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gop SECRET
- 20 -
It was Ambassador Smith's impression that the Soviet
Government was playing for time and that it wanted to
prolong the discussions, and to shift the onus of a
1
possible break to the Western Powers.
The Soviet reply to the aide-mémoire of the Three
Powers was handed to their representatives on September 18.
The reply denied that the Soviet Commandant had misinterpreted
the intent of the directive given to him. It maintained that
the Soviets were justified in insisting on their interpreta-
tion of the November 30, 1945 agreement on air traffic, and
that the Soviet offer during the Berlin discussion would
have lifted the blockade in compliance with the directive.
Respecting the Finance Commission, the Soviets insisted that
its functions should be limited to those listed in points
"A" to "D" of the directive, and denied that the Commission
should have control functions over the "whole activity of
the German Bank in Berlin". They also maintained that there
had not been adequate agreement on the matter of trade, and
suggested that further instructions be sent to the Military
2
Governors.
In the discussion which followed the presentation of the
aide-mémoire, both sides restated and clarified their positions,
the point of view of the three Western Powers being stated by
Ambassador Smith. In essence he said that the Three Powers were
willing to accept Soviet currency in Berlin, but would consent
to no arrangement which would derogate from their rights in
Berlin. The functions of the Finance Commission should be
1. Doc. 65.
2. Doc. 67.
Yor SECRET
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"ocrText": "gop SECRET\n- 20 -\nIt was Ambassador Smith's impression that the Soviet\nGovernment was playing for time and that it wanted to\nprolong the discussions, and to shift the onus of a\n1\npossible break to the Western Powers.\nThe Soviet reply to the aide-mémoire of the Three\nPowers was handed to their representatives on September 18.\nThe reply denied that the Soviet Commandant had misinterpreted\nthe intent of the directive given to him. It maintained that\nthe Soviets were justified in insisting on their interpreta-\ntion of the November 30, 1945 agreement on air traffic, and\nthat the Soviet offer during the Berlin discussion would\nhave lifted the blockade in compliance with the directive.\nRespecting the Finance Commission, the Soviets insisted that\nits functions should be limited to those listed in points\n\"A\" to \"D\" of the directive, and denied that the Commission\nshould have control functions over the \"whole activity of\nthe German Bank in Berlin\". They also maintained that there\nhad not been adequate agreement on the matter of trade, and\nsuggested that further instructions be sent to the Military\n2\nGovernors.\nIn the discussion which followed the presentation of the\naide-mémoire, both sides restated and clarified their positions,\nthe point of view of the three Western Powers being stated by\nAmbassador Smith. In essence he said that the Three Powers were\nwilling to accept Soviet currency in Berlin, but would consent\nto no arrangement which would derogate from their rights in\nBerlin. The functions of the Finance Commission should be\n1. Doc. 65.\n2. Doc. 67.\nYor SECRET"
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