Ask the Scholar

Page 3 of 23
I can add historical knowledge about this page.

Page image

Page 3

OCR

- 3 - General Bradley went on to answer the question by saying that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been in nearly continuous session through- out the day and it was their opinion that no new Directive should be issued for the time being, certainly not until the military situation clarifies. General Bradley said he felt that the reports which were coming in over the press and radio about the strength and momentum of the Chinese communist offensive might well be exaggerated. He rather doubted that our lines had been been breached in the manner the news- papers were saying and he felt that it was entirely possible that the Chinese offensive might not go very far because of the extremely dif- ficult terrain (which we would find advantageous from the defensive point of view) and because the Chinese communists had a difficult sup- ply situation. General Bradley concluded this portion of his remarks by saying that the Joint Chiefs might feel it desirable to issue a new Directive in 48 or 72 hours. General Bradley said the second question related to the great air potential of the Chinese communists. In his remarks on the ground situation, he did not mean to minimize the seriousness of the military situation. The Chinese communists have an air potential of at least 300 bombers on nearby fields in Manchuria. These bombers could seriously THEMAS ARCHIVES AND RECORDE 6 SERVICE

Page data

Page
3
Source index
0
Type
photo
Media ID
264a7156508bd4d5
Size
unknown

Document data

ID
205714313
Core
doc
Type
document
DTO data
{
    "id": "205714313",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205714313",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Summary of Special Meeting of the National Security Council",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205714313",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Korean War, 1950-1953"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750215/750215-03-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750215/750215-03-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750215/750215-03-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 23,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

Context sent to Scholar

Document identity
{
    "localId": "205714313",
    "label": "Summary of Special Meeting of the National Security Council",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205714313"
}
Document source metadata
{
    "id": "205714313",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205714313",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Summary of Special Meeting of the National Security Council",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205714313",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Korean War, 1950-1953"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750215/750215-03-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750215/750215-03-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750215/750215-03-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 23,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205714313",
    "naId": 205714313,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1950-11-28",
            "month": 11,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
    "seq": 3,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750215/750215-03-03.jpg",
    "mediaId": "264a7156508bd4d5",
    "ocrText": "- 3 -\nGeneral Bradley went on to answer the question by saying that the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff had been in nearly continuous session through-\nout the day and it was their opinion that no new Directive should be\nissued for the time being, certainly not until the military situation\nclarifies. General Bradley said he felt that the reports which were\ncoming in over the press and radio about the strength and momentum of\nthe Chinese communist offensive might well be exaggerated. He rather\ndoubted that our lines had been been breached in the manner the news-\npapers were saying and he felt that it was entirely possible that the\nChinese offensive might not go very far because of the extremely dif-\nficult terrain (which we would find advantageous from the defensive\npoint of view) and because the Chinese communists had a difficult sup-\nply situation. General Bradley concluded this portion of his remarks\nby saying that the Joint Chiefs might feel it desirable to issue a\nnew Directive in 48 or 72 hours.\nGeneral Bradley said the second question related to the great\nair potential of the Chinese communists. In his remarks on the ground\nsituation, he did not mean to minimize the seriousness of the military\nsituation. The Chinese communists have an air potential of at least\n300 bombers on nearby fields in Manchuria. These bombers could seriously\nTHEMAS\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDE\n6\nSERVICE"
}