Copy of Letter from General Douglas MacArthur to Veterans of Foreign Wars, Reprinted from U. S. News and World Report

Letter of General MacArthur to Veterans of Foreign lars, printed in U.S. News and World Report, September 1, 1950. TO: CLYDE A. LEVIS, CORT'ANDER-IN-CHIEF, VETERANS OF FOREIGN JARS OF THE ASCHWES AMD UNITED STATES, RECORDS SERVICE CHICAGO, ILL. Your inspiring message of the 17th has moved me deeply and I trust that you vill convey to all of my comrades-in-arms of the Veterans of Foreign Jars assembled on the occasion of our 5lst Annual National Encampment my assurance that their confidence and support will give this Command much added strength to meet the tests of battle which lie immediately chead. Tell them that I am happy to report that their successors in arms nov engo.g- ing the enemy along our battle lines in South Korea are exemplifying that same high standard of devotion, fortitude and valor which characterized their own march to victory when they themselves engaged in combat in the field. From senior commanders dorm through all ranks, their tactical skill, their invincible determinition, and their fighting qualities against a fanatical foe, well trained, expertly directed and heavily armed, have up- held our country's finest troditions. Toward victory, however difficult the road, they are giving an account of themselves which should make every American heart beat with pride and infinite satisfaction. In view of misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relation- ship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific, I believe it in the public interest to aveil myself of this opportunity to state my views thereon to you, cll of whom having fought overseas understand broad strate- gic concepts. To begin with, any appraisal of that strategic potential requires an appreciation of the changes wrought in the course of the past wer. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Havaii, Midway and Guam to the Philippines. That salient N° S not an outpost of strength but an avenue of wreakness long which the enemy could and did attack us. The Pocific was a potentinl area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All of this wes changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. le control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands, extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas, held by us and our allies. From this island chnin we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful vithout control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. lith naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would be doomed to failure. Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of anproach for a prospective invader--it assumes instead the friendly as- pect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression. If we hold this line we may have peace--lose it and war is inevitable. The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of this defensive perimeter, 100-150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly and the Philippines--than any point in continental Asia. At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration