sufficient\ntrained in naval warfare.\nservices. The war demon-\nLack of such aircraft under\nstrated that they must be\ncomplete naval control as to\ncomplementary--mutually\ndesign, procurement, opera-\nsupporting. With respect\ntions, personnel, training\nto land planes, there are\nand administration might be\nno purely naval functions\ndisastrous to our national\nwhich justify uneconomical\nsecurity. Similarly the\nduplication of equipment\nNavy must have air transport\nand installations. For\nessential to its needs.\nexample, the Air Force al-\nready performs long-range\nreconnaissance for the\nground forces and itself.\nThe Navy's recognized re-\nquirement for the products\nof long-range reconnaissance\ncan be effectively filled\nby the Air Force. As re-\ngards anti-submarine war-\nfare, it is the view of\nthe War Department that\nthe experience of the Army\nAir Forces in the last war\nadequately justifies the\nbelief that land based\nplanes operated by the\nAir Forces can meet this\nrequirement).\n2-G\n4.\nUnited States Marine Corps\nThe Navy and the Army differ on the functions of the\nUnited States Marine Corps as follows:\nWar Department View\nNavy Department Views\nThere shall be maintained\nThere shall be maintained\nas a constituent part of the\nas a constituent part of the\nNaval Service a balanced Fleet\nNaval Service a balanced\nMarine Force including its\nFleet Marine Force including\nsupporting Air Component for\nits supporting Air Component\n(1) service with the\nfor\nFleet in the seizure of enemy\n(1) service with the\npositions not involving sus-\nFleet in the seizure or\ntained land fighting and\ndefense of advance Naval\nBases or for the conduct of\n(2) to continue the devel-\nsuch limited land operations\nopment of tactics, .techniques\nas are essential to the\nand equipment relating to\nprosecution of a Naval cam-\nthose phases of amphibious\npaign and\nwarfare which pertain to\nwaterborne aspects of landing\n(2) to continue the\noperations.\ndevelopment of those aspects\nof amphibious operations\nwhich pertain to the tactics,\ntechniques and equipment\nemployed by landing forces.\nThere is agreement upon the other primary duties of\nthe Marine Corps, viz:\n(1) To provide detachments and organizations for\nservice on armed vessels of the Navy, and\n(2) To provide security detachments for protoction\nof Naval property at Naval stations and bases.\n(OVER)\n2-H\nThese matters have been explored by us with\na sincere desire to comply with your wishes that\nthe military services reach complete mutual agree-\nment. Our failure to achieve complete unanimity\nis due to no reason other than that our respective\nviews on the points of difference are as sincere\nas they are divergent.\nFaithfully yours,\n/s/ James Forrestal\n/s/ Robert P. Patterson\nSecretary of the Navy\nSecretary of War\n3-A\nThe text of the letter from the President to Secretaries Patterson\nand Forrestal follows:\nJune 15, 1946\nGentlemen:\nI have read with care your joint report of May 31, 1946.\nIt was also helpful to me to have the full oral presentation of the\npoints involved, which you and the members of your Departments made\nto me on June 4th.\nI am pleased and gratified at the progress you have made.\nI feel that WC have come & long way in narrowing the zone of disagree-\nment which had previously existed between the services. The full under-\nstand: ng reached on eight vital aspects of unification is a\nsignificant accomplishment. These eight elements are Council of\nCommon Defense, National Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs of\nStaff, omission of singlo Military Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence\nAgency, Procurement and Supply, Research Agencies and Military\nEducation and Training.\nIn addition to these oight points of agreement, I am advised\nalso by representatives of both services that they are in accord in\ntheir attitude toward the provision in the Thomas Bill, S. 2044, which\nprovides for four assistant secretaries in charge of Research,\nIntelligence, Procurement, and Training, respectively. They believe\nthat such assistant secretaries are unnecessary. I agree with their\nposition that the presence of these four assistant secretaries is\nundesirable because they would greatly complicate the internal\nadministration of the services and that such a plan would deprive\nthe secretaries of the respective services of functions which are\nproperly theirs.\nYour report of May 31st listed four items upon which you\nwere unable to agree. An analysis of your comments contained in your\nreport, and in the lengthy discussion which we had, discloses that\nthe services are not nearly so far apart in their attitude toward\nthese points as had been reported. It is my firm conviction that the\ndetermination of these questions in the manner which I present herein\nwill result in a plan which incorporates the best features offered by\nthe respective services.\nWith reference to the points upon which full agreement was\n(OVER)\n3-B\nnot reached my position is as follows:\n1. Single military department.\nThere should be one Department of National Defense. It\nwould be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the\ncabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the\ntitle of \"Secretary.\" These secretaries would be charged with the\ninternal administration within their own services. They would not be\nmembers of the cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,\nsubject of course to the authority and overall control by the Secretary\nof National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different\nfunctions and different organizations and for these reasons the integrity\nof each service should be retained. The civilian secretaries of the\nservices would be members of the Council of Common Defense and in this\ncapacity they would have the further opportunity to represent their\nrespective services to the fullest extent.\n2. Three coordinated services.\nThere should be three coordinate services -- the Army,\nNavy and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and\nshould operate in a common purpose toward overall efficiency of the\nNational Defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary of\nNational Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should be\nknown as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and Secretary\nfor the Air Force.\n3. Aviation.\nThe Air Force shall have the responsibility for the\ndevelopment, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military\nair resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in\nwhich responsibility must be vested in the Navy:\n(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft essential\nto Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States\nMarine Corps.\n(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal\nadministration and for air transport over routes of sole\ninterest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot\nbe met by normal air transport facilities.\n(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of\npersonnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.\nLand-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, anti-\nsubmarine warfare and protection of shipping can and should\nTREMEN\nAND\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVED AND\nRECORDS\nTOTAL\n8.5.\nSERVICE\n3-C\nGUYERTMENT\nbe manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services\nare to work as a team there must be close cooperation, with\ninterchange of personnel and special training for specific\nduties.\nWithin its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation\nmust not be restricted but must be given every opportunity\nto develop its maximum usefulness.\n4. United States Marine Corps.\nThere shall be maintained as a constituent part of the\nNaval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its supporting\nair component to perform the following functions:\n(1) Service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of\nAdvanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land\noperations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval\ncampaign.\n(2) To continue the development of those aspects of\namphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique,\nand equipment employed by the landing forces.\n(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service\non armed vessels of the Navy.\n(4) To provide security detachments for protection of\nNaval property at Naval stations and bases.\nIt is important that the basic elements of the plan of\nunification be stated clearly. The cight fundamental points agreed\nupon and the four points which are herewith decided, constitute a\ntotal of twelve basic principles that should form the framework of the\nprogram for integration.\nThere is no desire or intention to affect adversely the\nintegrity of any of the services. They should perform their separate\nfunctions under the unifying direction, authority and control of the\nSecretary of National Defense. The internal administration of the\nthree services should be preserved in order that the high morale and\nesprit de corps of each service can be retained.\nIt was gratifying to have both of you and General Eisenhower\nand Admiral Nimitz assure me that you would all give your wholehearted\nsupport to a plan of unification no matter what the decision would be\non those points upon which you did not fully agree. I know that I can\ncount upon all of you for full assistance in obtaining passage in the\n(OVER)"
}