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    "title": "Summary of Special Meeting of the National Security Council",
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        "Korean War, 1950-1953"
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    "ocrText": "215\nECRET\nAt 3:05 P.M., Tuesday, November 28, 1950, the President convened\na special meeting with of the National Security Council in the Cabinet\nRoom at the White House.\nThose present at the meeting were as follows:\nThe President\nW. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President\nSidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President\nGeorge M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President\nThe Vice President\nDean Acheson, Secretary of State\nPhilip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large\nH. Freeman Matthews, Deputy UnderSecretary of State\nDean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far\nEastern Affairs\nBaul H . Nitze, Director, Poli Cbal Planning Staff\nGeneral George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense\nRobert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense\nFrank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army\nThomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force\nDan Kimball, Under Secretary of the Navy\nGeneral Omar Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nGeneral J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army\nAdmiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations\nGeneral Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force\nStuart Symington, Chairman, National Security Resources Board\nRobert Smith, Vice Chairman, National Security Resources Bd.\nJohn W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury\nJames S. Lay, Executive Secretary, National Security Council\nGeneral W. B. Smith, Director, Central Intelligence Agency\nThe President asked General Bradley, who had set up a large map of\nKorea at one end of the room, to delay the military briefing until the\nCabinet convened at 4 P.M.\nThe President then asked the Secretary of State to open the dis-\ncussion.\nGREAT ARCHIVES NATIONAL RECORDS TRUMAN AND LIBERTY\nDECLASSIFIED\nSERVICE\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\n8.5.\nREVERNING\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\nPROJECT NLT 78.40 NSC LTR. 1-8-81\nBy NLT- HC\nNARS, Date 2-25-81\n- 2 -\nMr. Acheson said that he had been on Capitol Hill all day,\nmeeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the morning,\nand the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the afternoon, and that\nhe was out of touch with the last minute developments in Korea. He\nsaid that, if the President didn't mind, he would appreciate hearing\nGeneral Bradley give a summary of the military situation.\nThe President then asked General Bradley to summarize the situa-\ntion in Korea.\nGeneral Bradley spoke at some length, outlining the disposition\nof United Nations and enemy troops, explaining General MacArthur's\noffensive operations which began about a week ago, and stating that\nthese operations had been cut short by the unexpected and unforeseen\nthousand.\noffensive of Chinese communist troops estimated at about 200 million.\nGeneral Bradley referred to a cablegram which had been received during\nthe night from General MacArthur and which had been called to the\nPresident's attention at 6:15 A.M. this morning. (The Department of\nthe Army incoming Top Secret cable\n.)\nGeneral Bradley said the new developments and General MacArthur's\ncable raised two questions. The first of these was whether the Joint\nChiefs of Staff should issue a new Directive to General MacArthur.\n- 3 -\nGeneral Bradley went on to answer the question by saying that the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff had been in nearly continuous session through-\nout the day and it was their opinion that no new Directive should be\nissued for the time being, certainly not until the military situation\nclarifies. General Bradley said he felt that the reports which were\ncoming in over the press and radio about the strength and momentum of\nthe Chinese communist offensive might well be exaggerated. He rather\ndoubted that our lines had been been breached in the manner the news-\npapers were saying and he felt that it was entirely possible that the\nChinese offensive might not go very far because of the extremely dif-\nficult terrain (which we would find advantageous from the defensive\npoint of view) and because the Chinese communists had a difficult sup-\nply situation. General Bradley concluded this portion of his remarks\nby saying that the Joint Chiefs might feel it desirable to issue a\nnew Directive in 48 or 72 hours.\nGeneral Bradley said the second question related to the great\nair potential of the Chinese communists. In his remarks on the ground\nsituation, he did not mean to minimize the seriousness of the military\nsituation. The Chinese communists have an air potential of at least\n300 bombers on nearby fields in Manchuria. These bombers could seriously\n- 4 -\ncurtail our air lift, and our planes were jammed so closely on the\nfields in Korea that surprise raids could do us very great damage.\nDespite these facts, General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff do not believe that General MacArthur should be authorized to\nbomb airfields in Manchuria.\nThe President asked if there was any way to lessen the damage\nsudden\nwhich we might suffer from a smokem air attack by the Chinese com-\nmunists.\nGeneral Vandenberg said no there was not, short of moving many\nof our planes back to Japan. This would, of course, mean a considerable\nslowing up of our own military operations.\nThe President then asked General Marshall to speak.\nGeneral Marshall said that the Armed Forces Policy Council had\nmet in the morning, and that the three Service Secretaries had met\nthereafter. General Marshall said that the results of the meetings\nwere admirably summarized in a memorandum prepared by the three Service\nSecretaries and he asked the President's permission to read the\nmemorandum. (A copy of this memorandum is attached.)\n/\nAfter reading the memorandum, General Marshall said: \"We talked\nover what our immediate reaction in the way of positive action ought\nto be. We must act on the assumption that United Nations forces can\n- 5 -\nhold a line. We feel that the second military supplemental budget\nestimate should go up at once. We will take the Budget Bureau cuts\non bases, but we cannot take any cut in armament or personnel. We\nfeel very strongly that the estimate has to go to Congress right away.\nThe General added that he knew the Department of State would go to work\nimmediately on the Korean problem in the United Nations.\nThe President interrupted to say that he had already told the\nBudget Director (Mr. Fred Lawton) to prepare the Budget estimate right\naway and that, on the basis of his discussion with General Marshall at\n12:30, he had told the Director what cuts could be made.\nabout\nGeneral Marshall resumed his discussion with the diplomatic as-\npects of Korea. He said he thought it essential for the United States\nto go along with the United Nations approach to the Korean question,\neven if going along with the United Nations meant some difficult problems\nfor us. He said he felt it essential for us to keep a unanimity of\napproach in the UN. He said he would like to repeat again the point\nwhich the three Service Secretaries had regarded as the most important\nitem in their memorandum, namely, not getting ourselves involved\nindividually, or as a United Nations matter, in a general war with\nChina.\n- 6 -\nHe said he thought \"off the cuff\" that there wasn't any danger\nof the United Nations getting us into such a fix. General Marshall\nsaid he wanted to say, in conclusion, that we should start to work\nat once on further military estimates which could be submitted to the\nnew Congress in January. He asked General Bradley if he had anything\nfurther to add.\nGeneral Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not\nrecommend that any additional Reserve components be ordered up now.\nHe said that there were no additional troops that could be sent to\nGeneral MacArthur and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not plan to\ntry and send any others. He added that this decision might be changed,\nbut he doubted it. The Joint Chiefs would like to see a bigger repre-\nsentation of troops of other United Nations forces fighting in Korea\nprovided that they really could fight and that they would not prove to\nbe too great a burden on us for supplies. General Bradley said that\nthe Joint Chiefs felt just as strongly as the three Secretaries that\nwe Should not let ourselves be pulled into any war in China.\nGeneral Marshall said that he would like to add a few remarks\nto General Bradley's earlier description of the current military\nsituation. H e pointed out that our forces in northeastern Korea\n- 7 -\nwere very scattered. There is a big gap in our lines and \"I don't know\nwhat MacArthur intends to do about that,\" Marshall said. \"It is his\nproblem. I won't even ask MacArthur what he is going to do. We have\nno business, here in Washington, 8,000 miles away, asking the local\nCommander what his tactical plans are. General Collins here, and\nGeneral Smith, know that all during the Battle of the Bulge the War\nAusthall\nDepartment did not ask them one single question. We let them do the\nfighting. It's the same way now. We must follow hour by hour any\nha\nI * want\ndevelopments pertaining to our getting further involved with the Chinese\ncommunists but we won't ask MacArthur his tactical plans.\nSecretary\nPace said that it was imperative that everyone in the room understand\nthat we have only the 82nd Airborne Division available in this country\ndivisions\nand that we would not have any National Guard units in combat form until\nMarch fifteenth.\nGeneral Marshall concurred with Mr. Pace but said that he felt\nif it really were urgent, the National Guard divisions could be ready\nby March first. That meant that the selectees would have had four\nmonths training.\nThe Vice President interrupted the discussion at this point and\nasked the President if he might ask a question, did General MacArthur\nmake the statement attributed to him a week ago that the boys in Korea\n- 8 -\nwould be home by Christmas? Did he know what was going on? If he\ndid know, why did he say it? How in the world could a man in his\nposition be guilty of such an indiscretion?\nThe President replied, \"He made the statement; you will have to\ndraw your own conclusions as to why he did it.\"\nThe Vice President wondered how any man could have said that.\n\"I can't comprehend why the statement was made,\" he said.\nSecretary Pace said he understands that MacArthur \"officially\"\ndenies the statement.\nDeputy Secretary Lovett said he understands MacArthur says his\nstatement was \"misinterpreted.\" However, Mr. Lovett continued, we have\na transcript of his press conference showing that he said it.\nGeneral Bradley said he had a personal theory about the state-\nment which might or might not be accurate. He feels that General Mac-\nArthur may have made it for the consumption of the Chinese communists,\nto show them that we mean to get out of Korea as quickly as possible\nand that we have no designs on Manchuria or on continuing the war.\nEven if that is a correct interpretation, it was still a rash statement.\nThe Vice President remarked that General MacArthur ought to\nrealize that any statement of his would have American consumption\nas well as Chinese consumption.\n- 9 -\nThe President said that, no matter what we might think about\nMacArthur's statement, we would have to be very careful \"not to pull\nthe rug out from under him.\" The President said we could not afford\nto damage MacArthur's prestige at this point.\nThe Vice President persisted, with the opinion that \"This is an\nincredible hoax.\" It gives rise to all sorts of speculation. \"I am\ngoing to be asked,\" he said, \"all kinds of questions about this on the\nHill.\" He remarked that everybody present knew of his personal rela-\ntions with General MacArthur and could understand why he was so con-\ncerned about this.\nGeneral Bradley said, \"I think MacArthur had full confidence in\nhis ability to get up there (to the Yalu River). His troop disposition\nshows he had no inkling of all those Chinese communists facing the\ncenter of his line.\"\n\"Why, \"asked the Vice President, \"didn't he reconnoiter? Why\ndidn't he know the communists were there?\"\nGeneral Marshall, in commenting on the MacArthur statement said,\n\"We regard it as an embarrassment that we have to ride around in some\nmanner. In support of what Bradley says, MacArthur thought he had\nonly 100,000 Chinese communists to contend with.\"\nThe Vice President remarked that the picture drawn by the three\nn\nService Secretaries\n- 10 -\nindicated a tragic manpower shortage on our part. He was not at all\nsure that we would be able to hold out in Korea if we can't put many\nmore men over there. How, he asked, could we have any confidence in\nMacArthur's estimate that there are 200,000 Chinese communists facing\nus now? A week ago he thought there were only 100,000. Maybe there\naren't 200,000; maybe there are 300,000 facing us. We can't hold on\nif the Chinese communists go in for an all out offensive. \"What do\nwe do?\" the Vice President concluded.\nGeneral Marshall said \"I can't give an immediate answer. I will\nsay that we can't get completely sewed up in Korea. We can't tie up\neverything we have there.\"\nThe Vice President wondered again what would happen if the Chinese\ncommunists came down in real force.\nGeneral Marshall asked General Bradley to read from the Joint\nChiefs of Staff'sDirective of September 27 to General MacArthur which\ncovered this point.\nGeneral Bradley did SO.\nGeneral Collins said he wanted to point out that his earlier re-\nmarks were not intended to mean that we could not send any men to Korea\nbefore March first; he only meant to say that we could not possibly\nsend any units out until March first. We could send replacements out\n- 11 -\nbeginning January first but that would only be to meet losses.\nGeneral Marshall said that even these replacements would not help\nmuch because General MacArthur was already about 30 percent short of\ndivisions\nU.S. troops to give full strength to the United States in Korea. Many\nof the United States divisions had large numbers of Korean soldiers in\nthem.\nGeneral Collins said he thought that MacArthur was short about\n30,000 men. Some discussion ensued as to the actual number of troops\nnow under MacArthur's command. No one seemed to have the exact figures.\nGeneral Collins said, despite the shortages, and unless the\nTenth Corps really got cut off, General MacArthur could hold a line.\nThe President expressed confidence that General MacArthur could\nhold a line in Korea.\nThe conference then broke up into small discussion groups for a\nfew moments. The President talked privately with Secretary Snyder.\nThe President then asked the Secretary of State for his views.\nMr. Acheson said that the events of the last few hours had moved\nus very much closer to a general war. There has always been some\nChinese involvement in the fighting in Korea. First, the Chinese let\nthe Koreans in Manchuria go back home to fight in Korea. Then they\n- 12 -\nlet a few \"volunteers\" go into Korea. Now there is a mass movement\nof Chinese forces into Korea. What has happened is that the cloak\nof Chinese neutrality has been lifted gradually, and we have an open,\npowerful, offensive\nattack.\nMr. Acheson asked everyone to remember that the Soviet Union\nhad always been behind every move. This meant that we must all think\nabout what happens in Korea as a world matter. We must think about it\nall around the world at the same time because we face the Soviet Union\naround the world. Whatever we think of current happenings in Korea\nmust be in the light of world events, and the three Secretaries and\nGeneral Marshall were very wise in emphasizing the fact that we must\nnot, under any circumstances, become involved in a general war with\nChina.\nambassador austin\nAs for the United Nations, we must go forward as said this\nmorning, by branding the Chinese as aggressors. \"I agree entirely,\"\nsaid Mr. Acheson, \"that the Soviet Union is behind this but we\nshouldn't say so -- we shouldn't say so because we can't do anything\nabout it now and to say that this is the Soviet Union and not to do\nw\nanything about it would weaken us in world opinion.\" We couldn't make\nthat position stick with some of the other countries in the United\nNations, her. acheson continued.\n- 13 -\nAs for the Chinese communists, said Mr. Acheson, we must draw\na line and not try to walk both sides of the street with the Chinese\ncommunists. There is no longer any question but what they are fighting\nus and it does no good to try and ignore this fact. We must stir up\ntrouble for the Chinese communists any way we can but we mustn't think\nthat the only way to go at it is by playing with Chiang.\nWe must make sure that General MacArthur understands his Directive,\nMr. Acheson said. MacArthur may have sprawled his forces out in Korea,\nin such a way that he was very vulnerable to communist attack, because\nhe thought his Directive required him to occupy all of Korea. Let's\nmake sure that he doesn't keep his forces all over the country just\nbecause he thinks his Directive makes him do it.\nMr. Acheson said we must ask ourselves, what do we want in Korea?\nThe answer is easy, \"We want to terminate it.\" We don't want\nto beat China in Korea, -- we can't. We don't want to beat China\nany place -- we can't. We must give most careful thought to the ques-\ntion of American air operations in Manchuria. If it is absolutely\nessential for the safety of the United States troops for us to bomb\nChinese air bases in Manchuria that is one question, but we can't\nterminate anything by going into Manchuria on our own. If we got\n- 74 -\ninto Manchuria and had any temporary degree of success in beating\nback the Chinese communists, \"Russia would cheerfully get in it.\"\nThe more we put in, the more they would put in and they would enjoy\ndoing it very much. We would just get into the bottomless pit if\nChinese, Russian and American involvement. It would get us no place.\nIt would bleed us dry.\nI don't know how to terminate it\", continued Mr. Acheson, but\nfind\nwe must first Rivght one spot where we can hold. We must stay there.\nWe must tell everybody we have done what the United Nations told us\nto do. Then, if there is any new attack, the whole United Nations and\nall our Allies must be told that this is a new Chinese aggression.\nWe will then try to bring all possible pressure on the Chinese to\nsolution.\nfind some kind of a political This probably would mean\ncontemplating some kind of a zone of neutrality.\nOur great objective, Mr. Acheson said, must be to hold an area,\nto terminate the fighting, to turn over some area to the Republic of\nKorea, and to get out so that we can get ahead with building up our\nown strength, and building up the strength of Europe. We must remove\nFrench obstacles to the rearmament of Europe and we must go ahead as\nfastas we can.\n- 15 -\nTime is shorter than we thought, Mr. Acheson said. We used\nto think we could take our time up to 1952, but if we were right in\nthat, the Russians wouldn't be taking such t errible risks as they are\nnow. What they are doing now means that we do not have as much time\nas we thought.\nWhen the Secretary of State had finished, the President asked\nthe Secretary of the Treasury if he had any comments.\nMr. Snyder assured the President that the Government was in\ngood fiscal shape to meet any sudden emergencies of financing.\nThe President asked Mr. Harriman to speak.\nMr. Harriman said he thought that the mood of the free world\nat this moment was terribly important. He wished to recommend to\nthe President that he take immediate leadership in this situation and\nthat he see that the United States keeps its position of leadership\nin the United Nations. Bold acts of leadership on our part are all\nthe\nthat can save us and we must not lose initiative. He agreed with\nthe others who had spoken that Europe is the most important area to\nconcern ourselves with. He hoped that we could get a Supreme Com-\nmander \"very fast.\" We should forego some of the details we have\nbeen insisting on and we should get a man over there in a hurry. The\n- 16 -\nattitude of the free world, and Soviet psychology at this moment,\nare both important to us and he knew the President recognized this.\nThe article which the President had called to his attention in the\nmorning New York Times was very relevant.\n(The article Mr. Harriman referred to appeared on page 11 of\nthe New York Times, Tuesday, November 28, 1950, and was a dispatch\nfrom Moscow entitled \"Pravda Says U. S. Faces Deep Crisis.\")\nThe President said, in following up Mr. Harriman's remark about\npublic attitudes, that a few months back, in Key West, Florida, he\nhad said at a press conference that the campaign of vilification and\nlies and distortion of the facts was the greatest asset that the Soviets\nhad. He said he felt that Hearst and McCormick, and Roy Howard, had\nsucceeded in doing exactly what the Kremlin wanted. They had divided\nour people and had shaken the confidence of the American people in\ntheir Government. This had to be overcome, .H \"We face a fact and a\ncondition,\" the President said, \"We must meet it. I want to make a\nat first\nproper approach to this question. I thought/of going up to Congress\nand addressing a special session on Thursday (November 30). Now, I\ndon't think SO. I don't want this country to make an individual approach\nto any of these matters of world importance, but I do say that we must\n- 17 -\nmeet this campaign of vilification and lies head on.\nThe Vice President confirmed the President's remarks about the\nseriousness of the recent publicity campaign from some quarters. \"It\nwas the most diabolical thing I ever ran into.\" As the others in the\nroom knew, the Vice President said, he had been traveling all over the\ncouldn't\ncountry. He found there was a real underground movement that he\nput his finger on. \"People you were trying to reach weren't there.\"\nThe minds of the American people were being poisoned by lies and\nrumors and untrue statements that caused them to worry and doubt their\nleadership. \"I don't know the remedy but it must be found.\"\nThe President said we were facing a situation at home like that\nin this country in 1840 (referring to the Know-Nothing movement).\n\"It is not political - -- it is a question of national survival.\"\nThe Secretary of the Treasury referred to an article in the noon\nedition of the Washington Daily News, which was an example of a\nScripps-Howard effort to create dissatisfaction with the Government.\nMr. Harriman addressed the President and said he was not sure\nthat we could get back to unity without Presidential leadership,\nS\nand the taking of firm position by the President on these all-important\n1\nquestions.\n- 18 -\nThe President asked Mr. Symington if he wished to speak.\nMr. Symington said that he recalled a statement made in a recent\nNational Security Council meeting to the effect that the United States\nwas the last real force in the world that could oppose communism.\nHe thought this was true, and he thought that for that reason the most\nimportant thing for us to do was to get out of Korea as fast as possible.\nHe said he had a second point, which was that labor and industry did not\nknow how critical a spot we were in and that we ought to tell them and\nget them to work with the Government in building up our national strength\nas rapidly as possible.\nThe President asked General Smith if he cared to comment on the\nsituation. General Smith said that he feld that the Chinese communists\ncould keep us on the defensive in Korea but that they could not drive\nus out.\nSecretary Finletter wanted to point out that we have had a surprise\non the ground and that we may well get a surprise in the air. We are\nvulnerable in the air and he would not make any attempt to hide that\nfact.\nGeneral Marshall concurred with Mr. Finletter and he asked\nGeneral Smith to read some recent Intelligence reports on the air\nbuild-up in Korea. General Smith did SO.\n- 19 -\nThe Vice President said he would like to follow up Mr. Symington's\nremark about getting out of Korea by asking what progress was being\nmade toward devising a face-saving way for us to get out.\nMr. Acheson said \"No deal is in the works.\" We do not have any\nplan at the moment for getting out that offers us much hope.\nThe President said that we might have to hold that line a long,\nlong time and that we can't lose face by drawing out in a hurry. He\nsaid he was sure that Mr. Symington understood that.\nThe President turned to Under Secretary Kimball and Admiral\nSherman and asked if either of them wished to speak for the Navy.\nIt\nAdmiral Sherman said he fully appreciated the remarks that had been\nmade earlier about the undesirability of our becoming involved in a\nair\nwar in Manchuria but he wanted to point out that any mass attack\nn\nfrom Manchurian bases would mean that we would have to strike back\ninto Manchuria. He felt that we must face that fact. We can't, he\nsaid, just sit on the neck of Korea and take heavy air attacks from\nManchuria. After all, it is only a short flying time and we can't\nin The air\nstop attacks on us, if they come, just by doing the fighting over\nKorean soil. As for the Naval side of things, the Russians have\n79 submarines in Far Eastern waters. So far as we know they are still\n- 20-\nRussian but it would be an easy matter to turn them into Chinese subs.\nAfter all, we turned 50 American Destroyers to British Destroyers in a\nhurry! The President asked Ambassador Jessup if he had any observations.\nqt\nMr. Jessup said he would like to point out that there was a strong\npossibility that the Indians might propose some kind of a peace movement\nin the United Nations. They might well come up with a \"Cease Fire\"\nresolution. This might not be bad provided their resolution did not also\npropose a \"Stand Still.\" If it were just a \"Cease Fire\" it would give\nMacArthur a chance to get some of his troops out of untenable positions\nsuch as the northeast corner of Korea. If there were a \"Stand Still\"\nthat would cause some problems. He wondered what. the military attitude\non this was H The President told him to take it up with the military\nTmr. tessult\ndirectly.\nThe President asked Deputy Secretary Lovett to speak.\nMr. Lovett referred to NSC68, and wondered if it provided an\nadequate base for the 1952 budget. He suspected that the guide posts\nin NSC68 might not be adequate to meet the present situation. He\nfeared that they might not provide for a fast enough build-up. We\nmay need to expand a lot faster. We may have to \"peak\" our production,\n- 21 -\nand then cut back military production and procurement after we\nhave achieved a satisfactory strength position. \"Peaking\" would\nbe undesirable in many ways because it would cause much more strain\non the civilian economy and on our manpower position, but it might\nnow be necessary. Everybody would have to give serious thought to\nthis.\nThe President agreed that that would have to be taken under\nconsideration immediately.\nThe Vice President said that he thought we ought to speed up\neverything -- both men and material. \"Go ahead and ask for what you\nwant\" he told the President.\nThe President promised theVice President that the military\nestimates would come up soon and that they would be big enough to\nshock the Vice President.\nThe Vice President said he was used to being shocked. He\nthought he could assure the President that he would get whatever he\nasked for from this session of the Congress.\nThe President remarked that it was now 4:10 P.M. and that he\nhad to meet with the Cabinet.\nMr. Lay asked if the President wished to record any decisions\nfrom this meeting. of the National Security Council.\n- 22-\nThe President replied that it had been a very satisfactory\nmeeting but that there were no decisions. It was just a meeting\nat which everybody could exchange information and ideas.\nBATTY NATIONAL TRUMAN LIBRARY\nU.S."
}