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just a few minutes before he was due to leave the House
to attend a party at Clark Clifford's. I told him
that both Clayton and Sullivan were greatly alarmed
over the Wallace speech and that Sullivan had sug-
gested that something ought to be done to call Wallace
off. It was then around 6:30 and Wallace was due to
speak in an hour or so. The President did not appear
alarmed. He said he had given Wallace permission to
make the speech for its political effect in New York
and while it might ruffle Byrnes, he did not think
it would do any permanent damage. Anyway, he felt
that it was too late to stop Wallace from speaking.
I did not press the point for, obviously, the damage
had been done. The damage had been done by the Pres-
ident's endorsement of the speech at his 4 o'clock
press conference. The speech had already been dis-
tributed to the press. Moreover, it was clear that
calling off the speech at that late hour, after the
President had endorsed it, would in itself create an
uproar and call attention to the contents of the speech.
I should like to emphasize that I still did
not know, except for the brief excerpts given me over
the 'phone from the State Department, what was in the
speech and did not know until I read portions of it
later in the evening on the ticker. When I did read
these excerpts it became clear to me that Clayton
and Sullivan were correct in their estimate of the
damage it would probably do.
The speech, as I learned later, was never
cleared with the State Department, which obtained its
first copy of it -- as I understand - late in the
afternoon from the press table at the Press Club. I
never saw a copy of the speech. If I had thought about
it at all, I should have assumed that no Cabinet officer
would make a speech calculated to harm the negotiations
at Paris.
At our staff meeting the next morning, Friday,
it was clear that the President realized the full im-
plications of his approval of the Wallace speech. He
berated himself for having make a grave "blunder"
The drumfire of criticism amounted to such a pitch that
had
I was in favor of an immediate statement to do what we
could to repair the damage. The consensus, however,
was that any statement at that time might only add
fuel to the flames and that we had better sit tight
and do nothing. I thought about the matter overnight
and came to the conclusion that something had to be done,
the
and done without delay.
43
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"ocrText": "just a few minutes before he was due to leave the House\nto attend a party at Clark Clifford's. I told him\nthat both Clayton and Sullivan were greatly alarmed\nover the Wallace speech and that Sullivan had sug-\ngested that something ought to be done to call Wallace\noff. It was then around 6:30 and Wallace was due to\nspeak in an hour or so. The President did not appear\nalarmed. He said he had given Wallace permission to\nmake the speech for its political effect in New York\nand while it might ruffle Byrnes, he did not think\nit would do any permanent damage. Anyway, he felt\nthat it was too late to stop Wallace from speaking.\nI did not press the point for, obviously, the damage\nhad been done. The damage had been done by the Pres-\nident's endorsement of the speech at his 4 o'clock\npress conference. The speech had already been dis-\ntributed to the press. Moreover, it was clear that\ncalling off the speech at that late hour, after the\nPresident had endorsed it, would in itself create an\nuproar and call attention to the contents of the speech.\nI should like to emphasize that I still did\nnot know, except for the brief excerpts given me over\nthe 'phone from the State Department, what was in the\nspeech and did not know until I read portions of it\nlater in the evening on the ticker. When I did read\nthese excerpts it became clear to me that Clayton\nand Sullivan were correct in their estimate of the\ndamage it would probably do.\nThe speech, as I learned later, was never\ncleared with the State Department, which obtained its\nfirst copy of it -- as I understand - late in the\nafternoon from the press table at the Press Club. I\nnever saw a copy of the speech. If I had thought about\nit at all, I should have assumed that no Cabinet officer\nwould make a speech calculated to harm the negotiations\nat Paris.\nAt our staff meeting the next morning, Friday,\nit was clear that the President realized the full im-\nplications of his approval of the Wallace speech. He\nberated himself for having make a grave \"blunder\"\nThe drumfire of criticism amounted to such a pitch that\nhad\nI was in favor of an immediate statement to do what we\ncould to repair the damage. The consensus, however,\nwas that any statement at that time might only add\nfuel to the flames and that we had better sit tight\nand do nothing. I thought about the matter overnight\nand came to the conclusion that something had to be done,\nthe\nand done without delay.\n43"
}