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    "title": "Telegram from Holmes to Secrertary of State Dean Acheson",
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    "ocrText": "TOP OBORET\n-2-#1511, September 11, Noon from London.\nHong Kong, we cannot say. Our source informed us that\nthis did not figure in the Cabinet discussions.\n6. Ministers who opposed foregoing line of reasoning did\nso not becuase they were in disagreement with the reasoning,\nbut because they approached problem from a different vantage.\nThey argued that US would not agree to seating Communist\nChina at this time, and it was imperative that there be no\nopen split between US and UK. They urged Cabinet majority\nto defer China matter at least until after November for if\nChina were seated in UN over US objections it would embarrass\nadministration, might seriously affect outcome of November\nelections, and might produce serious division in US over\nforeign policy.\nTo Germany The Cabinet is prepared to go very far and\nmove rapidly with respect to arming German police and raising\nGerman military formations within framework of an allied\narmy. Only two Ministers held out on this, one of whom was\nDalton, who is emotionally anti-Germany. In our opinion,\nBevin can be pressed very hard on this point\n8. Bevin's frame-of-mind Bevin is convinced that US and\nUN resistance in Korea has left a deep impression on the\nKremlin, and that Stalin knows now that the period of\nexpansion without risk of a general war is over. Some others\nshare this view. Bevin therefore thinks that the moment is\nripe or soon will be for a detente. He sees himself as\nalmost at the end of his career and life, and he is dramatizing\nthe possibility that he, as his final act, can engineer a\nsettlement with Russia, that will bring peace.\n9. We do not think Bevin will make any dramatic public move\nthat could be interpreted as appeasement. Bevin is too\nshrewd for that. But we suspect that Bevin's judgment may\nbe colored by his dream as peace maker. It may, for example,\nexplain why Bevin will press hard for UN recognition of\nCommunist China.\nHOLMES\nMRM:CM\nSECRET"
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