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{
    "localId": "165976608",
    "label": "Clipping, \"The Story of Douglas MacArthur,\" by Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Harper's Magazine",
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    "id": "165976608",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Clipping, \"The Story of Douglas MacArthur,\" by Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Harper's Magazine",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/165976608",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "logicalDate": "1951-07-01",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1951
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{
    "seq": 11,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602190/876437/876437-45-011.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "THE STORY OF DOUGLAS MACARTHUR\n31\nobserved, seemed an aptly named diplomat,\nmarched to the frontier, the Chinese threat\nhad a long record of crying wolf; several\nwould be faced down. Thus, he assured Presi-\nmonths earlier he had warned of an immi-\ndent Truman at Wake Island that the Chi-\nnent Communist assault on Formosa which\nnese would not intervene, grandly offered to\nnever took place. For another, the Peiping\nrelease a division for European service in\ngovernment had already warned the United\n1951, and held out to his men the hope of\nNations command in far more comprehensive\nbeing home by Christmas 1950.\nterms than those of the message relayed by\nAt all events, he pushed rapidly north of\nMr. Nehru. It had said, several weeks back,\nPyongyang in the face of warnings that this\nthat \"the Chinese would not sit idly by while\nmight prove an exceedingly dangerous thing\ntheir Korean brothers were being butch-\nto do. Still, he was disregarding warnings and\nered.\" No blame whatever attaches to Mac-\nnot, as so many people think, violating orders.\nArthur for his crossing of the parallel. In\nThe counsel he received was divided, to say\nproceeding northward, he was carrying out\nthe least. Dean Acheson and most members\norders, not violating them.\nof the State Department (George Kennan,\nnot then on active service, being a notable\nORTH of the parallel, a heavy mist set-\nexception) were every bit as certain that the\nN\ntles over the whole dispute. There\nChinese would not intervene as MacArthur\nseems to be no question but that Mac-\nwas-though it might be said, in their behalf,\nArthur was well and authoritatively warned\nthat they had acquired some of their certainty\nof ominous developments if he proceeded far\nfrom MacArthur's intelligence reports. In the\nbeyond Pyongyang at the narrow and defen-\nfall of 1950 the Department, while making\nsible waist of the peninsula. It happens,\nit clear that it was deeply pained by many\ncuriously, that most of those who warned him\nof MacArthur's views, stood firmly behind the\nexpressed more apprehension over the possi-\nGeneral in his operations in North Korea. It\nbility of Russian intervention as the UN\noffered, as a political justification for the drive\nforces drew close to Vladivostok than over the\nto the Yalu, the responsibility that the United\npossibility of Chinese intervention as they\nNations, and particularly the United States,\ncame within range of Mukden. As a matter\nwould face when Korea had been unified.\nof fact, MacArthur himself had shared these\nState Department people were then in the\napprehensions to a degree at least. Shortly\nhabit of pointing out that the reconstruction\nafter the Inchon landings, it was explained in\nof Korea would be a hopeless task if Com-\nTokyo that it was hoped at headquarters that\nmunists, North Korean or Chinese, remained\nthe UN armies could drive straight across the\nin sole control of the dams and power stations\npeninsula before any North Koreans could\nalong the Yalu. For those power stations pro-\nescape to the north; the reason given for the\nvided electricity for Korean as well as for\nhope was not only that it would end the war\nManchurian industry. This gave us an addi-\nsooner but that it would keep the Russians\ntional reason for not bombing them, and ex-\nfrom nourishing their neurotic fears of en-\nplained, so the Department said, why it was\ncirclement. But perhaps, in ignoring the\nnecessary for MacArthur to conquer all Korea.\nwarning, MacArthur himself had the Chinese\nIf we had cut off a strip of Korea and given it\nmore on his mind than the Russians. Sum-\nto China, a solution widely recommended, the\nming up his decades of experience in the Far\nCommunists could have turned out the lights\nEast in the summer of 1950, he had said that\nall over Korea any time the fancy took them.\n\"it is the pattern of Oriental psychology to re-\nKnowing Communists, the Department said\nspect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dy-\nthat the fancy would take them often.\nnamic leadership and to quickly turn from\nThe real case against MacArthur in North\nleadership characterized by timidity and va-\nKorea was not that he provoked aggression\ncillation.\" Operating on this doctrine, he\nbut that he failed to prepare for it. In his\ncould reasonably have concluded that the dan-\ncertainty that there would be no intervention,\ngers of war would not be reduced but in\nhe neglected to make the necessary precau-\ncreased if he hesitated. If he hung back, his\ntions against surprise attack. He was con-\napparent weakness would invite Chinese ag.\nvinced in October that it would be physically\ngression; but if he showed firmness and\nimpossible for more than fifty or sixty thou-\nC5* TRUMAN \"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES RECORDS ADMIN. AND\nPreservation Copy\nG.S."
}