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    "label": "Memorandum from Sidney Souers to the National Security Council",
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    "title": "Memorandum from Sidney Souers to the National Security Council",
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    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nPARAPHRASE OF A RECENT TELEGRAM FROM MR. BEVIN\nLong and careful consideration was given to all the risks involved, but\nthe greatest risk, especially having regard to the lesson of past history,\nis to do nothing and not to be positive in our development, and we feel\ntherefore that the approach that has been made to the problem of regional\ndefence is the right one.\nI have had an opportuni ty of consulting in the greatest secrecy the Prime\nMinister and a few of my closest colleagues. They agreed that the summoning\nof a conference by the United States Government to discuss defence arrange-\nments for the North Atlantic area is the right course and would be the best\nguarantee of peace that could be imagined at the present time.\nAs I have stated above, we considered the risks and whether such action\non the part of the United States Government might provoke the Soviet and\ncause them to take further rash measures which might result in war; but we\ntook the view that this would not occur, and the risk would be a very small\none. We believe that a real effort at organisation of collective securit ty\nby the western powers now is more likely to cause an eventual reorientation\nof policy on the part of the Soviet Union, whereas if we proceed with half\nmeasures which are purely economic and financial and do not carry them to\ntheir logical conclusion, the Soviet Government might think that that is all\nwe are likely to do. This would consequently weaken our position and so\nmight precipitate the conflict which we desire to avoid.\nAnother essential thing in Western Europe, and indeed among 211 free\nEuropean countries, is to give confidence. That confidence would have very\ngreat repercussions and make the economic steps that have been taken more\neffective. Therefore the construction of a North Atlantic defence system\nwould put heart into the whole of Western Europe and would encourage them\nin their resistance to the infiltration tactics which they have had to face\nhitherto.\nIf a defence arrangement were set up which resulted in a really solid\nbacking for the Brussels Treaty and which produced a sound Atlantic Security\nsystem, this would have a profound influence in dealing with the Long-standing\nGerman problem. France, of course, had hoped for the four-party treaty pro-\nposed by Mr. Byrnes and supported by Mr. Marshall. This would have given\nFrance a feeling of security in the event of a resurgence of the German men-\nace. The French are still nervous and there is concern here too. In addi--\ntion if the new defence system is so framed that it relates to any aggressor\nit would give all the European States such confidence that it might well be\nthat the age-long trouble between Germany and France might tend to disappear.\nWe feel that American support only in the form of a declaration by the\nPresident would be inadequate. It would leave the situation in doubt and\nthis would apply whether we extended it to the Scandinavian States and Italy,\nor whether we left it to the more limited area of the five-power treaty.\nAgain, any such declaration not having the backing of the Senate would make\npeople here very doubtful as to whether they had incurred any reciprocal ob-\nligation. We should certainly be under a moral obligation not to leave the\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or 17\nNC 5-27-17\nOSD letter, April 12, 1974\nTOD CECDET\nNLT- HILL NARS Dateb-30-77"
}