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- 13 -
As for the Chinese communists, said Mr. Acheson, we must draw
a line and not try to walk both sides of the street with the Chinese
communists. There is no longer any question but what they are fighting
us and it does no good to try and ignore this fact. We must stir up
trouble for the Chinese communists any way we can but we mustn't think
that the only way to go at it is by playing with Chiang.
We must make sure that General MacArthur understands his Directive,
Mr. Acheson said. MacArthur may have sprawled his forces out in Korea,
in such a way that he was very vulnerable to communist attack, because
he thought his Directive required him to occupy all of Korea. Let's
make sure that he doesn't keep his forces allrover the country just
because he thinks his Directive makes him do it.
Mr. Acheson said we must ask ourselves, what do we want in Korea?
The answer is easy, want to terminate it." We don it want
to beat China in Korea, -- we can't. We don't want to beat China
any place -- we can't. We must give most careful thought to the ques-
as
tion of American air operations in Manchuria. If it is absolutely
essential for the safety of the United States troops for us to bomb
Chinese air bases in Manchuria that is one question, but we can it
terminate anything by going into Manchuria on our own. If we got
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"ocrText": "- 13 -\nAs for the Chinese communists, said Mr. Acheson, we must draw\na line and not try to walk both sides of the street with the Chinese\ncommunists. There is no longer any question but what they are fighting\nus and it does no good to try and ignore this fact. We must stir up\ntrouble for the Chinese communists any way we can but we mustn't think\nthat the only way to go at it is by playing with Chiang.\nWe must make sure that General MacArthur understands his Directive,\nMr. Acheson said. MacArthur may have sprawled his forces out in Korea,\nin such a way that he was very vulnerable to communist attack, because\nhe thought his Directive required him to occupy all of Korea. Let's\nmake sure that he doesn't keep his forces allrover the country just\nbecause he thinks his Directive makes him do it.\nMr. Acheson said we must ask ourselves, what do we want in Korea?\nThe answer is easy, want to terminate it.\" We don it want\nto beat China in Korea, -- we can't. We don't want to beat China\nany place -- we can't. We must give most careful thought to the ques-\nas\ntion of American air operations in Manchuria. If it is absolutely\nessential for the safety of the United States troops for us to bomb\nChinese air bases in Manchuria that is one question, but we can it\nterminate anything by going into Manchuria on our own. If we got"
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